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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Blame and Credit in Organizations:
Theory and Evidence Explaining the Responses of Leaders after Failure and Success
by
Jasmine Morlee Huang
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Kurt T. Dirks, Chair
The blame and credit literature has operated largely on the assumption that actors want to reduce
the blame assigned to them and increase assigned credit (Gioia & Sims, 1985; Greenwald, 1980;
Shaver, 1985). As a result, much of the literature has focused on the shifting of blame away from
the self and of credit towards the self (e.g., Crant & Bateman, 1993), rather than other behaviors
that are less self-serving (e.g., blame-taking, Gunia, 2011). This dissertation explores a variety of
blame and credit behaviors and explains why leaders may enact different types of blame and
credit behaviors. In Chapter 2, I conducted a Pilot Study of semi-structured interviews with
coaches to examine their thought processes leading up to communications of blame and credit.
Study 1 painted a more comprehensive picture of the expressions and patterns of blame and
credit which arise during post-game press conferences of NFL coaches. In Chapter 3, I drew
from and integrated four separate literatures to develop a theoretical model proposing that there
are four motives that drive leader blame and credit behaviors, and that contextual factors may
influence the relationship between motive and behavior. In Chapter 4, I conducted three studies
to test key elements of the theoretical model, combining an online field survey and experimental
designs in the laboratory. These studies revealed that leaders with disparate motives may enact
xiii

different blame behaviors in light of unsuccessful outcomes in particular. Overall, this
dissertation (1) evolves our understanding of the communication and variety of blame and credit
in organizations, (2) establishes a theoretical model delineating the motives driving leader blame
and credit behaviors, and (3) provides empirical evidence that supports the validity of the
theoretical model. This is the first paper of its kind to provide theory and scientific evidence
regarding the motives behind blame and credit behaviors of leaders. In doing so, this dissertation
brings to the forefront the importance of leaders’ blame and credit behaviors in organizations,
and both generates and advances the conversation about these behaviors in the workplace.
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Chapter 1: Motivation and Central Concepts
Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold
and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon
the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion
to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.
--Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech written in case D-Day invasion failed
June 5, 1944
In February 2014, General Motors (GM) issued a recall of 780,000 Cobalt and Pontiac
G5 cars sold between 2005 and 2007. Six days later, with pressure mounting from the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, GM expanded the recall to 1.37 million cars. Later, it
came to light that GM had been aware of a defect in the cars’ ignition switch system but had
failed to warn the public of the defect or issue a recall. In fact, GM engineers had first noticed
the problem as early as 2001 and again in 2004, yet no changes or recommended solutions were
implemented due to budgetary concerns. The result was hundreds of accidents between 2005 and
2010 related to the ignition switch problem, many fatal (Blau, 2016). In total, GM ultimately
issued 84 recalls that affected more than 30 million vehicles in the aftermath of the, by that time,
widely publicized faulty ignition switch scandal (Blau, 2016; DeBord, 2014).
Ripple effects of the crisis included a $3 billion cut in GM shareholders’ value over a
four-week period between March and April of 2014 (Lachappelle & Bost, 2014) and an eventual
$900 million fine paid to federal prosecutors (Ivory & Vlasic, 2015). In light of revelations of the
deadly ignition switch problem, the company’s CEO, Mary Barra, fired twelve employees,
though no executives were implicated and no GM employees were charged with any wrongdoing
1

(Blau, 2016). Barra stepped forward and publicly took full responsibility for the problems facing
the major automaker (Colvin, 2014). Moreover, despite that the defects occurred before Barra
became CEO in January of 2014, she “[took the] hit, over and over again” and refused to blame
the typical easy targets (i.e., middle management) (DeBord, 2014).
The example of CEO Barra contrasts with the CEOs of major financial firms following
the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. Three years prior to GM’s mass recall, in January 2011, the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) found the Financial Crisis to be avoidable but
caused by a multitude of factors, including “widespread failures in financial regulation and
supervision,” “dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many
systemically important financial institutions,” poor preparation by the U.S. government for the
crisis, and “a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency”
by financial institutions (Financial Inquiry Commission, 2011: xviii-xxii). The Commission held
public congressional hearings in Washington, D.C., during which executives of four major
financial firms, including the Morgan Stanley chairman and CEOs of JPMorgan Chase, Goldman
Sachs, and Bank of America, were witnesses. The financial executives testified to their
companies’ involvement in the financial meltdown, such as Goldman Sachs’ selling of securities
containing subprime mortgages and subsequently shorting those investments to hedge their risk
(Puzzanghera, 2010), and Morgan Stanley traders betting billions of dollars in the subprime
mortgage market, which eventually nearly forced the company into bankruptcy.
Despite evidence connecting actions taken by Wall Street firms and their employees to
the massive financial meltdown, however, the executives avoided taking blame for the crisis.
They “admitted making mistakes” and explained that they were “among the many players, from
major financial firms to average consumers, who took on too much risk during the boom of the
2

last decade” and said that the “system” and “poor government regulation played a role in the
crisis” (Puzzanghera, 2010).
The contrast between the Wall Street executives and CEO Mary Barra prompts the
question of what motivates leaders to different types of acknowledgements of accountability
following a negative event like a scandal or crisis. In both of these situations, multiple
individuals and groups of people at varying levels of each organization made decisions that
contributed to the occurrence and magnitude of the outcome. Moreover, the complexity of these
events adds to the range of response options that executives in each organization might consider
in their public (and private) reactions. Similarly, an equally complex or ambiguous series of
decisions can trigger positive events, such as successes, after which a leader could communicate
accountability in the form of the placement of credit towards or away from him or herself.
1.1 Motivation
Blame is a social explanation for failure, and people naturally assign it following a failure
(Shaver, 1985; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). In a normative sense, individuals are blamed
because they engage in behaviors that have led to negative consequences, incurring additional
blame if they knew the negative event would occur, acted voluntarily in doing so, and/or
provided no justification (Shaver, 1985; Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003). In a descriptive sense,
blame is often assigned outside of these criteria, in particular when the negative event evokes
negative emotions (Alicke, 2000). Thus, the ascription of blame hinges on one’s subjective
interpretation of the series of events leading to the negative event or failure. Additionally,
because of the ambiguous nature of organizational events (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005),
an individual’s interpretation of the event may differ from another’s. Although credit is not the
exact opposite of blame, credit can be characterized in a parallel fashion as a social explanation
3

for success. Importantly, credit is often assigned more liberally than blame (Pizarro, Uhlmann, &
Salovey, 2003).
Blame has been examined from numerous scholarly perspectives, including psychology
(Alicke, 2000), sociology (Tilly, 2008), anthropology (Douglas, 1992), philosophy (Shaver,
1985), legal studies (Pennington & Hastie, 1986), and psychiatry (Brickman et al., 1982). Much
of this work, however, has focused exclusively on blame-assignment, as opposed to other forms
of blame behaviors, such as the blame-taking case of GM CEO Mary Barra.
Furthermore, literature on organizational attributions suggests that there are particular
individuals in organizations who are blamed more frequently – an organization’s leaders, or
senior managers. There are at least two reasons for this outcome. First, individuals inside
organizations may subscribe to the “romance of leadership,” the belief that leaders determine the
fate of their organizations (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). Here, people believe that
failures and negative outcomes imply that the leader or senior manager did something wrong in
the case of a negative outcome or right in the case of a positive outcome. Thus, the theory
indicates a belief in the link between the events and the senior leaders’ actions (Lee & Tiedens,
2001; 3.Meindl et al., 1985; Salancik & Meindl, 1984). One example of this theory is when a
football coach loses his job when his team underperforms. Second, leaders are often blamed by
“proxy” as the representative of the organization or team that has fallen short (e.g., Gibson &
Schroeder, 2003; Zemba, Young, & Morris, 2006). The idea that leaders may be blamed “by
proxy” is illustrated in instances in which leaders, such as CEOs, whose actions are most likely
removed from the negative outcome, are blamed or expected to take blame for a crisis.
Theories on self-enhancement and the promotion of self-image may explain why much of
the academic research has directed more attention to blame giving as opposed to other blame
4

behaviors (e.g., blame-taking). These theories operate on the assumption that actors want to
reduce the blame assigned to them and increase assigned credit. The motivation to avoid threats
to self-esteem drives individuals to take credit for successful outcomes more than they take
blame for unsuccessful outcomes, as well as take credit for diffuse achievements and blame
others for diffuse failures (Shaver, 1985; Gioia and Sims, 1985). For example, Crant and
Bateman (1993) found that accounting firm employees who employed the use of tactics such as
self-handicapping and causal accounts were able to diminish the amount of blame assigned for a
failure. This finding highlights that individuals may strategically present information in order to
sway others’ assignments of blame or credit in order to shift blame away (i.e., to protect the self)
and to shift credit towards themselves (i.e., to enhance the self) (Crant & Bateman, 1993).
Although it seems unlikely, that the current academic literature places more weight on the
act of blame giving, rather than blame-taking, may imply that individuals generally do not take
blame in organizations. Indeed, in recent years, popular news media outlets have addressed the
idea that managers and leaders may in fact reap benefits from taking blame, not only individually
but across their groups and organizations as well (Bregman, 2013; Sharer, 2014; Suddath, 2012).
Furthermore, at least one organization explicitly promotes a culture of blame-taking: U.S. Navy
SEALs are taught that “someone has to be able to take the blame when things go wrong”
(Cannon and Cannon, 2003: 87); they are instructed not to “shirk or run away” but to “take the
hit” (92). Thus, given the acknowledgment of the potential benefits of blame-taking in the
popular press and anecdotal documentation of blame-taking occurrences in some organizations
(e.g., U.S. Navy SEALs, CEO Mary Barra at GM), there exists evidence that managers and
leaders do, at times, engage in blame-taking, though perhaps not as often as blame-assignment.

5

Moreover, although existing research has not comprehensively examined the wide variety
of blame and credit behaviors, the notion of taking blame has not been completely overlooked.
Specifically, in his dissertation work, Gunia (2011) investigated the incidence and effectiveness
of blame-taking within organizations. Through eight studies using surveys, scenario
manipulations, and laboratory methods, Gunia established that blame-taking occurs less
commonly than evasion in light of a failure. His work further illustrated that people believe that
they would engage in blame-taking over evasion, and that they prefer acts of blame-taking to
remorse and acts of remorse to evasion. Indeed, his dissertation suggests that blame-taking is
linked to positive perceptions of the transgressor’s character, whereas evasion is not.
Nevertheless, beyond this work on the incidence and effectiveness of blame-taking, there
remains a wide gap in our understanding of the other ways in which blame (and credit) may be
communicated, and importantly, why.
Given that the current literature focuses disproportionately on blame giving rather than
other forms of blame behaviors, the question of how these other types of blame behaviors
compare deserves attention. Similarly, the question of what other types of credit-related
behaviors exist and how they compare also needs attention. We know little with respect to what
other types of acknowledgements of blame and credit may look like in organizations; that the
organizational literature has not delved into the topic of blame-taking specifically exposes a void
in existing theory. Consequently, the literature does not consider that there may be situations in
which blame-taking may be natural, appropriate, or even beneficial. We also know little about
when and why individuals take blame, as well as the factors and conditions that contribute to
such events. Further, what drives leaders to engage in disparate types of blame and credit
behaviors is a key unanswered question. Although a universal self-serving bias might be one
6

explanation behind the tendency for an individual to assign blame and take credit, we lack a full
understanding of when and why someone might choose to take or share blame or assign or take
credit. In sum, the blame and credit literature does not currently address the motives and
consequences of these behaviors and does not adequately examine the various types of blame
and credit behaviors enacted by leaders. This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of
why leaders choose to engage in different types of blame and credit behaviors. In addition to
identifying the drivers of these various behaviors, this dissertation identifies contextual factors
that influence the effects of these motives on blame and credit behaviors.
1.2 Central Concepts and Assumptions
1.2.1 Diffuse events. The scope of this paper includes diffuse but not concentrated
events. Specifically, it includes negative and positive events that are diffuse in nature because
they cannot readily be attributed to a single source or cause. A diffuse failure is seen as a
negative event for which several parties are likely to be responsible (Shaver, 1985). Conversely,
diffuse successes are seen as positive events for which several parties are responsible. In
contrast, concentrated events are those in which the event can be directly attributed to a single
source or party. The scope of this paper does not include concentrated events. Whereas
concentrated failures prescribe apologies as an appropriate response, Gunia (2011) suggests that
diffuse events require a different response, such as blame-taking, or the taking of personal
responsibility for a diffuse negative event (i.e., failure). The cases of the Financial Crisis of
2007-2008 and the GM ignition switch scandal can be classified as events for which numerous
factors and decisions could be attributed to the eventual outcomes (i.e., a diffuse failure, or a
diffuse negative event).
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The abundance of possible causes and the division of labor in organizations (Weber,
1928) contribute to the ambiguity surrounding ownership of a negative outcome (i.e., diffuse
failure) or a positive outcome (i.e., diffuse success). The positive and negative events examined
in this paper are complex in that there are multiple potential variables that led to the outcome.
Although there may be certain factors that are more salient, the sequence of decisions in the
events ultimately leading to the outcome are interdependent and cannot be easily disentangled. In
addition, the diffuse outcomes studied are bounded in that the set of possible individuals or
groups being blamed or credited is not infinite; instead, there is a finite set of potential
individuals who can incur blame or credit for an event. Further, that individuals are employed by
the same organization does not necessarily mean that they are equally culpable for or connected
to a diffuse success or failure within the organization.
Moreover, the direction of the outcome, positive or negative, is generally dependent on
the perspective of the focal individual or group. Outcomes may be positive for one party yet
negative for another, and likewise, negative outcomes may be negative for one party yet positive
for another. Organizational members may face uncertainty when determining whether an event
constitutes a success or a failure (Ginzel et al., 2004). Whether an outcome is positive or
negative is dependent on a reference point. According to Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979)
prospect theory, the psychological reference point corresponds to the current “level,” or status
quo, but this level may be shaped by other factors, such as recent changes to this level or
comparisons to other parties. Kahneman and Tversky’s ideas have also given rise to the idea that
reference points can change, that they can vary by individual, and that subjective perceptions of
an outcome are dependent on its deviation from some reference point, which results in a “gain”
(i.e., a positive outcome) or a “loss” (i.e., a negative outcome) (Hardie et al., 1993). Thus, the
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positive or negative nature of the diffuse outcomes in this dissertation are dependent on a
reference point set by the leader. The leader must manage this reference point and frame her
communications (e.g., regarding blame and credit) accordingly following a positive or negative
outcome. A loss could be seen as a gain, depending on the reference point; for example, if profits
come in below expectations, a leader may frame this as a positive outcome because of the
reference point being set even lower than the actual profits earned. Therefore, because of
reference dependence, some losses may feel like wins and some wins may not feel as positive,
and leaders may frame their communications according to this reference dependence.
In prospect theory, the reference point plays a prominent role, yet this point can change
over time (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Given a series of outcomes, the hedonic consequences
of an outcome may cause one’s reference point to change, and the consequences of a subsequent
outcome then depend on the adaption of this reference point. Relatedly, various researchers have
also studied changes in behavior and their relationship to changes in aspiration levels (e.g.,
Lopes, 1987; March 1988). An aspiration level is a specific type of reference point, defined as
“the smallest outcome that would be deemed satisfactory by the decision maker” (Schneider,
1992: 1053). When evaluating an outcome, comparisons to an aspiration level are made to
determine if the outcome is a success or failure (Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988).
Furthermore, according to adaptive aspirations theory, an organization’s aspiration levels may
change over time; these levels are set and adjusted in response to goals in previous periods,
experiences with respect to that goal in the previous period, and comparisons made to other
organizations (Cyert & March, 1963). This suggests that an individual’s aspirations levels can vary

as well, in line with assertions made by prospect theory. In this dissertation, the leader is the
decision maker, and she will adjust her behavior based on an outcome’s relationship to an
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aspiration level, which too may be subject to change based on past outcomes and on social
comparisons. Ultimately, the leader’s subjective reference point determines the positive or
negative nature of an outcome, and the leader can choose to respond to the outcome depending
on their subjective interpretation of whether it is positive or negative.
1.2.2 Blame and credit behaviors. When unanticipated behavior occurs, we expect an
account or explanation of the behavior to follow (Scott & Lyman, 1968). In a similar vein,
following a diffuse negative event such as an organizational failure, we expect a representative
of the organization to give an account or explanation of the event. Leaders of organizations are
often the individuals expected to step forward and make a statement regarding the event.
Acknowledgments of positive events exist as well; when an organizational success occurs,
leaders and members of those organizations may also give reasons for successes that other
individuals and organizations can use as exemplars or guidelines for achieving success. In this
paper, I define a leader as a formal leader within an organization who is in a formal relationship
with one or more subordinates as their direct manager (or direct supervisor). I define a blame
behavior as a voluntary behavior of designating internal responsibility for a negative outcome to
an individual or group of individuals, either the self or followers. Similarly, a credit behavior is a
voluntary behavior of designating internal responsibility for a positive outcome to an individual
or group of individuals, either the self or followers. Thus, both blame and credit behaviors shift
blame or credit toward a specific person or group of people, through the taking, sharing, or
assigning blame or credit.
In addition, the apology is not included in the scope of this dissertation. Blame-taking and
apologizing are closely related concepts, but the apology is distinctive because it involves an
expression of regret or remorse. Kim and his colleagues (2004; 2006) defined apology as having
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two components, one that acknowledges responsibility and another that conveys remorse. In an
apology, the acknowledgement of responsibility may be directed toward the group and not
necessarily the self. In contrast, blame-taking does not include the regret component of
apologizing, and beyond an acknowledgment of responsibility, blame-taking is solely the
voluntary shouldering of or designation of responsibility categorically unto oneself.
1.2.3 Audiences. The organizational communications literature divides communications
into two groups of stakeholders: internal and external (Cornelissen, 2008). Internal
communications refer to those that are distributed inside an organization, whereas external
communications are those to stakeholders outside of an organization. Similarly, research on
marketing and ad campaigns have referred to internal communications as those directed toward
employees and external communications as those directed toward consumers (Celsi & Gilly,
2010). The distinctions between internal and external audiences in the communications literature
parallel Weiner’s (1986) notion of locus and controllability. In a crisis context, the locus
indicates whether the cause of the crisis is internal or external to the organization, and
controllability refers to whether the organization has control over whether it can prevents the
crisis (i.e., an internal locus is associated with a controllable crisis, whereas an external locus is
associated with uncontrollable crisis). A crisis perceived to fall within the boundaries of an
organization is then classified as having an internal locus, and one that falls outside the
boundaries of an organization are classified as having an external locus (Lee, 2004).
For the purposes of this research, the audience is defined as the individual or group of
individual who observe a leader’s blame and credit behaviors. Blame and credit behaviors are the
designations of internal responsibility for an outcome toward an individual or group within the
organization. These designations can be communicated to both external and internal audiences
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with differing consequences. In this dissertation, the distinction between an external and an
internal audience stems from the organizational communications and crisis communications
literature. Therefore, an external audience is comprised of individuals who are not formally
members of the organization – namely, they are external to the organization. These individuals
can be consumers of what the organization produces, but they are not official members of or
employed by the organization. For example, users of an end product or fans of sports teams can
be affected by behaviors of an organization, but they are not an official or formal member of the
organization. An external audience includes stakeholders and the general public, but not
employees of an organization. Leaders of organizations, such as coaches or executives, will
provide opinions or statements to the media, and as recipients of that information, the general
public can be considered an external audience for blame and credit behaviors that may be
incorporated in these communications.
Conversely, an internal audience is comprised of individuals who are official employees
of the organization. An internal audience may be aware of the public communication (e.g., blame
or credit behaviors) from individuals within the organization, such as a leader to an external
audience, but blame or credit behaviors may also be communicated to them in an internal setting.
Acknowledgements of blame and credit to an internal audience are thus private and intended to
be disclosed only within the organization.
In this dissertation, I also distinguish between two types of internal audiences: the intrateam audience and the extra-team audience, terminology that is also inspired by the
organizational communications literature that divides audiences into internal and external
categories (e.g., Cornelissen, 2008; Lee, 2004). The intra-team audience includes individuals or
parties whose actions could have directly led to the diffuse event. For example, salespeople on a
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sales team that fails to meet its collective sales target are an intra-team audience, as are coaches
and football players on a team that win a football game. These individuals might incur blame or
receive credit based on closer proximity to the outcome compared to the extra-team audience.
The extra-team audience includes parties who are formal members or employees of the
organization but not directly involved in the diffuse event. These extra-team parties may be other
people (e.g., other employees, other managers) or groups within the organization (e.g., other
teams in the same organization or department) who are not considered potential causes of the
outcome because, for example, their roles and actions are isolated from the diffuse event. Both
intra-team and extra-team internal audiences can include individuals who are above, below, or of
equal hierarchical rank to the individual engaging in the blame or credit behavior.
1.3 Overview
In this dissertation, I examine how and why leaders, defined in this paper as formal
leaders in the role of a manager or supervisor, of organizations communicate accountability by
addressing blame and credit. This dissertation contributes to and extends the conversation about
blame and credit behaviors in the workplace by deepening our understanding of the distinct ways
in which leaders express blame and credit to an external audience and leaders’ perspectives on
their own blame and credit behaviors to an internal audience. I then develop a theoretical
framework delineating the motives and related factors driving such behaviors internally within
organizations. Chapter 1 provided the general motivation for studying the selected topic and
clarified concepts central to this dissertation in particular.
In Chapter 2, I take an exploratory approach to identify numerous blame and credit
behaviors beyond those previously emphasized in the literature. In the initial Pilot Study, I use an
in-depth, semi-structured interview approach to garner an understanding of the internal,
13

conscious processes of leaders of sports teams, coaches. These leaders may be aware of their
conscious thought processes prior to and during their communication of blame and credit to team
members situated hierarchically (and internally) below them. In Study 1, I survey statements
made by professional American football coaches in a public setting that address blame and credit
following the win or loss of a football game. The purpose of this study is to develop a more
comprehensive picture of what expressions of blame and credit look like, as well as to identify
any patterns regarding these behaviors. Together, these two studies (i.e., Pilot Study and Study 1)
address the distinctions among different blame and credit behaviors, providing suggestions for
why some leaders may engage in one type of behavior over the other.
Chapter 3 builds upon conclusions drawn from the Pilot Study and Study 1 and develops
a model arguing that leaders’ tendencies to engage in blame and credit behaviors are not always
driven by self-serving biases. I explore the reasons behind these disparate behaviors by
proposing that there is a set of commonly experienced motivations that drives leaders to enact
various blame and credit behaviors beyond shifting blame away and credit towards oneself.
Drawing from a variety of literatures, I identify four broad categories of motives driving blame
and credit behaviors. The set of motives introduced in Chapter 3 provide a method for
categorizing the key common explanations for why leaders might choose to enact one type of
blame or credit behavior over another. Thus, Chapter 3 contributes to the existing literature by
expanding our understanding of why leaders engage in specific types of behavior through a new
theoretical framework.
Next, in Chapter 4, I describe three studies (Studies 2, 3 and 4) conducted to test key
elements of the theory proposed in the third chapter regarding leaders’ motivations to shift blame
and credit either toward themselves or away, toward others. I develop hypotheses that test
14

motives developed in Chapter 3, as well as potential moderating variables. Study 2 is an online
field survey study conducted with a sample of working managers. Study 3 is an experimental
study conducted with a sample of undergraduates, testing the main effects of the model. Finally,
Study 4 is an experimental study using a procedure similar to Study 3 that additionally tests the
moderating effect of reward structure. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 5, presenting the key
takeaways and contributions, implications, and proposed future steps.
In sum, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of the communication of blame
and credit in organizations, the distinctions among different types of blame and credit behaviors,
and the motives driving these types of behaviors. It both exposes and extends the opportunity for
future exploration of the downstream consequences of blame and credit behaviors. It does so by
initiating a dialogue about why leaders engage in disparate behaviors, such as blame-taking and
credit-giving. Examining these factors, as well as contextual factors, allows for a deeper
understanding of the variation in behaviors across leaders. I aim to offer practical guidance for
managers and other formal leaders about how to navigate their set of response options following
a positive or negative organizational event. Thus, this dissertation paves the way for future
research on how blame and credit behaviors can improve the nature, efficiency, and effectiveness
of leaders who manage subordinates and teams.
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Chapter 2: Introductory Studies
2.1 Introduction
The blame and credit literature has not yet delved into the variety of ways in which
organizational leaders acknowledge blame and credit following diffuse positive and negative
outcomes. Although scholars have examined blame assignment behaviors, much of this work has
operated on the assumption that individuals act to reduce blame and increase credit assigned to
them. As a result, within the literature, we know little with respect to the other blame behaviors
that might exist or what they look like, as well as credit behaviors beyond credit taking. This
dissertation addresses this void by surveying a context in which acknowledgements of blame and
credit arise with regularity and investigating the display of these types of behaviors and how they
compare to one another.
In this chapter, I conduct exploratory work to create a more comprehensive picture of
blame and credit behaviors. In the Pilot Study, I interview two organizational leaders to address
and develop an understanding of private, internal blame and credit behaviors. The objective of
the Pilot Study is to enhance our understanding of why leaders choose to engage in certain types
of blame and credit behaviors and how they view these processes themselves.
The objective of Study 1, an exploratory study qualitative in nature, is to illustrate that a
variety of blame and credit behaviors exist, and these expressions may not occur in symmetric
ways in the public context of the study. By identifying and mapping out distinct categories of
blame and credit, I uncover existing patterns in these types of behaviors. I also explore both
public and private blame and credit behaviors, determining that these behaviors vary when
directed to an external (aligned with Study 1) versus an internal audience (more aligned with the
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Pilot Study). The private context of behaviors observed in the Pilot Study and the opportunity to
probe the thought processes of those who directly enact these behaviors, on top of the mapping
of blame and credit behaviors in a public arena through Study 1, will prompt a conversation
regarding the possible motivations behind various blame and credit behaviors from the
perspective of the leaders.
2.2 Pilot Study: Coach Interviews
In order to begin to understand blame and credit behaviors enacted by leaders, I first
looked to leaders of sports teams. While I am interested in how coaches communicate blame and
credit toward an external audience, enhancing my understanding of how they communicate
blame and credit toward an internal audience helps identify potential opportunities for conceptual
development and data collection. Namely, in this study, I wanted to answer the question of how
coaches determine which blame and credit behaviors to engage in when communicating with an
intra-team audience of their athletes.
I conducted two rounds of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with two coaches at a
mid-sized, private university in the Midwest with an athletic program competing in Division III
of the National Collegiate Athletic Association. In-depth interviews that are scheduled in
advance and take place in a private setting are conducive to trust and candor on part of the
interviewee (Padgett, 2008). In addition, advance preparation of an interview guide with
questions and probes allows the interviewer to clarify the goal of the interview (e.g., Seidman,
2006; Weiss, 1994). Qualitative interviewing also gives the interviewer the opportunity to decide
whether to probe further or to cover broader or additional topics, providing some control over
data collection. Challenges with this technique include striking a balance between the general
versus the particular and the planned versus the spontaneous. The approach can also be
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physically and emotionally taxing based on the topics discussed and the length of the interview.
To address these challenges, I prepared ahead of time and consulted various resources to develop
my interview guides and protocols.
The purpose of the interviews was to gain further insight into how coaches themselves
believed they made decisions regarding blame and credit behaviors and their general approach to
communicating with the team (e.g., giving feedback). Thus, the focus of the Pilot Study was on
coaches’ perceptions of their own process of coaching and communicating blame and credit, as
well as their personal “philosophy” and reasons for doing so.
2.2.1 Method. I developed interview questions with the objective of conducting semistructured interviews. The interview guides were developed to create a short, in-depth interview
that was both discursive and dialectical (Soss, 2014). The interviews were dialectical in that there
was not one single path to be taken, allowing the element of unpredictability of a conversation to
occur. I wanted to maintain the presence of a goal of the interview while still allowing the
interviewee, the coach, to prioritize what information to share in the interview. The dialectical
aspect of the interviews was reflected in that the interview was a back-and-forth conversation
instead of one single person dominating the conversation, and the discursive aspect was reflected
in the natural flow of the interview from topic to topic, similar to a conversation. I needed to
moderate the discussion but they needed to provide the information for which I was looking.
The first interview protocol included questions to provide a basis for understanding the
circumstances and context in which the coach leads. These questions focused on how the
coaches perceived their role as coach and the role of the athletes, as well as how the coaches
communicated with the athletes. The later interview questions in this protocol directly addressed
beliefs about blame and credit in the sports context. The second interview protocol included
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questions that were developed based on what I learned from the first interview. I probed deeper
into the coaches’ growth over their career regarding providing communication and feedback to
the team, as well as their personal opinions about leading and growing a team. I developed
questions in certain topical domains (e.g., responsibilities of coach, communication to team,
career trajectory, and lessons learned) and annotated these questions for my own use with probes
(Padgett, 2008). These probes would remind me to ask the coach a specific question in case they
did not cover it spontaneously.
I conducted two rounds of semi-structured interviews with the men’s basketball coach
and women’s softball coach at the university. I met with each coach for one hour in each session,
and the second interview occurred approximately three months after the first. The basketball
coach was male, his age was 79 years, and he had served as the head basketball coach at the
university for 37 seasons and as assistant coach for one season. He had previously spent 9
seasons as assistant coach at a Division I university and was a former Division III basketball
player. The softball coach was female, her age was 44 years, and she had served as the head
softball coach at the university for one season. Previously, she had been the head coach at a
Division I university for eight seasons and assistant head coach at another Division I university
for six seasons. She was a former Division I softball player, in addition to being a former
member of the U.S. National Team and the U.S Olympic Team.
2.2.2 Results. Both coaches emphasized process over outcome. This was interesting
because outcomes in sports are often what the stakeholders (e.g., owners, fans, and media) focus
on and value. Although the coaches emphasized process over the outcome in the interviews and
we might assume this is what they actually do with their teams, a coach can also make
acknowledgments of blame and credit with respect to the process instead of the diffuse outcome
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(i.e., wins and losses). The coaches also conveyed an awareness of the importance of sensitivity
to the needs of the players, explaining that one player’s reaction to a blame or credit behavior
might be very different from another’s, i.e., one athlete might experience the communication as
constructive and another as humiliating. Both coaches also spoke at length about building a
relationship with the players. They believed that understanding their players and creating a high
level of trust with them would help them, as the coach, to provide effective and compelling
feedback and directives to an athlete.
Furthermore, the coaches were insistent that they cannot (i.e., should not and do not)
place blame on the team members because doing so might lead to reduced morale, weakened
relationships with athletes, or negative emotions that disrupt the process and progress of the
team. They both acknowledged the possibility that athletes experience blame when given
feedback during and after practices and games. As a result, although coaches may not think they
are blaming players, the players may interpret words and actions in a manner different from what
their coaches intended. The coaches voiced the importance of building rapport with the athletes
so that they, as the coach, would know the best course of action to take when communicating
blame or credit – whether it was after the outcome of a game, during a game, or during practice
while refining skills to be exhibited during an official game. Nevertheless, both coaches
emphasized that they were the leaders of a team and therefore both had the final say in
communicating blame and credit, and once they carefully thought through what engaging in
specific blame or credit behaviors would achieve, would communicate it accordingly.
2.3 Study 1: Public Acknowledgements of Blame and Credit
Private, internal communications may differ from statements made to the public (i.e., to
an external audience), including in the context of sports. For example, although coaches may
20

exercise more restraint in press conference dialogue and body language than they do when
speaking privately with the team (e.g. in the locker room or during practices), public statements
that a coach makes that communicate blame and credit arise with regularity and are ripe for
analysis. Because the current literature has focused heavily on blame assignment and credit
taking over other types of possible blame and credit behaviors, our knowledge of other types of
acknowledgements and how they compare and contrast to self-serving blame and credit
behaviors is lacking. In order to further our understanding of how and when individuals
acknowledge blame and credit, I examine actors’ expressions of blame and credit in
organizations. Using an exploratory approach, I conducted a study in a professional sports
context to map out various types of blame and credit behaviors that leaders engage in in the
public to discover patterns indicating that actors tend to approach potential incidents of blame
and credit in predictable ways.
2.3.1 Study context. Mary Barra’s blame-taking statement was in response to an
unexpected anomaly and, as a result, is inherently irregular, resulting in unpredictable
communications. Therefore, it is not possible to analyze similar situations and construct a valid
dataset. Acknowledgments of blame and credit, however, occur with regularity and consistency
during professional sports postgame press conferences. During these conferences, each head
coach addresses the public through the professional sports media. Coaches often take this
opportunity to make evaluative and explanatory statements, including reflections on the game
played, explanations for actions or outcomes, and/or assessments of the team’s performance and
condition. Archives of coaches’ press conferences are publicly available on many sports teams’
official websites, and that makes them a source of data for systematically examining
communications of credit and blame in business organizations.
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Behaviors in professional athletics provide a good source of comparison for behaviors in
other organizations. Professional sports are becoming increasingly recognized as a huge and
globally expanding business that has reshaped cultures around the world (Mooney & White,
2014; Morss, 2012). For example, in the past couple of years, the controversy surrounding
corruption in the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) increased the
recognition of professional sports associations operating as businesses (Ozanian, 2015).
Moreover, in contrast to manufacturing companies, which are rapidly incorporating automation
into their operations and thus diminishing the human factor (McAfee, 2013), the human factor
remains central in professional sports. Consequently, examining human behaviors, especially
those of an individual observed to be the leader (i.e., coach) of a group or organization of people
(i.e., a sports team), through postgame press conferences provides case studies in which
acknowledgments of blame and credit arise with regularity.
Study 1 examines postgame press conferences in the National Football League (NFL),
one of the four major professional sports associations in North America. The NFL is a profitable
business; in the 2015 season alone, the NFL brought in over $13 billion dollars in revenue, up
from $8.5 billion in revenue in 2010 (Belzer, 2016), which was distributed among the teams.
Revenue in the NFL comes from licensing agreements, sponsorships, merchandise, and ticket
sales, but most critically from television rights fees (Rocco, 2015). In 2015, the largest
proportion of revenue was accounted for by television rights at about $5 billion from CBS, NBC,
FOX, and ESPN combined (Kutz, 2016).
During its season, NFL games occur weekly, with each team receiving one bye week.
Because games are played once a week, coaches and teams have time to analyze the previous
game and prepare for the upcoming game. In other professional sports associations, games may
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occur more frequently, such as in Major League Baseball (in which teams play games almost
every day, with about one day off every ten days), resulting in less time to reflect and practice
between games. Journalists and fans of baseball also have less time to focus on the events of one
contest before they are superseded by the next. Thus, any given football press conference has
greater salience.
Postgame press conferences by NFL head coaches provide a rich dataset for
acknowledgments of blame and credit given the extent of their responsibilities as head coach of
the team. Some coaches are involved with the intricacies of team membership and game
execution (e.g., in obtaining players and calling plays). But most NFL coaches are regularly in
charge of postgame analysis, game planning, managing practices, making adjustments during the
game (often aided by communication from staff members from a “bird’s-eye view,” via headset),
providing a framework for schemes and formations, and ultimately leading “on and off the
field—in and out of the locker room” (Garda, 2013). Because NFL coaches are deeply involved
with their players before and after the game, and because football games move at a pace allowing
for awareness of almost every decision made by the team on the field during the game, postgame
statements of NFL coaches are often reported extensively in the media and widely analyzed by
sports journalists.
In the NFL, policies regarding press conferences have been implemented with the
approval of franchise owners, to sustain public interest which, in turn, translates into advertising
revenue. Postgame press conferences occur approximately 10-12 minutes after the completion of
each game, and the coach and “at least one star player of the game” arrive at an interview area
near or inside the home and visiting team locker room areas (NFL Media Access Policy, 2015).
All accredited news media are allowed into the area. During the press conference, the head coach
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can provide comments without being prompted explicitly, but news media people oftentimes
guide the “interview” by asking the coach open-ended questions. Coaches, as well as athletes,
most likely receive professional media training paid for by the owners of the franchise. Because
coaches’ statements during press conferences are so widely reported and scrutinized, coaches are
trained in order to cast the organization and themselves in a better light. As a result, some of the
statements made during post-game press conferences are likely a combination of what
professionals believe are normatively proper responses and coaches’ gut responses made under
stressful conditions (e.g., severe losses), which may not cast the organization in as favorable a
light.
2.3.2 Methods.
Post-game press conference transcriptions. I focused on NFL postgame press
conferences from the 2015 regular NFL season. Because of resource constraints, I randomly
selected 12 NFL teams to be included in this study, as listed in Table 2.1. At the time of data
collection (and currently), all head coaches in the NFL were male.1 The dataset included 14 total
head coaches instead of 12 because two teams fired and replaced the head coach midseason.2
Within the subset of 12 teams, 12 coaches were white, one was Hispanic, and one was African
American.

1

There has never been a female head coach in the NFL, although the Buffalo Bills made history in January 2016 by
appointing the first full-time female coach in NFL history, Kathryn Smith, who was the special teams quality control
coach for the Bills during the 2016 season (Rodak, 2016). To date, there have been three women on full-time NFL
coaching staffs (Florjancic & Lai, 2018).
2
The Philadelphia Eagles fired head coach Chip Kelly after Game 15 (6-9 record), and offensive coordinator Pat
Shurmur took over as interim head coach for the final week of the 2015 season. The Tennessee Titans fired head
coach Ken Whisenhunt following Game 7 (1-6 start), and tight ends coach Mike Mularkey replaced him as interim
head coach for the remaining nine games of the season.
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Table 2.1 National Football League (NFL) Teams Included in Study 1

2015 season
record
13-3

2015 preseason
record
2-2

John Harbaugh

5-11

1-3

Carolina Panthers

Ron Rivera

15-1

3-1

Cleveland Browns

Mike Pettine

3-13

1-3

Denver Broncos

Gary Kubiak

12-4

3-1

✔

12-4

Green Bay Packers

Mike McCarthy

10-6

2-2

✔

12-4

Houston Texans

Bill O'Brien

9-7

2-2

✔

9-7

New Orleans Saints

Sean Payton

7-9

0-4

7-9

San Francisco 49ers

Jim Tomsula

5-11

2-2

8-8

Philadelphia Eagles^a

Chip Kelly

7-9

3-1

10-6

Team
Arizona Cardinals

Coach
Bruce Arians

Baltimore Ravens

Playoffs
✔

Previous season
record (2014)
11-5
10-6

✔

7-8-1
7-9

Pat Shurmur
Tampa Bay Buccaneers

Lovie Smith

6-10

2-2

2-14

Tennessee Titans^b

Ken Whisenhunt

3-13

2-2

2-14

Mike Mularkey
a

Philadelphia Eagles coach Chip Kelly was fired after Game 15, ending with a 6-9 record. Interim coach Pat Shurmur was
appointed and ended the season with a 1-0 record.
b
Tennessee Titans coach Ken Whisenhunt was fired after Game 7, leaving with a 1-6 record. Interim coach Mike Mularkey
was appointed and ended the season with a 2-7 record.

Video files of post-game press conferences were obtained from each of the 12 NFL teams’
official team websites, and the videos ranged from approximately 3 minutes to 16 minutes. I
transcribed 192 NFL postgame press conferences given by 14 head coaches of 12 teams from video
into text. I collapsed each conference into logical subsections or “blocks” and preserved the
chronological ordering of these blocks for the sake of the organization and systemization of the
coding and analytic processes.
Coding the post-game press conference transcription data. The analytic approach
followed an iterative process of developing themes, based on the working hypotheses with
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respect to asymmetry and occurrences of acknowledgments of blame and credit. I informally
tested these themes and hypotheses in subsequent analyses. This process is described below.
This methodological approach draws on aspects of grounded theory research design in an effort
to understand and theoretically explain a process, action, or interaction (e.g., blame and credit
behaviors and acknowledgements) (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) through multiple phases of coding,
in addition to aspects of content analysis in order to quantify incidents of certain phenomena
(e.g., instances of blame and credit) (Creswell, 2013). I used these quantifications as variables in
conducting regression analyses in order to help identify patterns and compare frequencies of
blame and credit acknowledgements across coaches.
First, during the transcription of the postgame press conferences, I took notes alongside
logical subsections or blocks of the press conference, developing significant themes or distinct
comments. Every transcribed press conference was transferred to a matrix which allowed me to
view coaches’ statements by block (down) and by theme or coding category (across), as well as
by game-level data (also across). This provided a systematic line-by-line (or rather, block-byblock) coding procedure.
Along with the initial emergent themes, I established preliminary, broad categories (i.e.,
open coding; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) that would account for focal concepts of the study – for
example, “Blame” and “Credit” to indicate instances where either was acknowledged. Next, I
sorted comments and subsections into this emergent set of topical categories using descriptive
and process coding, some categories of which were predetermined prior to coding and some
were established “in vivo,” to capture what seemed like frequent themes or chunks of data
(Saldaña, 2016). Descriptive coding uses a word or short phrase to summarize the basic topic of
a passage of qualitative data (e.g., “Blame,” “Credit”) (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Wolcott,
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2009), and process coding (or action coding) uses gerunds to connote action in the data (e.g.,
“Taking blame,” “Assigning credit”) (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007; Charmaz, 2002, 2008; Corbin
and Strauss, 2008; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). After open coding each set of eight press
conferences, (i.e., half of the regular season games for each team), I compared notes among the
eight press conferences in each set to ensure that the use of the coding scheme was consistent
and to see if any new patterns had surfaced.
After the first round of open coding, I completed two iterations of more focused coding. I
used narrow concept coding to search for “the most salient categories” and to make decisions
regarding which initial codes from the first round made “the most analytic sense” (Charmaz,
2006). The coding categories were also narrowed to distinguish between taking, sharing,
deflecting, and assigning blame and credit, to highlight instances of mixing blame and credit, and
to flag important events that corresponded to these behaviors, such as winning and losing streaks
and breaks in those streaks. I conducted a final and third iteration of coding to ensure that I
reached a point of saturation in which all text blocks were coded appropriately. Lastly, I revisited
the press conference transcriptions to ensure that I had not missed relevant codes and to confirm
certain patterns I identified were classified correctly during the coding and mapping processes.
Team-level data. During and after the transcription of the postgame press conference
videos, I also collected information from the official websites of each team regarding each game
for each press conference. Team-level variables included the team’s final record for the 2015
season, the previous (2014) season, and the 2015 preseason record, as well as whether the team
earned a spot in the postseason playoff tournament (see Table 2.1).
Individual game-level data. For each game, I recorded the name of the opposing team,
the result of the game (i.e., win or loss), the game score, and the score margin, which was
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positive (>0) if the team won and negative (<0) if the team lost (e.g.., a score margin of -14
denotes that the team lost by 14 points). I recorded the season record up to and including that
specific game and the record margin including that game, which was positive (>0) if the team
had more wins than losses and negative (<0) if more losses than wins. I also noted whether the
opposing team was a division opponent and the location of the game (i.e., home or away). I
recorded the number of consecutive wins and the number of consecutive losses; for example, if
the team lost Game 7 and Games 4, 5, and 6 were also lost, Game 7 would be coded as “4
consecutive losses.” I recorded the team’s rank in the NFL prior to that game.
I accessed historical data regarding Vegas betting odds and point spreads for each game
and recorded the betting spread as a way of measuring the most likely, or the expected, outcome
of each game (FootballLOCKS.com, 2016). 3 Using betting odds and point spreads is important
in determining whether the outcome of a game is considered positive or negative (i.e., a gain or a
loss), as outcomes are reference point dependent (see Chapter 1). While the reference point may
sometimes be simply neutral, in that a win is a successful outcome and a loss is an unsuccessful
outcome, the reference point may also vary and depend on the team’s previous game record
leading into the current game.

3

The point spread in sports betting is the key unit of measurement between the two NFL teams playing against one
another. The point spread indicates how much better one team is perceived to be than another (Odds Shark, 2016;
TheSportsGeek.com, 2016). The betting moneyline would then refer to the amount an individual would need to bet to
win (i.e., profit) $100. For example, if the point spread was -3 (i.e., the team is favored to win by 3 points) and you
bet the moneyline of -110 (i.e., you bet $110), and the team covers the spread and wins, you would earn $100.
Conversely, if you bet on the underdog in the same game on the moneyline of +120, a $100 bet would win you $120
if the underdog ultimately won the game. There was a record $132.5 million placed in bets on Super Bowl 50 at the
conclusion of the 2015-2016 NFL season (Brinson, 2016).
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A negative spread (<0) indicated that the team was favored and a positive spread (>0)
indicated that the team was the underdog. Based on the betting point spreads (i.e., + vs. -) and
result of the game (i.e., W vs. L), I coded whether the outcome of the game was an unexpected
loss (unexpectloss) or an unexpected win (unexpectwin). As a result, if the spread was less than
zero (i.e., they were the favorite to win) but the team lost the game, the game was coded as an
unexpected loss (unexpectloss=1), and if the spread was greater than zero (i.e., they were the
underdog) but the team won the game, the game was coded as an unexpected win
(unexpectwin=1).
Based on the betting spread and the final score margin of the game, I computed the
difference between the predicted outcome of the game (by using the betting spread) and the
actual outcome of the game and called this variable the “bet versus actual” (betvsactual). For
example, if the betting spread was -5.5, then the most likely outcome, or predicted outcome, of
the game was that the team would win by at least 5.5 points. If the actual outcome of the game
was a 13-24 loss, this would be a score margin of -11 points. The difference between 5.5 points
and -11 points is -16.5, and thus betvsactual = -16.5. From this variable, I calculated magnitude,
or the absolute value of betvsactual, which denotes the magnitude, or severity, of the difference
between the actual final score of the game and the predicted, most likely outcome of the game
based on the Vegas betting spread.
Lastly, based on the betting spread data and the final score of the game, I computed two
binary variables. The first binary variable (negative violation, negv) denoted whether the team
underperformed and did not meet the predicted expectation of the bettors (i.e., lost when they
were expected to win, or won by a smaller margin than they were expected to win by) – thus, 1 =
the game was a negative violation of predicted expectations, and 0 = the game was not a negative
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violation of predicted expectations. The second binary variable (positive violation, posv) denoted
whether the team “overperformed,” exceeding the predicted expectation of the bettors (i.e., won
when they were expected to lose, or lost by a smaller margin than expected).
2.3.3 Results.
Types of blame and credit behaviors (acknowledgements). I observed several types of
acknowledgments with respect to blame and credit. The range of acknowledgments in the dataset
created goes beyond what Crant and Bateman (1993) examine by including not only the
assignment and taking of blame or credit but also deflection and sharing. As in Gunia’s (2011)
characterization of blame-taking, the act of assuming personal responsibility for a diffuse
negative outcome was evident in statements acknowledging that an actor takes full responsibility
for an outcome (e.g., “this is my fault,” “this is on me,” “I take responsibility for this loss”). The
data also revealed that a diffuse failure may also lead to expressions that convey the sharing of
blame among a group of people (e.g., “this is on us,” “we didn’t do it right,” “no one to blame
but ourselves”), the deflection of blame away from oneself or any one group or indivdual in
particular (e.g., “this is no one’s fault,” “I can’t give you a reason”, “feel like we ran out of
time”), or the assignment of blame unto another actor or group (e.g., “he did something wrong,”
“he made poor decisions”).
A diffuse success (i.e., a diffuse positive outcome) elicited parallel acknowledgements of
credit. Taking credit, or the act of assuming personal responsibility for a diffuse positive event
(i.e., diffuse success), conveys that the success is attributed to the actor and to decisions he or she
made, whereas assigning credit conveys that the success is attributable to another actor or party
(e.g., “he did a great job,” “the offense did a great job”). Sharing credit conveys the sharing of
responsibility and acclaim for a diffuse positive event with other individuals or groups (e.g., “we
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played well as a team,” “we got it done on the field”), and lastly, deflecting credit attributes the
cause of the success to an external source, either tangible (e.g., a person or group) or intangible
(e.g., luck, timing: “we were fortunate … that we got away with it today”).
I aggregated the statements coded as acknowledging blame or credit – specifically,
taking, assigning, deflecting, and sharing either blame or credit – at the game level. To do so, I
computed the number of times each type of blame- or credit-acknowledgment was made during a
single post-game press conference. Thus, I counted the number of times every type of blame- or
credit-acknowledgment was made in a specific post-game press conference, and how many times
each coach used each type of acknowledgment across the entire season. For more complete
examples of various acknowledgments of blame and credit, see Table 2.2 and Table 2.3.
I discovered an observable asymmetry between parallel acknowledgments of blame and
credit (see Appendix A for boxplot comparisons) that has not previously been addressed. The
asymmetry is most prominent for credit- versus blame-sharing and credit- versus blame-taking.
Notably, leaders took blame quite often but almost never took credit; only one instance of credittaking was coded in the entire 192 post-game press conference dataset. This single instance was
coded simultaneously as assigning credit to a specific player as well as the coach taking credit;
the coach, Ron Rivera, of the Carolina Panthers briefly referenced a decision he made that
contributed to an important play call that gave the team an advantage:
“On the fourth down, I decided to go for it because I felt comfortable and confident that
we were winning at the point of attack on that drive and thought it was a good
opportunity to go for it. I’m really pleased with what Jerricho Cotchery (wide receiver)
did, with that catch, willing to get that first down conversion. It was huge.”
The analyses conducted in this study that delve further into the above observations, along
with arguments drawn from theory, inform the propositions put forth in Chapter 3.
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Table 2.2 Study 1 – Examples of Taking and Assigning of Blame and Credit: NFL Post-game
Press Conferences
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Table 2.3 Study 1 – Examples of Sharing and Deflecting of Blame and Credit: NFL Post-game
Press Conferences

Violations of expectations. When unexpected behavior occurs, it violates expectations
and warrants an explanatory account (Scott & Lyman, 1968). Leaders of organizations,
following a failure or success, are expected to address an unexpected outcome – for example, an
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unexpected win or an unexpected loss. With a violation of expectations, the magnitude of the
violation may influence how a leader chooses to address blame or credit.
For the data collected, a positive violation of expectations was operationalized by two
variables: unexpectwin (i.e., if the team was the underdog but ultimately won the game) and
posv (i.e., if the team won when they were expected to lose, or lost by a smaller margin than they
were expected to lose). A negative violation of expectations was operationalized by two
variables: unexpectloss (i.e., if the team was favored to win but ultimately lost the game) and
negv (i.e., if the team lost when they were expected to win, or won by a smaller margin than they
were expected to win).
The data provide preliminary support for the above ideas. For games that were
unexpectedly won, sharing credit (M = 4.06, SD = 2.79) occurred significantly more than taking
credit (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00), t(31) = 8.23, p < .001. For games in which the team won when they
were expected to lose, or lost by a smaller margin than they were expected to lose, sharing credit
(M = 3.54, SD = 2.46) occurred significantly more than taking credit (M = 0.01, SD = 0.10), t(90)
= 13.69, p < .001. This significant difference, extreme beyond asymmetry, was likely driven by
the fact that only one coach took credit only one time across all 192 postgame press conferences
in the dataset. For games that were unexpectedly lost, sharing blame (M = 6.06, SD = 3.35)
occurred significantly more than taking blame (M = 0.37, SD = 0.81), t(38) = 9.76, p < .001. For
games in which the team lost when they were expected to win, or won by a smaller margin than
they were expected to win, sharing blame (M = 4.89, SD = 3.29) occurred significantly more
than taking blame (M = 0.67, SD = 1.32), t(124) = 11.60, p < .001.
In addition, the data provide preliminary evidence that a positive violation of
expectations (e.g., a win when a loss is expected, a more substantial win than is expected, or a
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smaller loss than is expected) is more likely to result in a leader sharing credit with others on the
team or in the organization than taking credit. Similarly, for a negative violation of expectations
(e.g., a loss when a win is expected, a more substantial loss than is expected, or a smaller win
than is expected), a leader will more often share blame with others on the team or in the
organization than take blame for the negative violation.
Magnitude of the violation. Although the direction of the violation of expectations may
influence the tendency of a leader to share rather than take blame or credit, the magnitude, or
severity, of that violation should also impact behavior. The magnitude (i.e., severity) of the
violation was operationalized using the magnitude variable, which denotes the magnitude of the
difference between the actual final score of the game and the predicted, most likely outcome of
the game (based on the Vegas betting spread). I estimated regression models to examine if the
criterion variable, the magnitude of the violation (measured both using the magnitude variable,
as well as the negv and posv variables), was a significant predictor of specific blame and credit
behaviors (i.e., taking, sharing, assigning, deflecting).
For unexpected wins, the magnitude of the positive violation was a marginally significant
predictor of a coach sharing credit, b = 0.14, t(30) = 0.09, p = .087. The magnitude of the
unexpected win also explained a marginally significant proportion of variance in occurrence of
sharing credit, R2 = 0.09, F(1, 30) = 3.14, p =.087. The regression of the magnitude of the
violation using the variable posv (i.e., if the team won when they were expected to lose, or lost
by a smaller margin than they were expected to lose) predicting sharing credit was not significant
(p = 0.14). Hence, for positive violations of expectations, there is preliminary evidence
supporting a positive relationship between the magnitude of the violation and the sharing of
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credit. Thus, for an unexpected win (e.g., when the margin by which the team won increases), a
leader is likely to share credit.
Similarly, as the severity of the negative violation worsens, there is more blame to spread
around for the diffuse failure. Although the linear regressions of the magnitude variable of
unexpected losses predicting sharing or predicting taking blame were not significant, the results
were more compelling when examining the magnitudes of negative violations using the negv
variable (i.e., if the team lost when they were expected to win, or won by a smaller margin than
they were expected to win). For negative violations of expectations (i.e., negv), the magnitude of
the violation significantly predicted occurrences of a coach sharing blame, b = 0.12, t(93) = 3.21,
p = .002; the magnitude of the violation also explained a significant proportion of variance in
sharing blame, R2 = 0.10, F(1, 93) = 10.30, p = .002. For negative violations of expectations, the
magnitude of the violation also marginally significantly predicted occurrences of a coach taking
blame, b = 0.03, t(93) = 1.95, p = .055; the magnitude of the violation also explained a
significant proportion of variance in sharing blame, R2 = 0.04, F(1, 93) = 3.79, p = .055. This
relationship may be more prominent for the negv variable compared to the unexpectloss variable
because lumping unexpected losses with any of the slightest “negative” outcomes (e.g., winning
by a smaller margin than expected) might have warranted a stronger acknowledgment of blame
compared to only unexpected losses. Therefore, for negative violations of expectations, there is a
positive relationship between magnitude and both sharing and taking blame: as the negative
violation of expectations becomes worse, sharing and taking blame are more likely to occur
compared to assigning and deflecting blame.

36

2.4 Conclusions
The Pilot Study previews and enriches the ideas uncovered in Study 1 by taking a semistructured interview approach to examine how and why coaches enact blame and credit
behaviors internally to members of the team. Public acknowledgements of blame and credit, such
as in the NFL, are directed more toward an external audience (although an internal audience, e.g.
team members, have access and exposure to such statements), whereas coaches’ private
communications of blame and credit to athletes on the team are directed to an internal audience.
These communications may be more candid and may have a stronger impact on both the
individuals on the team and the team as a collective.
Thus, the Pilot Study provides insight into two coaches’ thought processes and strategies
regarding blame and credit behaviors as a method of giving feedback to the athletes. The fact
that these two coaches believed that blame and credit should be dispensed carefully following an
actual outcome (i.e., a win or a loss of a game) and, instead, more frequently directed toward the
process that led to the outcome raises an interesting point: as the leader of the team, the coach,
following a diffuse outcome, may tend to think back to the series of events that contributed to the
outcome instead of blaming or crediting a player or the team for the outcome itself. Thus, they
may exercise care with respect to when they enact a blame or credit acknowledgement – for
example, speaking to a specific skill or play that the team or team member failed to demonstrate
during the game that was expected of them, rather than the ultimate result of the game. Implied
in this behavior is that if the person or group had been able to demonstrate a specific
competency, the (negative) outcome might have been avoided, leading to an implication of
blame.
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Given that coaches in the NFL are perceived as the leader of the team with myriad
responsibilities, the insights drawn from the constructed dataset in Study 1 are likely most useful
in considering organizations and groups with similar hierarchical structures. I selected the
context of professional sports, namely the NFL, because it allowed me to directly examine blame
and credit behaviors in a sample of coaches over an entire football season during which each
team experiences diffuse events that are both positive and negative in relation to a reference
point. Further, these behaviors were precisely recorded with no measurement error.
The findings in Study 1 map out the conditions and factors that shape how individuals,
specifically leaders, may acknowledge blame and credit following a diffuse outcome at the team
or organizational level. Although natural inclinations to promote a positive self-image and
manage impressions advocates that individuals will claim credit and shirk blame, acts of taking
and sharing blame do transpire and have been largely ignored in the literature. An asymmetry
between blame and credit does exist, and elements of blame-taking and -sharing, as well as
credit-giving and -sharing, should be included in a more comprehensive picture of this
asymmetry. My findings that coaches shared and deflected blame and credit to a greater extent
than taking and assigning blame and credit thereby support both the asymmetry and call for
further study. Notably, the fact that credit-taking occurred only once in the data illustrates that
credit-taking is a deviation from what is considered a normative response during a press
conference and likely contrary to the media training coaches receive. The data demonstrate that
there are circumstances and factors related to both the individual leader and the
environment/situation that lead to the taking, assignment, and sharing of credit and blame. The
patterns observed in Study 1 provide a starting point for exploring what motivates actors to
acknowledge blame and credit in varied ways.
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A key limitation for both of these studies is that they involve the context of sports at the
professional level and collegiate level. The context for Study 1 was selected because it allowed
examination of the ways in which individuals acknowledge blame and credit across a sample of
coaches over an entire football season during which each team experiences diffuse events that
are both positive and negative. Given the regularity and timing of NFL games and the uniformity
of the postgame press conference arrangement with news media, I was able to analyze statements
of blame and credit, along with other statements made during press conferences, with reference
to situational features and team-level characteristics. It is important to consider how my findings
and conclusions translate and compare to other organizational contexts other than sports. Given
that coaches of sports teams are indeed perceived as the leader of the team with myriad
responsibilities, my insights are likely most useful in considering organizations and groups with
similar hierarchical structures. In other organizations with relatively flat structures,
acknowledgments of blame and credit may occur differently. My findings have implications for
groups within organizations and organizations themselves, particularly those with structure and
norms similar to the NFL, as the nature of the postgame press conferences sampled in this study
involve blame and credit behaviors that are directed toward and observed by an external
audience (i.e., the public) rather than an internal audience (e.g., the athletes or assistant coaches),
although the internal audience is also able to observe the coaches’ statements.
Furthermore, Study 1 is limited to the study of male actors and their behavior, and
women may behave differently, depending on the organization. Individuals in other firms may
also be subject to disparate organizational cultures and norms that perceive blame and credit in a
more or less extreme manner. It is quite possible that coaches, both those in the NFL and the
college-level coaches I interviewed, acted according to their particular organization’s norms. For
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example, in the context of NFL press conferences, coaches rarely took personal credit for a
positive outcome and rarely blamed specific players for a negative occurrence, which may be an
artifact of the professional media training they receive. These behaviors may be more prevalent
in other organizational contexts.
Existing literature does not fully address the range of blame and credit behaviors that
leaders enact in organizations, and instead focuses more heavily on blame placement and credit
taking. In terms of public expressions of blame and credit, findings from Study 1 demonstrate
that leaders of teams communicate blame and credit in disparate ways, shifting blame and credit
in different directions (e.g., taking, sharing, assigning, and deflecting). Previously, because of the
lack of a comprehensive map of various blame and credit behaviors in organizations, it was
impossible to determine the balance of such behaviors. Study 1 provides preliminary evidence
that, in general, leaders shift more blame towards themselves and more credit away from
themselves and toward others.
Based on the responses to interview questions in the Pilot Study as well as additional
information conveyed during these interviews, some coaches may be cognizant of how they
communicate to players and sensitive to the potential variation of responses across the team to
their blame and credit behaviors. But not all coaches may lead in a similar way or have a parallel
leadership philosophy. Coaches from different schools or sports or with different genders,
backgrounds, and levels of experience may act in ways that are different from one another. In
addition to these observable differences, leaders of sports teams may also be driven by
motivations that are less easily observed. What separates a coach who avoids blaming the players
for a loss and instead shares blame from a coach who outright blames the team for each mistake?
The two coaches interviewed for the purposes of the Pilot Study help us understand why some
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leaders engage in certain blame and credit behaviors in that these two coaches both understood
that, as leaders, their behaviors would indeed impact the team (e.g., their “subordinates”) and
future elements related to the team – for example, future performance outcomes, team dynamics,
and the relationship of the coach with specific or all players.
Thus, leaders of organizations may have different motivations for engaging in certain
blame and credit behaviors. Although the two coaches interviewed for the Pilot Study believe
that they deliberately act and react to the performance of athletes on the team, insights from this
study suggest that individuals may not be aware of the exact motive driving their behavior, even
if they have consciously thought through their actions. Therefore, the objective of Chapter 3 is to
outline a set of motives that helps explain why individuals, and particularly leaders, express
blame and credit in specific ways. Following the development of the theory delineating these
categories of motives, I conduct studies in Chapter 4 that test elements introduced in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: The Motives Driving Private Blame and Credit
Behaviors
The Pilot Study used a semi-structured interview approach to understand private blame
and credit behaviors from the perspective of two coaches of collegiate sports teams. The findings
from Study 1 provided evidence that leaders of teams do, in fact, publicly communicate blame
and credit in disparate ways, shifting blame and credit in different directions. In addition, the
acknowledgements of blame and credit observed in Study 1 were asymmetric: leaders shifted
more blame toward themselves and more credit away from themselves and toward the team
overall. Together, the studies in Chapter 2 introduced the idea that different motives explain why
people engage in various types of blame and credit behaviors. In Chapter 3, I construct a theory
that addresses what motivates leaders to enact different types of blame and credit behaviors,
taking into account contextual factors (i.e., organizational culture and reward structure) that act
as moderators of the relationship between each motive and associated blame and credit
behaviors.
3.1 Introduction
Imagine a software development team of ten people working to deliver a banking
technology software (i.e., a trading platform) product to a client, a financial investment firm. The
team is one of many within a larger organization. A manager, who ranks hierarchically above the
team members, is included in the ten-member team and leads the team and delegates tasks across
individuals. These individuals all have different responsibilities, ranging from gathering business
requirements of the product (from the investment firm), translating these business “asks” into
technical specifications, developing the code to create the software, running user tests and stress
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tests on the product, repairing defects that arise during software testing, compiling the code onto
the proper channels, and executing the live release of the product by the deadline set by the
client. This entire process occurs over several months and requires frequent iterating, heavy
collaboration across individuals on the team, and clear communication among team members, as
well as effective task delegation by the leader. Decisions made and actions taken throughout the
duration of the project, though likely attached to a standard set of procedures, are interdependent
and carry risks.
Now imagine that the development team presents the final product to the client and the
software goes “live” to end users. In the first week of its use, end users discover a defect not
previously detected by any of the members of the software build team that critically impairs the
ability to execute certain types of trades and causes investors to lose a significant but not
catastrophic amount of money. The defect is not linked to a specific individual’s work, and the
interdependence and complexity of the software development lifecycle adds to the ambiguity of
the situation and source of the defect. Thus, the failure of the team to deliver on expectations is a
diffuse negative outcome. Yet in this unexpected negative situation, the development team,
disappointed and worried after its failure to deliver a quality product to the client, will expect an
account or explanation of the outcome (Scott & Lyman, 1968) likely from the leader of the team.
Envision a parallel scenario in which the trading software goes beyond what the business
client requested, by executing trades more quickly or providing additional functionality that
minimizes the time investors spend clicking through windows or entering figures. The
unexpected positive nature of this outcome might also warrant an explanation from the leader, an
account of the team’s success. In these two contrasting examples, the leader has a number of
decisions to make regarding her communication to the team members, especially with regard to
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the blame or credit that they may expect her to address. Why might a leader shift blame towards
herself and away from the team in the case of the diffuse negative outcome (or vice versa)? In
the case of the diffuse positive outcome, what might drive a leader to shift credit away from
themselves and towards the team (or vice versa)?
Although the current literature on blame and credit has examined specific types of
behaviors, such as blame assignment and credit taking (e.g., Crant & Bateman, 1993; Gunia,
2011; Shaver, 1985; Gioia and Sims, 1985; Greenwald, 1980), it has not fully addressed other
blame and credit behaviors. As a result, there is great potential to develop theories to increase our
understanding of what motivates leaders to engage in different types of blame and credit
behaviors following a diffuse outcome. Extending our understanding of why leaders might
choose to engage in one behavior over another will allow us to educate managers and leaders of
organizations and teams on why they may be engaging in these types of behaviors, whether
intentionally or unintentionally.
3.2 Definitions and Boundary Conditions
Blame behavior is the voluntary designation of responsibility for a negative outcome
internally towards the self or group of individuals (e.g., self, subordinates, followers), whereas
credit behavior is the voluntary designation of responsibility for a positive outcome internally
towards the self or group of individuals. Credit and blame behaviors can be envisioned on two
separate spectrums of behavior (see Figure 3.1). On the spectrum of credit behaviors, credit is
shifted toward others on one end (i.e., assigning credit) and toward the self on the opposite end
(i.e., taking credit), with sharing credit in the middle (e.g., sharing credit with the self and
others). The spectrum of blame behaviors is constructed in the same way, with blame shifted
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toward the self on one end (i.e., taking blame) and toward others on the other end (i.e., assigning
blame), with sharing blame in the middle.

Figure 3.1. Spectrum of Blame and Credit Behaviors.

As uncovered in Study 1, leaders may also deflect blame and credit. Deflecting behaviors
can be classified in two ways. Deflection may be observed merely as a description of a positive
or negative outcome, without placing blame or credit on an individual or group. Deflection can
also appear in the form of an excuse or justification, attributing an event to an external, rather
than internal, cause that may not necessarily involve another person or group – for example, to
good or bad fortune or to situational factors. The opposite ends of the spectrum of blame and
credit behaviors depicted in Figure 3.1 signify blame or credit being shifted toward other people
or to the self, which does not include deflecting behaviors that shift blame or credit on other
individuals. Descriptions or factual summaries of what happened following a positive or negative
outcome are sometimes interpreted as deflection, but these statements are not blame or credit
behaviors that designate responsibility for an outcome towards the self or group of individuals.
Therefore, in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, I focus on the assigning, sharing, and taking
of blame and credit rather than the deflecting of either, and the subsequent theory and studies
only examine blame and credit behaviors directed towards the leader’s self or her subordinates.
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Moreover, the theoretical model in Chapter 3 involves diffuse events, or outcomes that
cannot readily be attributed to a single source or cause. Several parties may be responsible for
the outcome. Furthermore, the model applies to events that are meaningful to the leader but does
not include events of very small or very large magnitude. Events of very large magnitude may
impact a leader’s behaviors beyond medium-sized outcomes that are typically encountered by
organizations and teams because they may cause catastrophic consequences. Leaders may not
think that events of a very small magnitude warrant a response as compared to events of
relatively more impact. Therefore, the theory presented in Chapter 3 assumes that diffuse
outcomes are those that are substantive and meaningful, but not extreme in magnitude. These
successful or unsuccessful outcomes rise to a leader’s level of consciousness enough to warrant a
communication of blame or credit, but not so much that they threaten the viability of the
organization.
Lastly, the theory constructed in Chapter 3 establishes a set of motives that drive leaders
to enact different blame and credit behaviors following positive and negative outcomes. In this
theoretical model, a motive is an individual difference that is more state-like than trait-like and
can be viewed as a long-lasting state. It is not a characteristic that is ephemeral or that changes
dramatically – it lasts for a longer period of time, but is not permanent. In this chapter, the
theoretical propositions argue that a leader’s motives induce her blame and credit behaviors, and
thus that these motives are linked to how a leader communicates blame and credit.
3.2.1 Blame-taking versus apology. Blame-taking is different from apology.
Management scholars define an apology as including both an expression of fault (similar to
blame-taking) and an expression of regret or remorse (Kim et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006), such
that an apology “acknowledges both responsibility and regret for a trust violation” (Kim, Dirks,
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& Cooper, 2009: 411) and the apologizer “must acknowledge responsibility… and express regret
… these are the definitional qualities of apologies” (Scher & Darley, 1997: 129). Thus, an
apology, as defined in the management literature, includes two elements: a component that
conveys fault and another that conveys remorse. The Oxford dictionary defines “apology” as “a
regretful acknowledgement of an offense or failure” and “apologize” as “to express regret for
something that one has done wrong” (Apologize, 2016; Apology, 2016). Blame-taking is only
part of an apology and is analogous to the expression of fault (e.g., “I take the blame for this
outcome,” “this is my fault”), and it does not necessarily include an expression of regret (e.g., “I
am sorry that this happened”).
Although scholars have looked at the role of apologies in repairing trust following a
violation, this body of work has operated largely on the assumption that in organizational and
work settings, termination of a relationship may not be an option. In order for the trust repair
process to begin, the parties each must be willing to put in the effort to repair a relationship they
deem worth repairing (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). However, why individuals might be willing to
put in effort and how they come to the calculus that the benefits of continuing the relationship
outweigh the costs has not yet been examined. In this dissertation, I examine the antecedents,
specifically the possible motives, behind why leaders may enact certain blame and credit
behaviors. The motives driving blame and credit behaviors may help inform potential
antecedents of apologies as well.
3.2.2 Focal audience. In the current and subsequent chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4),
the scope of blame and credit behaviors pertains only to internal behaviors. Study 1 examined the
public acknowledgements of blame and credit made by professional football coaches to an
external audience (and observable by the internal audience), but the remainder of this dissertation
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focuses solely on blame and credit behaviors enacted toward an internal audience. Based on
responses to interview questions in the Pilot Study, coaches focus heavily on and understand that
their behaviors in private with the athletes (e.g., during practice, on the sidelines of a game) have
implications beyond public press statements. Coaches also seem to have varying reasons for
acting in a certain way or deliver a particular message. Therefore, the scope of Chapters 3 and 4
focuses on the private communications and interactions between leaders and their subordinates
(i.e., members of the internal audience – the players, formal members of the team)
In addition, with respect to these internal, private communications, the scope of Chapters
3 and 4 includes communications of blame and credit concerning the intra-team internal
audience rather than the extra-team internal audience. To clarify, an organization refers to a
social structure with hierarchy and division of labor (Hall, 1987; Scott, 1964; Weber, 1928).
Within an organization, I differentiate between two types of internal audiences: the intra-team
audience and the extra-team audience. The intra-team audience refers to individuals and parties
directly involved in the event and diffuse outcome who could sustain blame or receive credit due
to their proximity to the outcome. Both types of audiences include individuals and groups who
can be hierarchically situated above, below, or at a laterally equivalent level with the individual
or group involved in the diffuse event or the individual engaging in the blame or credit behavior.
On the other hand, the extra-team audience refers to parties affiliated with or located within the
organization and who are not directly involved in the diffuse event (e.g., other managers or
employees who are not involved in the event). The extra-team audience may have reactions to
the leader and her behaviors and communications, even though the audience is not a formal
member of the team and its actions are not linked to the outcome.
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In the example of the software development team described previously, the intra-team
audience is comprised of the leader or manager and the members of the development team. The
extra-team audience includes other employees, teams, and managers within the organization who
were not working on the specific project, as well as the business client to whom the product was
delivered. The extra-team audience parties who are official members of the organization in
which the event occurred but not directly related to the event (i.e., not formal members of the
team). They are not relevant to the blame and credit behaviors enacted by leaders, but can be
observers with their own perceptions and reactions to these behaviors.
3.3 Motives Driving Blame and Credit Behaviors
Leaders enact various blame and credit behaviors that include the taking, sharing, and
assigning of credit or blame. These credit behaviors occur along a spectrum that shifts blame (or
credit) toward the self (i.e., taking) or toward others (i.e., assigning), with sharing of blame (or
credit) occurring in the middle of the spectrum (see Figure 3.1). In the following sections, I
introduce four theoretical perspectives on motives that cause leaders to enact specific types of
blame and credit behaviors toward the self or toward others: (1) ego-defensive, (2) impression
management, (3) implicit beliefs, and (4) relationship building motives. Based on the twodimensional classification scheme established in the paragraphs following, this set of motives
encompasses the most common drivers at play in interpersonal processes and thus for engaging
in blame and credit behaviors, but may not be exhaustive.
The literatures from which I extracted these motives differs, and as a result, I introduce
each of these four motives separately. This accounts for the possibility that they may result in
divergent predictions based on differing assumptions; in Chapter 3, I tie these different
theoretical perspectives together. In making sense of these disparate literatures and identifying
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the set of motives of blame and credit behavior associated with them, I also establish a way to
categorize the motives on two dimensions. This classification scheme provides a way to organize
four classes of motives that comprise the most common reasons for a leader’s blame and credit
behaviors.
The classification scheme I developed as part of the theoretical model classifies each
motive on two dimensions: objective and direction. A visual depiction of the matrix composed of
these two dimensions is shown in Table 3.1. The primary dimension, the objective of the motive,
refers to whether the behavior driven by the motive is enacted with the purpose of influencing
either image or performance. An image objective indicates that the motive is associated with
ultimately enhancing one’s image, whereas a performance objective indicates that the motive is
related to enhancing performance, either of self or of others (e.g., subordinates, the team).

Table 3.1 Categorizations of the Four Motives Driving Blame and Credit Behaviors
2. Direction
INWARD

OUTWARD

IMAGE

Ego-defensive motive

Impression management
motive

PERFORMANCE

Implicit beliefs motive

Relationship building motive

1. Objective

The secondary dimension, the direction of the motive, refers to whether the objective of
the motive is directed either inward or outward. An inward direction indicates that the goal of the
motive is self-focused (e.g., related to one’s own ego or beliefs); whereas, an outward direction
implies that the goal of the motive focuses on others (e.g., related to others’ perceptions or
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relationships with others). The direction of the motive is different from the concepts of
individualism and collectivism. For example, the objective of an individual’s motive may be to
enhance performance, but this objective could be in an inward direction – e.g., to enhance one’s
own performance. Moreover, the objective of an individual’s motive could be to enhance image,
and this objective could be in an external direction – e.g., to enhance one’s image with respect to
how others perceive and see the individual. In addition, the fact that the objective of image has
an outward direction does not mean that it is necessarily collectivistic in nature, because being
perceived favorably by others may not be directly aligned with collectivistic or joint goals or
norms.
In the following section, each motive is presented not only in terms of, first, its image or
performance objective and, second, its inward or outward direction, but also with propositions
regarding the motive’s relationship to blame and credit behaviors. Each motive is presented
separately because the research supporting each is distinct. This chapter thus unifies these four
theoretical spaces to explain why individuals are driven to enact blame and credit behaviors
toward the self and toward others. The motives are presented in order of their objective: those
with an image objective are presented first (i.e., ego-defensive and impression management
motives), followed by those with a performance objective (i.e., implicit beliefs and relationship
building motives). A diagram depicting the proposed relationship between the motives with
blame and credit behaviors can be seen in Figure 3.2.
3.3.1 Ego-defensive motive. Literature on relational and motivational psychology has
operated on the assumption that humans are universally motivated to promote and defend a
positive self-image (Greenwald, 1980). This literature indicates that individuals will take credit
for successes and blame others for failures in order to avoid threats to their self-esteem.
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Greenwald states that “people perceive themselves readily as the origin of good effects and
reluctantly as the origin of ill effects,” citing evidence that people accept more credit for
successful outcomes and assign more blame for unsuccessful outcomes (Greenwald, 1980: 605).
These arguments from psychology function on the assumption that blame threatens a positive
self-esteem, whereas credit strengthens a positive self-esteem. The motivation to avoid threats to
self-esteem thus drives individuals to reduce the blame and increase the credit assigned to them
(Shaver, 1985) because individuals may see blame and credit behaviors as ways to maintain their
ego.

Figure 3.2. Diagram of Motives Driving Blame and Credit Behaviors.

Displaying an ego-defensiveness bias when it comes to attributing causality for
successful and unsuccessful experiences underscores the tendency to place or shirk blame instead
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of taking blame for shortcomings (Ross, 1977). This pattern was observed in governmental
hearings after the financial crisis. The ego-defensive motive has an image objective because the
goal is ultimately related to enhancing sense of self-image and perceptions of self – or her ego.
With respect to the secondary motive dimension, direction, the ego-defensive motive driving
blame and credit behaviors has an inward direction because the image objective refers to image
and perceptions of the self. Research on ego-defensiveness suggests that because individuals are
more likely to take credit for successful outcomes than take blame for unsuccessful outcomes in
order to preserve a positive ego, therefore, leaders motivated strongly by a desire to protect and
promote ego should enact blame and credit behaviors consistent with an ego-defensiveness bias.
Proposition 1. Leaders motivated to protect and defend their ego will tend to enact blame
behaviors toward others and credit behaviors toward the self.
3.3.2 Impression management motive. The impression management literature defines
impression management itself as “the process by which individuals attempt to control the
impressions others form of them,” which can be traced back to notion that “people have an
ongoing interest in how others perceive and evaluate them” (Leary & Kowalski, 1990: 34). In the
context of this dissertation, actors prefer to be seen by others in a favorable light, and leaders in
particular are motivated to be seen as competent and effective in their roles (Pfeffer, 1981).
Because individuals in leadership positions may feel the need to maintain a sense of authority
and competency, they could enact behaviors to ensure that others view their competency
favorably (e.g., Elsbach, 2003; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983).
With respect to the impression management motive, “others” refers to the both the intra-team
and the extra-team audience. Leaders may be concerned with the perceptions and evaluations of
an extra-team audience member, such as managers of other teams or individuals with a higher
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hierarchical rank. Leaders may also recognize that blame and credit behaviors can be used to
strategically shape their reputation and others’ views of them so that other parties (e.g., extrateam audience members) believe they are responsible for successes rather than failures (e.g.,
Crant & Bateman, 1993). Furthermore, individuals may believe that they have more to gain from
being seen positively by others than they have to lose by casting others in a negative light, and
therefore, the benefits to being seen in a positive light may outweigh the costs of putting others
in a negative light.
As a result, leaders strongly influenced by a desire to preserve their image in the eyes of
others, in particular the extra-team audience, may be motivated to maintain their status. The
impression management motive is similar to the ego-defensive motive in that both of these
motives have the primary objective of serving image. Therefore, these two motives are
appropriately grouped into an image objective bucket. The ego-defensive and impression
management motives, however, are dissimilar in their direction. The ego-defensive motive is
directed inward while the impression management motive has an outward direction, associated
with how others perceive the actor. This idea aligns with those from impression-management
theory, which suggests that actors prefer to be seen by others in a favorable light (Gioia and
Sims, 1985; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983; Tedeschi, Schlenker,
& Bonoma, 1971). The outward direction of the impression management motive does not
indicate that this motive is collectivistic in nature; instead, it simply denotes that individuals
motivated to manage impressions attempt to do so to enhance their image (i.e., the objective of
the motive). Specifically, they prefer to be perceived favorably in the eyes of others (i.e., the
outward direction of the motive), not necessarily (or solely) in their own eyes.
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I expect that leaders motivated to maintain their authority and competency as leaders may
act to manage these impressions accordingly, and as a result, leaders who are motivated to
manage others’ impressions will shift blame away from and credit towards themselves.
Proposition 2. Leaders motivated to manage impressions will tend to enact blame
behaviors toward others and credit behaviors toward the self.
3.3.3 Implicit beliefs motive. The third motive, the implicit beliefs motive, is the first
motive out of four that falls into the bucket of a performance objective. The implicit beliefs
motive operates on ideas from implicit leadership theory, or preconceptions of the patterning of
leadership variables (Eden & Leviatan, 1975). Implicit theories of leadership represent
followers’ subjective view of a leader. Implicit leadership theory derives from Rosch’s (1977,
1978) categorization theory, in which individuals create and possess schemas in their mind that
store exemplars of different types of leaders. Literature on implicit leadership theories (ILTs)
suggests that congruency between follower ILTs and leader behavior is linked to more positive
evaluations of leaders (Nye & Forsyth, 1991). Positive ILTs are those “ideal” leader qualities
such as being charismatic and team-oriented. When leaders exhibit these qualities, subordinates
may show higher overall well-being, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment
(Epitropaki & Martin, 2005). In the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior
Effectiveness (GLOBE) project, House and colleagues (1999) developed and validated a 112item leadership behavior scale that measured the image of an ideal leader, or an effective leader.
The scale determines if an individual believes a behavior or characteristic greatly inhibits or
greatly contributes to an individual being an outstanding leader. In the GLOBE project, House
and colleagues found that positive ILTs, or qualities prototypical of an ideal leader, included

55

characteristics such as being team-oriented, charismatic, participative, and humane, and excluded
characteristics like being self-protective and autonomous.
From the literature on ILTs, we know that individuals hold stored conceptions of traits
associated with leadership that inform their ILTs and lay theories about “good leadership.” These
ILTs may prompt leaders to enact credit and blame behaviors in particular ways. Individuals
want to communicate their desired identity (e.g., “a good leader”), and others will use these
messages to make inferences about them (Belk, 1988, Berger and Heath, 2007). Moreover,
leaders who have their own ILTs regarding how a “good leader” acts may believe that wasting
tangible and intangible resources on the allocation of blame for a diffuse event will preclude
optimal performance outcomes. These leaders may want to behave in ways they believe a “good
leader” would in order to enhance performance outcomes.
Literature outside of academia suggests that people have lay beliefs about “good leaders,”
namely that good leaders take blame rather than shirk blame or place blame on their employees.
American business-related news media have published articles on how to “navigate the blame
culture,” “stop playing the blame game,” and other blaming-related topics (e.g., Donner, 2011;
Fast, 2010; Patel, 2014; Zimmerman, 2011). Although there may be variations in implicit beliefs
about how a good leader acts, the implicit beliefs motive outlined here operates on the
assumption that, in general, individuals believe that a good leader acts in ways that are more
team- rather than self-focused. Thus, the implicit beliefs motive contrasts with the ego-defensive
and impression management motives.
The primary dimension, the objective, of the implicit beliefs motive is to improve the
performance of the leader, and subsequently the team, through the actions that an ideal, or good,
leader would take. By attempting to be an ideal leader, and therefore, enact the qualities of an
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“ideal” leader, the leader hopes to perform well. The objective of this motive is performancebased, the motive’s direction, and the secondary dimension, is inward rather than outward
because this motive presumes the leader is attempting to deliver a high quality “performance” as
the leader. A leader who holds these implicit beliefs about good leadership and attempts to act
accordingly as a leader does so to fulfill her personal belief about how a good leader should act.
Conceptualization of ideal leadership, or ILT, is closely related to individual self-concept. In a
similar vein, individuals want to work for leaders who match their ILTs, and individuals may
also want to be the type of leader for whom they would want to work (e.g., Epitropaki & Martin,
2005). ILTs may influence a leader’s behavior because individuals are motivated to behave
consistently with his or her own self-concept (e.g., Lord & Brown, 2001), which is related to
idealized conceptualizations of leadership. Thus, by trying to behave congruently with her
personal beliefs regarding good leadership, the leader is attempting to match their implicit
theories regarding ideal leadership with her behaviors as a leader. Thus, I expect that leaders
driven by the implicit beliefs motive will enact blame and credit behaviors congruent with the
qualities of what a “good leader” would do.
Proposition 3. Leaders who are motivated to fulfill positive ILTs will tend to enact blame
behaviors toward the self and credit behaviors toward others.
3.3.4 Relationship building motive. Leadership behaviors that occur through
interpersonal exchanges can help develop the relationship between a leader and a member (for
example, LMX) by establishing norms of reciprocity and patterns of interdependence
(Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Interdependence in social
exchanges involves mutual and complementary arrangements; thus, social exchanges are defined
by bidirectional transactions (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Molm, 1994). The principal of
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reciprocity is key to understanding the interdependent nature of social exchanges because if one
party supplies a benefit (i.e., an individual takes the blame for an undesirable outcome), the
receiving party should respond correspondingly in the future. Social exchange theory assumes
that exchange relationships that follow expectations of reciprocity will “evolve over time into
trusting, loyal, and mutual commitments” (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005: 875). Therefore,
leaders may believe that employees will repay a supportive employer with hard work (e.g., if
leader supplies a benefit, receiving party will respond in kind in the future).
For example, the gesture of taking blame may be considered a high quality social
exchange that enhances perceptions of organizational support. Stronger relationships between a
leader and her followers may then enhance team performance. Scholars suggest that perceived
organizational support predicts organizational commitment, and that organizational commitment
improves with increased perceptions of organizational support (Settoon et al., 1996; Masterson et
al., 2000). Not only does greater organizational commitment positively influence job
performance (Rhoades, Eisenberger, & Armeli, 2001), but high levels of perceived
organizational support have also been linked to better job performance (Eisenberger et al., 2001;
Randall, Cropanzano, Bormann, & Birjulin, 1999; Wayne et al., 1997). Therefore, interpersonal
exchanges in the form of blame and credit behaviors may be used as a way to establish and
strengthen the relationship between a leader and her subordinates.
Blame and credit behaviors may also be seen as a way to build trust and respect. Trust in
a leader is defined as the expectation or belief that the leader has good intentions toward the
group and that the team can rely on the leader’s actions or words (Dirks, 2000). If a leader
assigns the blame to a subordinate or subordinates for a failure, trust in the leader may decrease.
On the other hand, a leader who takes the blame after a diffuse failure sends the message that the
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failure was a result of poor leadership and of the leader’s behavior. By blaming her own
leadership instead of the behavior of the team members, the leader may be perceived as more
trustworthy because she is fulfilling her role as a leader, which strengthens the quality of the
relationship between leader and subordinate. As a result, leaders may believe that blame and
credit behaviors are viable means to augment the relationship with a subordinate.
A leader motivated by the potential benefits of social exchange may engage in behaviors
that could be perceived as supportive of her followers. Yet the converse argument can be made
that leaders will behave in ways that do not necessarily augment their relationship with a
subordinate, but instead protect the relationship and their followers from harm (e.g., Rosen et al.,
2011). Leaders may enact certain blame and credit behaviors in order to establish a relationship
(e.g., placing credit, taking blame), but they may also be motivated to avoid certain blame and
credit behaviors. These leaders do not wish to harm their followers (e.g., avoiding placing direct
blame, avoiding taking credit) and instead wish to protect them as a way to maintain their high
quality relationship (e.g., Scandura & Graen, 1984). As a byproduct of that protection, leaders
may believe that employees will repay them in the future in accordance with the story of
interdependent exchange and mutual obligations as outlined by social exchange theory
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).
with hard work (e.g., if leader supplies a benefit, receiving party will respond in kind in
the future) – these perceived mutual obligations may lead some leaders to believe that .
The objective of the relationship building motive is to augment performance. By building
relationships and improving relationship quality with subordinates, leaders driven by the
relationship building motive aim to ultimately see performance improvements. Thus, the implicit
beliefs motive and the relationship building motive can be grouped together into a performance
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objective bucket. Furthermore, a leader driven by a relationship building motive thus works to
establish and maintain her relationships with followers (i.e., subordinates and other individuals
who are a part of the intra-team audience) in order to enhance performance. Thus, the
relationship building motive can be classified as being directed outward, as the leader behaves to
uphold the relationship and/or avoid harming the other individual. I expect that leaders driven to
develop positive relationships with subordinates will exhibit blame and credit behaviors to that
end.
Proposition 4. Leaders motivated to strengthen relationships with their subordinates will
tend to enact blame behaviors toward the self and credit behaviors toward others.
Although it is possible that other motivations also exist, the proposed set of four motives
include the most common motives that influence leaders’ blame and credit behaviors and
communications. These can be envisioned as individual differences, or characteristics, with
internal drivers. These motives are not fleeting, but they also are not permanent. Each of the
motives introduced are states that are relatively long-lasting drivers of a leader’s blame and
credit behaviors, compared to ephemeral states. I argue that individuals are driven to some extent
by each of the four motives presented, but that one motive (e.g., to manage impressions) may
outweigh one (or all) of the other motives (e.g., to build and strengthen relationships with
subordinates). In short, a leader holds some level of each of the four motives, but some motives
are more salient than others. Therefore, one (or more) motive may be more salient for a leader,
and this motive may have heightened impact on her blame or credit behaviors. Conversely, (or
more) motive may be more muted for a leader, and this motive may have diminished influence
on her blame or credit behaviors.
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3.3.5 Relaxing the assumption of an internal, intra-team audience. The scope of the
motives introduced above is limited to the blame and credit behaviors of a leader directed toward
the internal, intra-team audience – that is, those individuals who are officially affiliated with (i.e.,
employed by) the organization and directly involved in the event and diffuse outcome, such that
they could sustain blame or receive credit due to their proximity to the outcome. The impression
management motive, as delineated above, relaxes this assumption slightly to allow for certain
leaders who may be motivated to manage the impressions that both the internal intra-team
audience and extra-team audience (e.g., other employees who do not report to that leader, other
managers with similar hierarchical rank) have of them. For the impression management motive,
this difference in assumption with respect to the audience of the behaviors enacted by a leader
stems from the notion that some leaders may be motivated to be viewed as competent in their
role by others within the organization (Elsbach, 2003; Pfeffer, 1981). Thus, blame and credit
behaviors beyond what a leader directs toward an internal, intra-team audience can be studied for
other motives as well. In the following section, I will explain how different types of audiences
may change how motives manifest as blame and credit behaviors.
To begin, the boundaries that separate the external audience from the internal audience,
as well as the intra-team from the extra-team audiences within the internal audience, can be
thought of as either open or closed. The boundary may affect the extent to which leader blame
and credit behaviors may be observed or visible to one or more audiences. Boundaries, then,
allow us to explore the isolation of an audience from the behaviors that another audience
observes. An open boundary refers to a porous boundary through which all leader behaviors and
communications pass easily and are not isolated to a specific audience. For example, when there
is an open boundary, behaviors enacted toward an external audience or even an internal, extra61

team audience are observable by the internal, intra-team audience. An NFL press conference is
an example of an open boundary that is accessible and observable by both internal and external
audiences. On the other hand, a closed boundary refers to a boundary through which the
behaviors and communication from the leader cannot and do not pass and are isolated to a
specific audience. For example, when there is a closed boundary, behaviors enacted toward an
external audience (or an internal, extra-team audience) are not observable by the internal, intrateam audience.
In addition, the type of audience observing the leader’s blame or credit behavior and the
boundaries associated with these audiences will not influence the two motives categorized as
having an inward direction with respect to objective (i.e., ego-based motive and implicit beliefs
motive). The behaviors predicted by these motives will not change because the objective of both
the ego-based motive and implicit beliefs motive is directed inward instead of outward and is
focused on the self (i.e., one’s own ego or own beliefs) rather than on others in the environment
(i.e., the perceptions and relationships one has with other individuals). Leaders driven by the
ego-based motive or the implicit beliefs motive will not act differently toward different types of
audiences. For example, a leader driven most strongly by the implicit beliefs motive, to enact
behaviors congruent with those of an ideal leader and with positive ILTs, will want to behave
consistently with this idealized conceptualization of leadership in front of an external audience as
well as in front of all types of internal audiences.
Conversely, because their objective is directed outward instead of inward, the impression
management motive and relationship building motive may be affected by different types of
audiences and the boundaries between those audiences.

62

Impression management motive. When boundaries between audiences are closed,
leaders who are driven by the impression management motive may then view their resulting
blame and credit behaviors as a means to tailor their image to a specific audience (e.g., an
external audience, an internal intra-team audience, or an internal extra-team audience) because
leader behaviors observed by one audience are not visible to another. Furthermore, leaders may
feel the need to manage impressions differently when communicating to internal extra-team
audiences situated hierarchically above, below, or laterally (Ginzel et al., 2004). Toward
superiors, a leader may engage in blame and credit behaviors directed toward an upward, extrateam audience that protect her image of being competent in a leader role. As a result, the leader
may shift credit toward the self and blame away, as predicted. In a laterally equivalent or in a
downward direction (e.g., toward an extra-team audience member who is hierarchically situated
below), a leader may be driven in a similar manner – to shift blame away and credit toward (e.g.,
Crant & Bateman, 1993).
Consider next a leader who would like to be viewed by others in a favorable light to
individuals at her same hierarchical rank or to lower level employees who either report or do not
report to them (e.g., either the intra-team audience or extra-team audience). This leader may wish
to manage the impression of being a certain type of leader (for example, team-oriented,
generous, or humble). In this case, for the leader, managing impressions might mean shifting
credit away toward others and shifting blame toward the self to appear as though one is a humble
and/or team-oriented leader. A similar prediction can be made for an external audience; if a
leader wishes to protect an image of being competent in front an audience with closed
boundaries, she will shift credit toward the self and shift blame away toward others. Yet, these
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behaviors may be less likely to occur and perhaps reversed if the leader wishes for the external
audience to perceive him or her as being a generous, humble, or team-oriented leader.
In a situation in which there are open boundaries across the different types of audiences,
leaders’ behaviors will be visible to a variety of audiences, both internal and external. With open
boundaries, leaders may then enact behaviors that maintain the impression that the leaders wish
to manage in light of the highest priority audience. For example, if the leader has a low priority
to cater to the external or the internal, extra-team audience, and instead, the leader’s top priority
is to maintain an impression of being a competent leader in the eyes of the internal, intra-team
audience, she may then shift blame toward others and shift credit toward themselves in front of
an audience with open boundaries. If she is most inclined to be perceived as a favorable, teamoriented leader in the eyes of the internal, intra-team audience (and lower on the list of priorities
are the internal, extra-team audience and the external audience), however, she may shift credit
toward others and shift blame toward the self. The desire and motivation to be perceived as
team-oriented may lead her to engage in relationship building. In this sense, the manifestations of
blame and credit behavior stemming from one’s drive to manage impressions may be congruent
with the manifestations of behavior stemming from a drive to build relationships. Whether the
boundaries between audiences are closed or open may influence what impression a leader wishes
to manage and how.
Relationship building motive. When boundaries across audiences are closed, a leader’s
blame or credit behavior observed by one audience is not visible to and is isolated from the
purview of other audiences. As a result, the leader may attempt to use blame and credit behaviors
as a means to build relationships with other types of audiences. As previously described, an
extra-team audience can be situated hierarchically above, below, or laterally equivalent. A
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leader’s blame and credit behaviors communicated toward an upward, internal, extra-team
audience may not be the most effective means to build relationships. Yet, if this is the case, then
a leader who is driven to build relationships with her superiors, or the internal audience members
situated hierarchically above, may shift blame toward the self and shift credit away toward others
(e.g., their own employees and team members) in order to signal that they can be held
accountable in the organization. Nevertheless, building a relationship with a superior may
sometimes mean promoting one’s own competence, and that would then fall in line with the
impression management motive and the behavior linked to that driver.
In contrast, if the extra-team audience to which the leader is communicating blame or
credit is located at an equivalent level or downward, a leader driven to build relationships with
these types of audiences may want to signal that she is trustworthy and not the type of leader to
throw others under the bus (e.g., Rosen et al., 2011). Thus, in these cases, a leader may be
inclined to shift blame toward the self and shift credit toward others. With respect to building a
relationship with an external audience while boundaries across audiences are closed, the blame
or credit behaviors enacted by a leader and communicated to these parties may be slightly
different. Because these behaviors are not visible to anyone within the organization (either the
intra-team or extra-team audience), the relationship that the leader wishes to build with external
audience members (i.e., family members, partners, friends) is outside the scope of the
organization. Therefore, leaders may be less likely to engage in behaviors that directly serve to
build relationships with individuals who work in the same organization, let alone individuals
who work for them or on their teams.
In cases where there are open boundaries across the different types of audiences, leaders’
behaviors will be visible to a variety of audiences, both internal and external. With open
65

boundaries, leaders may then enact behaviors that either protect their relationships with their
subordinates or protect their subordinates directly (or both) in an effort to preserve and maintain
positive relationships with their employees. When boundaries are open across audiences, a leader
will likely engage in the same blame and credit behaviors in front of all audiences as they would
an internal, intra-team audience (i.e., shifting blame toward the self and shifting credit toward
others) because they do not wish to harm the relationship they do have and want to have with
their subordinates. Acting in a way that shift blame toward their subordinates and credit toward
the self could potentially harm their subordinates as well as the relationship.
3.4. Individual- and Group-focused Moderating Factors
Although these motives are internal and can be visualized as long-lasting states and as
individual differences or characteristics, there may also be contextual factors, such as
organizational culture or reward structure, which contribute to variation in blame and credit
behaviors as well. When an individual walks into a different context, the factors within that
context will influence the relationship between the motives and blame and credit behaviors. A
contextual factor may change the blame or credit behavior that a leader ultimately enacts, even
though she may continue to be driven by a specific motive (or motives). In the previous section, I
argued that leaders who hold certain motives, or characteristics, will tend to enact certain blame
or credit behaviors across situations, but it is important to address that contextual factors may
either decrease or increase the behavioral manifestations of those tendencies or motives.
Individuals will continue to hold certain motives; those motives may continue to exist, but the
relationship from a leader’s natural motives to her behaviors may be amplified or attenuated.
In the following section, I introduce two contextual factors that may influence the degree
to which a leader’s motive drives blame or credit behavior: (1) the organization’s culture and (2)
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the reward system. I introduce these two specific motives because they are prominent factors in
organizations that fit well with the theory developed in this chapter. Each of these motives are
likely to affect how an individual behaves because they change the way certain behaviors, in
particular blame and credit behaviors, are valued or perceived within an organization. I also
highlight these two contextual factors because they are likely to affect the objective of an
individual’s motivation to act in a certain way. Indeed, the two factors delineated may switch a
leader’s focus toward image or toward performance (i.e., related to the objective dimension of
the motive), and in doing so, the relationship between the leader’s motive and their natural blame
and credit behaviors may be altered. While contextual factors do not change whether the
individual has a particular motive, these contextual factors may change how a leader decides to
behave, and, in turn, their blame and credit behaviors.
Specifically, I look at each of these factors in terms of how individual- or group-focused
they are. In a sense, the extent to which a factor is individual- or group- focused can be related to
the constructs of individualism and collectivism.4 While collectivism and individualism has been
studied at the societal level, collectivistic and individualistic values can be present at the
organizational level as well (Earley, 1993), for example, through the attraction, selection, and
attrition mechanism (Schneider, 1987). As part of this theoretical model, I incorporate the effects
of individualistic and collectivistic values in an organization rather than of a society. In extant
literature, the individualism construct refers to a concern for oneself and immediate family,

4

At this point, the current theoretical model focuses on organizational cultural differences and has yet to encompass
national cultural differences. National and societal cultural differences are addressed in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.3:
Future Research). In Chapter 5, cultural differences, including individualism versus collectivism and low versus
high power distance, are discussed with respect to the implicit beliefs and relationship building motives.
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personal autonomy and self-fulfillment, and the link from identity to personal accomplishments
(Hofstede, 1984); thus it is conceptualized more broadly as “a worldview that centralizes the
personal … and peripheralizes the social” (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002: 5). In
contrast, the collectivism construct assumes that the group, or collective, binds and mutually
obligates individuals to further the goals of the group. In a similar vein, organizational cultures
and reward systems can each be categorized as individual-focused or group-focused.
I argue that the individual-focused versus group-focused nature of the contextual factors
(i.e., organizational culture and reward system) may shape, and more specifically, moderate the
relationship between a leader’s natural motive and subsequent blame and credit behavior due to
the contextual factor’s impact on the objective of the motive. When leaders are subject to
individual-focused factors, such as an individualistic organizational culture or an individual
reward structure, they may be more likely to act in the service of their own image because the
environment emphasizes the importance of the individual and her own accomplishments. On the
other hand, when leaders are exposed to group-focused factors, such as a collectivistic
organizational culture or shared reward structure, they may be more likely to act to further the
performance of the group as a whole, through actions of their own, because the environment
emphasizes the importance of the collective and its shared interests.
3.4.1 Organizational culture. The culture of an organization is rooted in and
characterized by the values, beliefs, and assumptions held by organizational members, which in
turn shape which members and elements of the organization’s operations become salient and
how individuals within the organization perceive and interact with one another (Denison, 1996;
Trice & Beyer, 1993; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996). Culture contributes to an organization’s
identity and sets the standard for members’ behaviors. As a result, I draw a connection between
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the emphasis an organization’s culture places on collectivistic or individualistic values and
potential behaviors within the organization.
Whether an organization places an emphasis on individualistic or collectivistic values is
related to task environment, organizational history, or industry; both individualism and
collectivism are considered “legitimate and effective models of organizational functioning”
(Chatman & Barsade, 1995: 424; e.g., Lincoln, Olson, and Hanada, 1978; Chatman and Jehn,
1994). In an organizational culture with strong individualistic values (i.e., individual-focused),
organizational members place priority on the pursuit and maximization of individual goals.
Examples include encouraging employees to think independently and to make decisions on their
own (Chatman & Barsade, 1995). People in these environments tend to focus on their own and
others’ specific unique abilities and traits, categorizing them into what makes them different and
unique from others. Conversely, in organizational cultures that emphasizes collectivistic values
(i.e., group-focused), members place priority on shared goals and collective action. The focus is
on joint objectives, shared interests, and commonalities among others in the organization.
Examples include employees sharing responsibilities, brainstorming ideas together, and making
decisions as a group.
Drawing on the example of the software development team’s failure (or success), the
organizational culture perceived by the members of that team and specifically the leader of that
team will shape their behaviors. Namely, whether the culture tends toward individualistic or
collectivistic values and norms might change a leaders’ behavior through the impact of these
values on to what extent particular blame or credit behaviors they enact, despite their motive(s).
For example, if the team fails to deliver a successful product to the client, the leader’s propensity
may be to shift blame towards the rest of the team because the impression management motive
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tends to drive her behaviors. The extent to which the organization’s culture stresses collectivistic
or individualistic values, however, may suppress the behaviors linked to her impression
management motive and activate different behaviors instead.
To clarify the link from individualistic and collectivistic cultures to the set of four
motives and the proposed ensuing blame and credit behaviors, I focus on the classification of the
motives in terms of their objective, in the classification scheme developed in Chapter 3 (see
Table 3.1). The objective of a motive refers to whether the resulting blame or credit behavior is
enacted with the goal of either influencing the individual’s (i.e., the leader’s) image or
influencing the performance. In an individualistic organizational culture with individual-focused
norms, people are fixated more on meeting (and exceeding) their own goals and on their own
unique characteristics and accomplishments. As a result, individualistic values are more
congruent with the ego-defensive and the impression management motives, both of which have
the objective of enhancing one’s own image in terms of either one’s own ego or how others
perceive them. In contrast, in a collectivistic organizational culture with group-focused norms,
members tend to fixate on the optimization of shared objectives and goals and on their shared
interests. Therefore, collectivistic values are more congruent with the implicit beliefs and the
relationship building motives, which, in turn, have the objective of enhancing performance,
either through one’s own performance as a leader or through the improvement of relationships
with subordinates. Although leaders will continue to harbor a particular motive(s), organizational
culture may change the likelihood of that motive manifesting as certain blame and credit
behaviors, rather than changing whether the individual continues to hold that motive.
As a result, when a leader’s motive(s) is incongruent with the organizational culture, the
emphasis on individualistic or collectivistic values may then effectively suppress the behavioral
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tendencies associated with this motive and instead activate behaviors that are more aligned with
the organizational culture. Thus, the individualism or collectivism of an organizational culture
will moderate the relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors.
Proposition 5. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors will vary
based on organizational culture.
a) In an organizational culture with an emphasis on collectivistic values, the
relationship between the ego-defensive and impression motives and blame and credit
behaviors is weaker than in a culture which emphasizes individualistic values.
b) In an organizational culture with an emphasis on individualistic values, the
relationship between the implicit beliefs and relationship building motives and blame
and credit behaviors is weaker than in a culture which emphasizes collectivistic
values.
3.4.2 Reward structure. Organizations can employ reward structures by which to
distribute rewards to two or more individuals, thereby motivating employees and allocating
resources. Reward structures have been grouped into two “pure” types (e.g., Deutsch, 1949b;
Johnson and Johnson, 1989; Tjosvold, 1982): individual rewards (sometimes known as
“competitive”) and joint or shared rewards (also known as “cooperative”). Individual rewards are
more individual-focused and are based exclusively on the performance of one individual and are
may be referred to as “competitive” because individuals are rewarded for outperforming others
(e.g., Pearsall et al., 2010). Shared rewards are more group-focused and provide a common
interest for individuals to work together and perform well because the reward depends on
collective performance. In a department store, employees may be compensated based on
individual or shared rewards. For example, when an individual employee in the furniture
department receives an annual bonus of $1,000 because she has exceeded her annual, personal
sales target by 10%, this constitutes an individual reward. When all the employees in the
furniture department receive a salary raise of 10% because the furniture department exceeded
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their annual departmental profit goals by 5%, this constitutes a shared reward. In another
example, Nucor, a steel production company, implements a shared reward system such that
steelworkers making batches of steel receive a bonus tied to the production of defect-free steel
during the group’s entire shift (Hope, 2009). It follows, then, that individual rewards are
classified as more individual-focused because members are rewarded for performance based on
their individual achievements, whereas shared rewards are more group-focused because
members are rewarded for joint contributions to the organization (e.g., Triandis, 1989).
Similar to organizational culture, in an individual-focused, individual reward structure,
leaders may be more likely to focus on themselves and the maximization of their own
achievements while disregarding or even minimizing the achievements of others. This type of
reward structure is more congruent with the ego-defensive motive and the impression
management motive, both of which have the objective of enhancing image in terms of either how
a leader sees herself or how others perceive her, respectively. Conversely, in a group-focused,
shared reward structure in which individuals are rewarded based on the performance of the
group, leaders may be more likely to focus on the collective and the optimization of their
behavior in an effort to bolster performance overall. The shared reward structure thus stresses a
focus on collective outcomes and is more congruent with the implicit beliefs motive and the
relationship building motive, both of which have the objective of enhancing performance
through exhibiting the characteristics of an “ideal” leader and building relationships. Even
though leaders will continue to harbor a particular motive(s), the reward system of their
organization may change the tendency of that motive translating into certain blame and credit
behaviors, rather than changing whether the individual continues to hold that motive.
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As a result, when a leader’s motive(s) is incongruent with the reward structure, the
emphasis on individual or shared rewards may then effectively suppress the behavioral
tendencies associated with this motive and instead activate behaviors that are more aligned with
the reward system. Thus, the individual or shared nature of the reward structure will moderate
the relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors.
Proposition 6. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors will vary
based on reward structure.
a) Under a shared reward structure, the relationship between the ego-defensive and
impression motives and blame and credit behaviors is weaker than under an
individual reward structure.
b) Under an individual reward structure, the relationship between the implicit beliefs
and relationship building motives and blame and credit behaviors is weaker than
under a shared reward structure.
Together, the four motives outlined in this chapter – the ego-defensive, impression
management, implicit beliefs, and relationship building motives – provide the most common
reasons for leaders’ blame and credit behaviors towards an internal audience following a diffuse
outcome. Although other motives may exist, these four motives should be viewed as a set within
which most other motivations fall. I proposed two contextual factors that contribute to this
variation as well. The extent to which organizational culture or reward structure is more focused
on the individual or on the collective may influence the relationship from motives to blame and
credit behaviors. When a leader’s motive is incongruent with the contextual factor of
organizational culture or reward structure, she may enact blame and credit behaviors that are not
predicted by her motive and instead are more aligned with the organizational culture or reward
structure. In Chapter 3, I delineated a theoretical framework of the motives that explain why
leaders express blame and credit in specific ways, as well as the impact of contextual factors. In
Chapter 4, I conduct three studies that test elements of this theoretical model.
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Chapter 4: Empirically Testing the Drivers of Blame and
Credit Behaviors
In Chapter 3, the theoretical development of a model comprised of a set of four motives
and two contextual moderators, organizational culture and reward structure, addressed what
motivates leaders to engage in distinct types of blame and credit behaviors. In Chapter 4, I report
a set of studies that empirically test the key theoretical elements introduced in Chapter 3. In
Study 2, I collected field data using survey methods in order to provide preliminary evidence that
links the four motives to blame and credit behaviors of leaders, as well as the moderating effect
of organizational culture in terms of individualism and collectivism. Thus, this study aimed to
confirm the main effects from the motives to blame and credit behaviors as outlined in the
previously stated propositions. In addition, I conducted two laboratory experiments, Study 3 and
Study 4, to test the hypothesized causal relationships between the motives and blame and credit
behaviors, in addition to reward structure as a moderator. These studies involved tasks to be
completed by the lab participant and a trained confederate, a motive manipulation, and reward
structure manipulation. Together, the contribution of the studies in Chapter 4 serve as the extent
of evidence supporting the theoretical model of motives driving blame and credit behaviors
developed in Chapter 3.
4.1 Development of Hypotheses
4.1.1 Ego-defensive motive. As outlined in Chapter 3, individuals whose blame and
credit behaviors are driven by the ego-defensive motive see their behaviors as ways to maintain a
positive self-image. The ego-defensive motive is oriented internally towards one’s own ego and
self-esteem with the objective of enhancing self-image. Thus, the ego-defensive motive can be
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operationalized by the construct of narcissism. As a concept, narcissism was introduced in the
psychological literature by Ellis (1898) and influenced Freud’s (1957) thinking, leading him to
identify different indicators of narcissism, including self-admiration and a tendency to see others
as an extension of one’s self. Although narcissism has been viewed as a clinical mental disorder
in the past, scholars have also maintained that narcissism can be conceptualized and measured as
a personality dimension (Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988). As a result, psychologists have
developed a psychometric scale for measuring narcissism beyond its designation as a clinical
syndrome (e.g., Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), Raskin & Hall, 1979). Clinicians focus
on outliers, individuals who are narcissistic to a clinical, extreme level as to impair their social
functioning in serious ways, whereas personality theorists focus on the full range of narcissistic
expressions, which encompass the less extreme, subclinical manifestations of narcissism.
Research has suggested that narcissism is positively associated with self-esteem
(Emmons, 1987; Morf and Rhodewalt, 1993) and biased self-enhancement (John and Robins,
1994), while it is negatively associated with the discrepancy between one’s sense of self and
one’s sense of ideal self (Emmons, 1987). Research has also suggested that narcissists regulate
their self-esteem by engaging in the defensive process of grandiose self-conceptualization as a
way of reinforcing their sense of self-importance, for example by winning admiration (Raskin et
al., 1991). Cognitively speaking, narcissism involves a belief that one possesses superior
qualities. In terms of motivation, narcissists have a strong need to have one’s superiority
reaffirmed. The craving for further admiration may lead a narcissist to engage in both
exhibitionism and the diminishment of others. Thus, leaders who are more narcissistic may be
more likely to take credit (rather than assign credit) for successful outcomes and assign blame
(rather than take blame) for unsuccessful outcomes.
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Hypothesis 1a. There is a positive relationship between leader narcissism and blame
behaviors toward others.
Hypothesis 1b. There is a positive relationship between leader narcissism and credit
behaviors toward the self.
4.1.2 Impression management motive. Leaders driven by the impression management
motive may enact blame and credit behaviors to uphold a sense of competency and authority.
These individuals may attempt to shape others’ views of them so that people believe them
responsible for successes rather than failures because they are motivated to maintain their image
in the eyes of others (i.e., external orientation, image objective). Although social psychologists
developed the concept of impression management, organizational scholars have suggested that
impression management research in social psychology can generalize to organizational settings
(Wortman & Linsenmeier, 1977). Impression management is the process or set of strategies that
people use to influence how others perceive them (i.e., the image that others have of them)
(Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995; Jones & Pittman, 1982).
The impression management motive can be linked to the concept of impression
motivation, which represents the extent to which individuals are motivated to control how others
see them (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Research suggests that this motivation comes into play
when an individual wishes to control how others perceive them when they have a goal and when
presenting themselves in a certain way will help them attain that goal (Leary, 1995). Researchers
have studied impression motivation in the context of personnel selection (e.g., Jansen et al.,
2012; Ingold et al., 2015); for example, when trying to receive a job offer, job candidates may
attempt to convey an impression that they perceive to be favorable to the potential employer. In a
similar vein, a leader may be motivated to portray a favorable impression of herself in light of a
failure or a success, as in the impression management motive.
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Therefore, individuals with high levels of impression motivation may be likely to engage
in blame and credit behaviors that emphasize their own abilities and competencies while
denigrating those of others around them.
Hypothesis 2a. There is a positive relationship between impression motivation and blame
behaviors toward others.
Hypothesis 2b. There is a positive relationship between impression motivation and credit
behaviors toward the self.
4.1.3 Implicit beliefs motive. As outlined in Chapter 3, individuals hold stored
conceptions or categorizations about leadership that inform their implicit leadership theories
about what constitutes an ideal leader. When leaders exhibit “ideal” leader qualities, subordinates
may show higher overall well-being, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment
(Epitropaki & Martin, 2005). The GLOBE project led to the development of a scale of 112
leadership behavior items that determines if an individual believes a behavior or characteristic
greatly inhibits or greatly contributes to an individual being an outstanding leader (House et al.,
1999). Positive ILTs, or qualities prototypical of an ideal leader, included characteristics such as
being team-oriented, charismatic, participative, and humane, and excluded characteristics like
being self-protective and autonomous.
Leaders themselves, as members of an organization, hold beliefs about ideal leader
qualities that may prompt them to enact credit and blame behaviors in particular ways. They may
want to communicate their desired identity as an ideal or effective leader so that others use these
messages to make inferences about them (Belk, 1988, Berger and Heath, 2007). Furthermore,
leaders who hold beliefs about an ideal leader prototype may be motivated to enact behaviors
congruent with an effective leader in order to ultimately enhance their team’s performance.
Specifically, leaders who hold implicit beliefs about ideal leadership (i.e., positive ILTs) that
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align with House et al.’s (1999) prototype of effective leadership may be more likely to enact
blame and credit behaviors that shift more blame towards themselves and more credit toward
subordinates because such behaviors are perceived as more team-oriented, charismatic,
participative, and humane, and less self-protective and autonomous.
Hypothesis 3a. There is a positive relationship between positive ILTs of an ideal (i.e.,
effective) leader prototype and blame behaviors toward the self.
Hypothesis 3b. There is a positive relationship between positive ILTs of an ideal (i.e.,
effective) leader prototype and credit behaviors toward others.
4.1.4 Relationship building motive. According to the relationship building motive, some
leaders may be compelled to establish high quality relationships with subordinates, as high
quality relationships have been linked to higher team performance. As described in Chapter 3,
leaders who aim to establish a relationship with a subordinate may engage in interpersonal
exchanges that reinforce norms of interdependence and reciprocity, and blame and credit
behaviors may be viewed as one way of doing so.
Comparably, high quality relationships are characterized by mutual trust, respect, and
obligation (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995); whereas low quality relationships refer to those in which
leaders instead engage in more contractual exchanges, for example, by allocating standard
benefits in return for standard job performance. Although quality of a leader-member
relationship conceptualized in the construct of leader-member exchange, or LMX, has often been
measured from the perspective of a subordinate’s perception of her relationship with a
supervisor, leaders can also hold their own beliefs regarding the strength of LMX with certain
subordinates (e.g., Cogliser et al., 2009; Sin et al., 2009). Furthermore, because not all
subordinates may desire high quality LMX relationships (Maslyn & Uhl-Bien, 2005), it is
possible that not all leaders are inclined, either consciously or subconsciously, to establish and
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maintain high quality LMX with subordinates. Some leaders may have a strong desire to
strengthen LMX, whereas others might not; thus, the motivation to establish a quality
relationship with subordinates can be conceptualized as a characteristic, or individual difference,
which leaders hold. Leaders who wish to maintain high quality LMX relationships with
subordinates thus might engage in distinct blame and credit behaviors in an effort to do so. It
follows that leaders who are motivated to establish high LMX relationships may be more likely
to engage in behaviors that shift blame toward themselves and shift credit toward subordinates
because doing so builds trust and a sense of obligation with subordinates.
Hypothesis 4a. There is a positive relationship between motivation to establish high
quality LMX relationships and blame behaviors toward the self.
Hypothesis 4b. There is a positive relationship between motivation to establish high
quality LMX relationships and credit behaviors toward others.
4.1.5 The role of individual-focused and group-focused factors. Based on the
theoretical model developed in Chapter 3, individuals may possess all four motives but one
motive may be more salient and another more muted. Contextual factors proposed in the
previous chapter may influence the activation or suppression of specific motives, including the
emphasis the organization’s culture places on individualistic or collectivistic values and the
organization’s reward structure.
In an organizational culture that emphasizes individualistic values, the pursuit and
maximization of individual goals weighs more heavily than shared goals, and individuals tend to
focus on their own and others’ unique competencies and traits (Chatman & Barsade, 1995). This
lies in direct contrast to collectivistic values. In an organization whose culture promotes
collectivistic values, members focus more on shared objectives and interests. An individual’s
context can influence which whether she engages in certain blame or credit behaviors. A
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contextual factor like the organizational culture’s emphasis on individualistic or collectivistic
values then shape the extent to which the motive-aligned behaviors manifest.
In an individualistic organizational culture, people are focused more on the optimization
of their own goals, characteristics, and accomplishments, which is aligned with the objective of
enhancing one’s own image. If a leader is naturally inclined toward the two motives with the
objective of enhancing group performance (i.e., implicit beliefs motive, relationship building
motive), being in a context that is more individual-focused may change their inclinations toward
certain blame and credit behaviors. In contrast, in a collectivistic organizational culture,
members tend to be more focused on the optimization of shared objectives and group interests;
as a result, collectivistic values are aligned with the objective of enhancing group performance. If
a leader is naturally inclined toward the two motives with the objective of enhancing own image
(i.e., ego-defensive motive, impression management motive), leading in a context that is more
group-focused may change their tendencies toward certain blame and credit behaviors. Thus, I
argue that emphasis on individualism or collectivism of an organization’s culture will moderate
the relationship between the motives and blame and credit behaviors.
Hypothesis 5a. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors is
moderated by organizational culture such that in an organizational culture that
emphasizes collectivistic values:
i)
The relationship between narcissism and blame and credit behaviors will have a
lower correlation than in an organizational culture which emphasizes
individualistic values.
ii)
The relationship between impression management motivation and blame and
credit behaviors will have a lower correlation than in an organizational culture
which emphasizes individualistic values.
Hypothesis 5b. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors is
moderated by organizational culture such that in an organizational culture that
emphasizes individualistic values:
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i)

ii)

The relationship between ILTs of an ideal leader prototype and blame and credit
behaviors will have a lower correlation than in an organizational culture which
emphasizes collectivistic values.
The relationship between motivation to establish high quality LMX relationships
and blame and credit behaviors will have a lower correlation than in an
organizational culture which emphasizes collectivistic values.

A second contextual factor is the reward system within an organization. As described in
Chapter 3, under an individual reward structure, members are rewarded for performance based
on their individual achievements, and thus individuals may feel motivated to demonstrate
individualistic behaviors (e.g., Deutsch, 1949b; Johnson and Johnson, 1989; Tjosvold, 1982).
Under a shared reward structure, an organization’s members are rewarded for joint contributions
to the organization, and thus they may demonstrate more cooperative behaviors. Thus, individual
and shared rewards may moderate the relationship between what leaders are naturally motivated
by (i.e., the four motives) and various blame and credit behaviors. However, hybrid, or mixed,
rewards, which are comprised of a combination of individual and shared rewards (e.g., Pearsall
et al., 2010), may have less of an impact on the degree to which they change the activation or
suppression of certain motives. An example of a hybrid reward is when an employee in the
furniture department in a department store receive a salary raise because the department as a
whole has exceeded their profit goals for the year, but she also receives an additional annual
bonus because she exceeded her personal sales target. Because hybrid rewards are mixed,
individuals may simply default to the motive that is most naturally activated, and motives that
are generally suppressed may remain that way. I argue that the organization’s reward structure
moderates the relationship between motives and blame and credit behaviors.
Hypothesis 6a. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors is
moderated by reward structure such that under a shared reward structure,
i)
The relationship between narcissism and blame and credit behaviors will have a
lower correlation than under an individual reward structure.
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ii)

The relationship between impression management (i.e., self-promotion and
intimidation) and blame and credit behaviors will have a lower correlation than
under an individual reward structure.

Hypothesis 6b. The relationship between motive and blame and credit behaviors is
moderated by reward structure such that under an individual reward structure:
i)
The relationship between ILTs of an ideal leader prototype and blame and credit
behaviors will have a lower correlation than under a shared reward structure.
ii)
The relationship between motivation to establish high quality LMX relationships
and blame and credit behaviors will have a lower correlation than under a shared
reward structure.
4.1.6 Attitudes toward the leader. Research on social exchange theory and reciprocity
norms between two interacting parties suggests that individuals respond in kind to benefits they
receive. Social exchange theory assumes that exchange relationships that follow expectations of
reciprocity will “evolve over time into trusting, loyal, and mutual commitments” (Cropanzano &
Mitchell, 2005: 875). Leaders who blame the employees without including themselves in the
blame create a fragmented relationship, where the leader’s responsibility for the team’s output is
unclear. Blaming employees implies that the leader is disconnected from the work, and therefore
might create a psychological distance between the two parties such that the employees feel
belittled or disgruntled. Conversely, when a leader takes the blame for subordinates, this gesture
may be considered a high quality social exchange leading to greater levels of perceived
organizational support. Additionally, a manager taking the blame for a negative event seemingly
caused by her team can be categorized as an example of supervisory support. Supervisory
support, in turn, has been shown to be associated with and potentially a cause of organizational
support (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002; Eisenberger et al., 2002). Scholars suggest that perceived
organizational support predicts organizational commitment, in that organizational commitment
improves with increased perceptions of organizational support (Settoon et al, 1996; Masterson et
al., 2000).
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Whether a leader assigns blame to other actors in the organization, or takes the blame
personally, will influence how employees feel about their leader. Trust in leadership –
conceptualized as the expectation or belief that a leader has good intentions toward the group and
that the team can rely on the leader’s actions or words – is positively related to team performance
(Dirks, 2000). If a leader lays the blame for a diffuse failure on the members of the team,
suggesting that her behavior is what led to the failure, this may demonstrate a fragmentation
between the leader and the team that leads to reduced trust. Conversely, a leader who takes the
blame after a diffuse failure sends the message that the failure was a result of poor leadership,
not the result of the employee’s behavior. If a leader takes the blame for a negative event and the
subordinates respond by matching the protection and helpfulness of the blame-taker, the act of
blame-taking reflects a favorable social exchange. Favorable social exchanges are linked to the
interpersonal construct of trust, wherein trust between two parties (e.g., an employee in the
organization and her supervisor) increases with favorable social exchanges (Blau, 1964). By
blaming her leadership instead of the behavior of the team members, the leader may be perceived
as more trustworthy because they are fulfilling their role as a leader.
Because individuals are more likely to feel safer and more positive about a manager
whom they perceive as trustworthy, trust in leadership is also positively related to organizational
commitment (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Subordinates who perceive greater levels of supervisory
support and have higher levels of trust in their leader may be more likely to engage in
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs), extra-role behaviors that are discretionary and not
related to the formal reward system but still supportive of the organization’s functioning (Organ,
1988a). An example of an OCB would be willingly helping others who have work-related
problems, even though doing so is neither a part of their job responsibilities nor helpful in
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receiving extra formal rewards at work. Individuals who experience a great deal of blame may be
less likely to engage in OCBs and may have lower levels of trust in the leader because they feel
little supervisory support. Thus, subordinates with leaders who shift blame toward themselves
and shift credit toward their subordinates are more likely to have higher levels of trust in their
leader and to exhibit OCBs.
Hypothesis 7. There is a positive relationship between blame and credit behaviors and
subordinate OCBs, such that
a) Leader blame behaviors toward the self are associated with greater OCBs enacted by
their subordinates.
b) Leader credit behaviors toward others are associated with greater OCBs enacted by
their subordinates.
4.2 Study 2: Studying the Motives behind Blame and Credit Behaviors of Managers
The purpose of this study was to provide evidence of a link between the four motives
(ego-defensive, impression management, implicit beliefs, and relationship building) to blame and
credit behaviors (Hypotheses 1 – 4). This study also aimed to test the effect of organizational
culture (individualistic vs. collectivistic values) on those relationships (Hypothesis 5) and to test
the relationship between leader behaviors (both blame and credit) and subordinate OCBs
(Hypothesis 7).
4.2.1 Methods.
Participants. I recruited 210 working managers via Prolific Academic (known as
Prolific) in exchange for $2.06. Prolific Academic is an online platform that is explicitly
designed for online participant recruitment by the scientific community (Palan & Schitter, 2018).
The Prolific Academic platform has the ability to pre-screen participants on demographic
variables (e.g., gender, age, employment status). A requirement to compensate participants an
effective rate of $6.50 per hour or more helps to maintain a high quality of response (Peer,
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Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisiti, 2017). Recent research provides evidence that higher quality
data is collected because participants recruited through Prolific are more honest and naïve to
common measures than other online platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (Peer et al.,
2017). As a result, researchers have used Prolific Academic as an alternative to Amazon
Mechanical Turk, especially when pre-screening participants on multiple specific demographic
variables (e.g., Adam, Ku, & Lux, 2019; De Cremer et al., 2018; Kappes, Balcetis, & De
Cremer, 2018; Matz & Gladstone, 2018; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2018).
I pre-screened participants via Prolific Academic to recruit only individuals who were
currently in a managerial role at work, who had been in this role for over a year, and who had at
least two direct reports (i.e., subordinates). I refer to these participants as “leader” participants in
the study. Data from 16 participants who failed attention checks were excluded from the final
sample. There were four attention check questions displayed randomly in the survey that
instructed participants to select a specific response option (e.g., “If you are reading carefully,
please select ‘Agree’.”). An incorrect response option was considered a failed attention check,
and participants who failed any of the attention checks in the survey were dropped from the
dataset. Thus, the final sample size was N = 194. Of the participants included in this study, 57%
were female and 90% were white.
Procedure. The participants (“leaders”) were directed to an online Qualtrics survey with
scales measuring their tendency toward each of the four motives and their perception of the
organization’s culture in terms of individualism or collectivism, detailed below. The leader
participant responded to items regarding their blame and credit behaviors following a past
positive outcome and a past negative outcome.
Measures.
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Ego-defensive motive. In order to assess the extent to which the ego-defensive motive
was salient, leaders completed a measure of narcissism derived from the original, 40-item
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988): the NPI-16 (Ames, Rose, &
Anderson, 2005). The NPI-16 measure is a widely used, validated, shorter, unidimensional
measure derived from the set of items in the NPI-40, consisting of 16 pairs of statements for
which participants select the statement that best reflects their personality. For example, a pair of
statements is “I am more capable than other people” and “There is a lot that I can learn from
other people.” Cronbach’s alpha for the 16 narcissism items was .75.
Impression management motive. To assess the extent to which the impression
management motive was salient, leaders completed a measure of impression motivation adapted
from three of seven items developed and validated by Jansen et al. (2012) and an additional three
items. See Appendix B for the entire adapted scale. The adapted impression motivation scale was
found to be highly reliable (6 items; α = .86).
Implicit beliefs motive. To assess the extent to which the implicit beliefs motive was
salient, leaders responded to 18 items based on findings from the Global Leadership and
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) research program (House et al., 1999). These
18 items were comprised of descriptive words or phrases taken from Javidan and colleagues’
(2006) conceptualization of the culturally endorsed implicit leadership theory of outstanding
leadership. The items were presented to leader participants, who then rated to what extent they
believed that the trait was characteristic of an effective leader, on a 7-point Likert scale from
“Not at all characteristic” to “Extremely characteristic.” These items measured what
characteristics and behaviors an individual believes an outstanding or effective leader possesses
and enacts. Examples include “Involves other in making decisions,” “Self-protective,”
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“Motivational,” “Emphasizes team building,” “Supportive,” and “Face-saving.” See Appendix B
for the entire scale. The implicit beliefs measure of outstanding or effective leadership was found
to be highly reliable (18 items; α = .83).
Relationship building motive. To assess the extent to which the relationship building
motive was salient, leaders completed items adapted from the multi-dimensional LMX-MDM,
12-item scale developed by Liden and Maslyn (1998). Participants responded to the items on a 7point Likert scale, from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The original items in the 12-item
scale are used to evaluate an individual’s feelings toward their immediate supervisor. I adapted
these items to reflect to what extent a leader is or is not motivated to establish high quality LMX
relationships with subordinates. For example, the original item “My manager would come to my
defense if I were “attacked” by others” was modified to “I would come to a subordinate’s
defense if they were “attacked” by others.” I then also added two items to the scale to reflect a
desire to build relationships with subordinates and checked the reliability of this scale as a whole.
See Appendix B for the entire adapted 14-item scale. Cronbach’s alpha for the 14 items was .82.
Individualistic versus collectivistic organizational culture. To assess the extent to which
the participant perceived that his or her organization emphasizes individualism or collectivism,
participants responded to items from the Organizational Culture scale developed by Chatman and
Spataro (2005). The scale included seven words or phrases measuring organizational culture on a
7-point Likert scale from “most uncharacteristic” to “most characteristic” of the organization’s
culture. The seven items were: team-oriented, collaborative, people-oriented, individually
demanding, supportive, fair, and competitive. Cronbach’s alpha for the seven organizational
culture items was .75.
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Leader blame and credit behaviors. To assess each leader’s blame and credit behaviors,
participants were asked to think about how they generally react following an unsuccessful
outcome (e.g., diffuse failure) at work, with a definition of such an event (e.g., “a negative
outcome for which the cause is ambiguous”). Then, they were presented with a series of
statements that reflect three different blame behaviors. The leader participants were asked to
indicate which one of the three statements most closely reflects how they generally respond after
that type of outcome. There were three sets of three statements each to form a composite item
measuring blame behavior. They responded to these items twice, the first time with respect to
their communication to their subordinates: assigning blame (e.g., “You made a mistake.”),
sharing blame (e.g., “We made a mistake.”), and taking blame (e.g., “I made a mistake.”). The
second time, they responded with respect to their communication to their communication to their
own superiors: assigning blame (e.g., “They made a mistake.”), sharing blame (e.g., “We made a
mistake.”), and taking blame (e.g., “I made a mistake.”). The full text of the three blame
statements can be found in Appendix B, “Items Measuring Leader’s Blame and Credit
Behaviors.” The composites were labeled “general blame behavior,” with respect to an audience
of subordinates (three items; α = .85), as well as an audience of superiors (three items; α = .87).
Then, participants were asked to recall a specific situation in which that type of
unsuccessful outcome occurred at work, and to indicate on the same scales as above what their
actual response was in the situation they recalled. These were labeled “situation-specific blame
behavior,” with respect to an audience of subordinates (three items; α = .93), as well as an
audience of superiors (three items; α = .93).
The leader participants were also asked to think about how they generally react following
a successful outcome (e.g., diffuse success) at work, with a definition of such an event (e.g., “a
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positive outcome for which the cause is ambiguous”). Then, they were presented with a series of
statements that reflect three different credit behaviors: assigning credit, sharing credit, and taking
credit. Then, the leader participants were asked to indicate which one of the three statements
most closely reflects how they generally respond after that type of outcome. Again, there were
three sets of three statements each to form a composite item measuring credit behavior. They
responded to these items twice, the first time with respect to their communication to their
subordinates, and the second time with respect to their communication to their own superiors.
The full text of the three credit statements can be found in Appendix B, “Items Measuring
Leader’s Blame and Credit Behaviors. The composites were labeled “general credit behavior,”
with respect to an audience of subordinates (three items; α = .85), as well as an audience of
superiors (three items; α = .88).
Then, participants were asked to recall a specific situation in which that type of
successful outcome occurred at work, and to indicate on the same scales as above what their
actual response was in the situation they recalled. These were labeled “situation-specific credit
behavior,” with respect to an audience of subordinates (three items; α = .94), as well as an
audience of superiors (three items; α = .89).
The order in which they are asked to recall either the most recent diffuse failure or the
most recent diffuse success was randomized. See Appendix B to see the statements associated
with each type of blame and credit behavior.
Attitudes toward the leader. In this study, leaders completed a measure rating the
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) of their subordinates. The items in this scale,
developed by Podsakoff and Mackenzie (1989; Podsakoff et al., 1990), included those based on
the five dimensions of OCB described by Organ (1988a): altruism, sportsmanship, courtesy,
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conscientiousness, and civic virtue. The measure of subordinate OCBs was found to be highly
reliable (10 items; α = .86).
Other variables and control variables. In addition to measuring demographic variables
such as gender, age, and ethnicity, I also measured the leader’s job insecurity as a control
variable, as job insecurity may be linked to blame and credit behaviors. A leader with high job
insecurity, in which they feel a “"powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a threatened
job situation" (Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984: 438), may be more likely to enact credit
behaviors toward the self and blame behaviors towards others because they fear that taking more
blame could increase this insecurity. Conversely, a leader with low job insecurity may think that
because they are not in a threatened job situation, they can afford to take some risks and instead
enact blame behaviors toward the self and credit behaviors towards others. Job insecurity was
assessed using Ashford, Lee, and Bobko’s (1989) items measuring perceived threat to total job
and powerlessness.
4.2.2 Results. I computed the means and standard deviations of the various individual
difference and behavior measures collected in the study. These can be found in Table 4.1 and
Table 4.2, respectively. Histograms depicting the distributions of the measures can be seen in
Appendix C, Figures C1 – C14. Additionally, the descriptive statistics and correlations between
each of the measures are displayed in Table 4.3.
I conducted a series of regressions to examine the relationship between the motive
measures and the leader’s self-reported blame and credit behaviors. Then, I conducted
regressions in which the leader’s scores on each of the four motive measures (separately) served
as the criterion (i.e., independent) variable, and the blame or credit behavior composites served
as the predictor (i.e., dependent) variables. The behavior composites were further classified as
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being 1) “situation-specific” or “general” and 2) for an audience of subordinates or an audience
of superiors. A negative coefficient indicated behavior shifting blame or credit toward others,
and a positive coefficient indicated a shift toward the self. Control variables included in the
regression analyses were gender, age, ethnicity, role tenure, and job insecurity, unless otherwise
noted. Descriptive statistics and correlations of the control variables are also included in Table
4.3.
Table 4.1 Study 2 – Means and Standard Deviations – Variables Measured
Variable
Mean St. Dev.
Min.
Max
Narcissism
0.23
0.19
0.00
0.94
Impression Motivation
6.22
0.68
3.00
7.00
ILT of Ideal Leadership
3.86
0.44
2.22
4.72
LMX Motivation
5.72
0.57
3.86
7.00
Organizational Culture
4.66
0.85
1.29
6.43
Subordinate OCBs
4.85
0.95
1.00
7.00
Note: N =194. Potential range for Narcissism was between 0 and
1. Impression Motivation, LMX Motivation, Organizational
Culture, and Subordinate OCBs were on a 7-point Likert scale. ILT
of Ideal Leadership was on a 5-point Likert scale.

Table 4.2 Study 2 – Means and Standard Deviations – Blame and Credit Measures
Variable
Mean St. Dev.
Blame - General; subordinate audience
4.43
0.93
Blame - General; supervisor audience
4.51
1.06
Blame - Situation-specific; subordinate audience 4.31
1.18
Blame - Situation-specific; supervisor audience
4.35
1.26
Credit - General; subordinate audience
3.66
0.88
Credit - General; supervisor audience
3.79
0.85
Credit - Situation-specific; subordinate audience 3.62
1.00
Credit - Situation-specific; supervisor audience
3.79
0.94
Note: N =194. All behaviors were measured on a 7-point Likert scale.

91

Min.
2.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Max
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00

Table 4.3 Study 2 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of All Variables

Job
Impression
LMX
M
SD
Min
Max
Gender
Age
Ethnicity Role Tenure Insecurity Narcissism Motivation
ILT
Motivation
Gender (Female = 1)
0.57
0.50
0
1
Age
37.31
9.57
22.00 66.00
0.04
Ethnicity (White = 1)
0.90
0.30
0
1
0.15*
0.08
Role Tenure
5.15
4.47
1.00
30.00
0.03
0.44**
-0.10
Job Insecurity
2.33
0.89
1.00
5.00
0.00
0.06
-0.18*
-0.01
α = .63
Narcissism
0.23
0.19
0.00
0.94
-0.14+
-0.06
-008
0.07
-0.02
α = .75
Impression Motivation
6.22
0.68
3.00
7.00
0.22**
-0.03
0.00
-0.05
0.04
0.08
α = .86
ILT of Ideal Leadership
3.86
0.44
2.22
4.72
0.19**
0.02
-0.05
-0.03
-0.04
-0.18*
0.35**
α = .83
LMX Motivation
5.72
0.57
3.86
7.00
0.09
0.09
-0.03
0.01
-0.01
0.03
0.53**
0.30**
α = .82
Organizational Culture
4.66
0.85
1.29
6.43
0.09
-0.08
0.03
0.00
-0.18*
-0.04
0.17*
0.11
0.11
Subordinate OCBs
4.85
0.95
1.00
7.00
0.13+
-0.02
0.01
0.07
-0.26**
0.03
0.21**
0.24**
0.18*
Blame - General; subordinate audience
4.43
0.93
2.00
7.00
-0.02
0.07
-0.04
0.04
0.01
-0.09
0.18*
0.05
0.15*
Blame - General; supervisor audience
4.51
1.06
1.00
7.00
-0.05
0.09
-0.06
0.09
0.00
-0.10
0.14+
0.09
0.05
Blame - Situation-specific; subordinate audience
4.31
1.18
1.00
7.00
-0.11
0.04
-0.02
0.02
-0.05
-0.24**
0.05
0.08
0.03
Blame - Situation-specific; supervisor audience
4.35
1.26
1.00
7.00
-0.06
0.09
0.03
-0.02
-0.05
-0.25**
0.06
0.08
0.04
Credit - General; subordinate audience
3.66
0.88
1.00
7.00
-0.06
-0.01
-0.08
0.12+
0.07
0.10
0.00
-0.05
0.06
Credit - General; supervisor audience
3.79
0.85
1.00
7.00
-0.06
-0.03
-0.02
0.14+
0.04
0.17*
0.07
-0.05
0.02
Credit - Situation-specific; subordinate audience
3.62
1.00
1.00
7.00
-0.08
-0.05
-0.14*
0.15*
0.04
0.18*
0.06
-0.11
0.10
Credit - Situation-specific; supervisor audience
3.79
0.94
1.00
7.00
-0.14*
-0.01
-0.08
0.09
0.05
0.16*
0.10
-0.09
0.12+
Note: N = 194. Job insecurity was measured on a 5-point Likert scale. Potential range for Narcissism was between 0 and 1. Impression Motivation, LMX Motivation, Organizational Culture, and Subordinate OCBs
were on a 7-point Likert scale. ILT of Ideal Leadership was on a 5-point Likert scale. All Blame and Credit Behaviors were measured on a 7-point Likert scale.
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Table 4.3 (continued) Study 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of All Variables
Organizational Subordinate
Blame Culture
OCBs
Gen; subord

Blame Gen; super

Blame Situation;
subord

Blame Situation;
super

Credit Gen; subord

Credit Gen; super

Credit Situation;
subord

M
SD
Min
Max
Gender (Female = 1)
0.57
0.50
0
1
Age
37.31
9.57
22.00 66.00
Ethnicity (White = 1)
0.90
0.30
0
1
Role Tenure
5.15
4.47
1.00
30.00
Job Insecurity
2.33
0.89
1.00
5.00
Narcissism
0.23
0.19
0.00
0.94
Impression Motivation
6.22
0.68
3.00
7.00
ILT of Ideal Leadership
3.86
0.44
2.22
4.72
LMX Motivation
5.72
0.57
3.86
7.00
Organizational Culture
4.66
0.85
1.29
6.43
α = .75
Subordinate OCBs
4.85
0.95
1.00
7.00
0.63**
α = .86
Blame - General; subordinate audience
4.43
0.93
2.00
7.00
0.06
0.15*
α = .85
Blame - General; supervisor audience
4.51
1.06
1.00
7.00
0.03
0.18*
0.79**
α = .87
Blame - Situation-specific; subordinate audience
4.31
1.18
1.00
7.00
0.13+
0.19*
0.58**
0.57**
α = .93
Blame - Situation-specific; supervisor audience
4.35
1.26
1.00
7.00
0.14*
0.20*
0.56**
0.59**
0.88**
α = .93
Credit - General; subordinate audience
3.66
0.88
1.00
7.00
0.13+
0.06
-0.02
0.01
0.01
-0.01
α = .85
Credit - General; supervisor audience
3.79
0.85
1.00
7.00
-0.01
-0.03
0.01
0.03
-0.05
-0.07
0.72**
α = .88
Credit - Situation-specific; subordinate audience
3.62
1.00
1.00
7.00
0.05
0.09
0.03
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.62**
0.59**
α = .94
Credit - Situation-specific; supervisor audience
3.79
0.94
1.00
7.00
-0.01
0.03
0.02
0.09
0.03
0.05
0.50**
0.67**
0.81**
Note: N = 194. Job insecurity was measured on a 5-point Likert scale. Potential range for Narcissism was between 0 and 1. Impression Motivation, LMX Motivation, Organizational Culture, and Subordinate OCBs
were on a 7-point Likert scale. ILT of Ideal Leadership was on a 5-point Likert scale. All Blame and Credit Behaviors were measured on a 7-point Likert scale.
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Credit Situation;
subord

α = .89

Demographic variables. I estimated regression models of gender (male, female), race
(white, non-white), and role tenure predicting blame and credit behaviors. Controlling for race
and role tenure, gender was not a significant predictor of general or situation-specific blame or
credit behavior for both types of audiences. The same was found for race (controlling for the
other two variables) and role tenure (controlling for the other two variables).
All four motives as criterion variables. I conducted regression analyses to examine how
all four motives together were related to blame and credit behaviors. The leader’s scores on all
four of the motive measures served as the criterion variables and the blame or credit behavior
composites served as the predictor variables. The regression model of all four motives predicting
blame behaviors for both types of audiences is shown in Table 4.4, and the regression model of
all four motives predicting credit behaviors for both types of audiences is shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.4 All Four Motives Predicting Blame Behaviors

Audience Type:
Narcissism
Impression Motivation
Effective Leader ILT
LMX Motivation
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 180)
F Statistic (df = 9; 180)

Criterion: Blame Behavior
General Behaviors
Situation-specific Behaviors
Subordinates
Superiors
Subordinates
Superiors
-0.12+
-0.13+
-0.31**
-0.33**
0.18*
0.21*
0.13
0.11
-0.04
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.07
-0.07
-0.03
-0.005
-0.07
-0.12
-0.20*
-0.14
0.05
0.07
0.03
0.14
-0.04
-0.05
-0.01
0.03
0.03
0.08
0.03
-0.08
-0.02
-0.02
-0.06
-0.05
4.44**
4.51**
4.31**
4.35**
190
0.06
0.02
0.93
1.33

190
0.06
0.01
1.06
1.30

Note:

190
0.09
0.04
1.16
1.96*

190
0.09
0.05
1.23
2.03*

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Table 4.5 All Four Motives Predicting Credit Behaviors

Audience Type:
Narcissism
Impression Motivation
Effective Leader ILT
LMX Motivation
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 180)
F Statistic (df = 9; 180)

Criterion: Credit Behavior
General Behaviors
Situation-specific Behaviors
Subordinates
Superiors
Subordinates
Superiors
0.06
0.11+
0.11
0.08
-0.03
0.08
0.05
0.11
-0.04
-0.02
-0.13+
-0.11
0.10
-0.01
0.13
0.10
-0.03
-0.05
-0.05
-0.13+
-0.07
-0.08
-0.12
-0.05
-0.05
0.03
-0.11
-0.03
0.14+
0.16*
0.19*
0.11
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.03
3.67**
3.80**
3.62**
3.79**
190
0.05
0.0004
0.89
1.01

190
0.06
0.02
0.85
1.33

Note:

190
0.10
0.06
0.98
2.26*

190
0.09
0.04
0.92
1.87+

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

In terms of blame behavior, for an audience of subordinates, narcissism was a significant
predictor of situation-specific blame behavior toward others, b = -0.31, p < .001, and a
marginally significant predictor of general blame behavior toward others, b = -0.12, p = .09. For
an audience of superiors, narcissism was also a significant predictor of situation-specific blame
behavior toward others, b = -0.33, p < .001, and a marginally significant predictor of general
blame behavior toward others, b = -0.13, p = .10. For an audience of subordinates, impression
motivation was a significant predictor of general blame behavior toward the self, b = 0.18, p
= .04. For an audience of superiors, impression motivation was also a significant predictor of
general blame behavior toward the self, b = 0.21, p = .03. No other motives in this regression
model were significant predictors of blame behaviors, regardless of behavior or audience type.
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In terms of credit behavior, for an audience of superiors, narcissism was a marginally
significant predictor of credit behavior toward the self, b = 0.11, p = .09. For an audience of
subordinates, effective leader ILT was a marginally significant predictor of credit behavior
toward others, b = -0.13, p = .09. No other motives in this regression model were significant
predictors of credit behaviors, regardless of behavior or audience type.
In the following sections, I test each individual hypothesis and report the results of the
regression analyses conducted by including each motive, separately, as the criterion variable.
Narcissism. In terms of blame behavior, for an audience of subordinates, narcissism was
a significant predictor of situation-specific blame behavior toward others, b = -0.30, p < .001.
For an audience of superiors, narcissism was also a significant predictor of situation-specific
blame behavior toward others, b = -0.32, p < .001. See Table 4.6 for the regression models of
narcissism predicting blame behavior. When reflecting on a specific past situation, for both an
Table 4.6 Narcissism Predicting Blame Behaviors: Regression Models

Audience Type:
Narcissism
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 183)
F Statistic (df = 6; 183)

Criterion: Blame Behavior
General Behaviors
Situation-specific Behaviors
Subordinates
Superiors
Subordinates
Superiors
-0.09
-0.12
-0.30**
-0.32**
-0.03
-0.06
-0.16+
-0.11
0.06
0.07
0.03
0.14
-0.04
-0.06
-0.02
0.02
0.01
0.07
0.02
-0.09
-0.004
-0.01
-0.05
-0.05
4.43**
4.50**
4.31**
4.35**
190
0.02
-0.02
0.95
0.49

190
0.03
-0.004
1.07
0.87

Note:

190
0.08
0.05
1.16
2.54*

190
0.08
0.05
1.23
2.77*

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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audience of subordinates and an audience of superiors, the more narcissistic an individual, the
more likely they were to report shifting blame toward their subordinates. In terms of general
blame behavior, narcissism was not a significant predictor for both types of audiences. Thus,
Hypothesis 1a was supported for situation-specific blame for both types of audiences, but not
supported for general blame.
In terms of credit behavior, for an audience of superiors, narcissism was a significant
predictor of general credit behavior toward the self, b = 0.12, p = .05. For an audience of
subordinates, narcissism was a marginally significant predictor of situation-specific credit
behavior toward the self, b = 0.14, p = .056. For an audience of superiors, narcissism was a
marginally significant predictor of situation-specific credit behavior toward the self, b = 0.12, p
= .089. See Table 4.7 for the regression models of narcissism predicting credit behavior.
Table 4.7 Narcissism Predicting Credit Behaviors: Regression Models

Audience Type:
Narcissism
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 183)
F Statistic (df = 6; 183)

Criterion: Credit Behavior
General Behaviors
Situation-specific Behaviors
Subordinates
Superiors
Subordinates
Superiors
0.07
0.12*
0.14+
0.12+
-0.04
-0.04
-0.05
-0.12+
-0.06
-0.09
-0.11
-0.04
-0.04
0.03
-0.09
-0.02
0.13+
0.15*
0.19*
0.10
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.05
3.67**
3.80**
3.62**
3.79**
190
0.04
0.01
0.89
1.21

190
0.06
0.02
0.85
1.79

Note:

190
0.07
0.04
0.99
2.47*

190
0.05
0.02
0.93
1.66

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Narcissism was not a significant predictor of general credit behavior for an audience of
subordinates. Thus, the data provide partial evidence supporting Hypothesis 1b, except for
general credit in front of an audience of subordinates. See Table 4.8 for a summary of significant
and non-significant findings related to narcissism.
Table 4.8 Narcissism Predicting Blame and Credit Behaviors: Summary of Findings
Audience Type
Subordinate Superior
Blame Behaviors
General
Shift toward others
Situation-specific
Shift toward others
Credit Behaviors
General
Shift toward self
Situation-specific
Shift toward self

n.s.

n.s.

p < .001

p < .001

n.s.

p = .05

p = .056

p = .089

Impression motivation. For audiences of subordinates and of superiors, impression
motivation significantly predicted general blame behavior in the direction opposite of what was
predicted – general blame behavior was directed toward the self rather than toward others.
Specifically, for an audience of subordinates, impression motivation was a significant predictor
of general blame behavior toward the self, b = 0.18, p = .01. For an audience of superiors,
impression motivation was a significant predictor of general blame behavior toward the self, b =
0.17, p = .03. When reflecting on their behaviors in general, for both an audience of subordinates
and an audience of superiors, the more motivated an individual was to manage impressions, the
more likely they were to report shifting blame toward themselves. In terms of situation-specific
blame behavior, impression motivation was not a significant predictor for both types of
audiences. Thus, the findings indicate results countering Hypothesis 2a. See Table 4.9 for the
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regression models of impression motivation predicting blame behavior and Table 4.11 for a
summary of findings related to narcissism and blame behavior.
Table 4.9 Impression Motivation Predicting Blame Behaviors: Regression Models

Audience Type:
Impression Motivation
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 183)
F Statistic (df = 6; 183)

Criterion: Blame Behavior
General Behaviors
Situation-specific Behaviors
Subordinates
Superiors
Subordinates
Superiors
0.18**
0.17*
0.09
0.08
-0.06
-0.09
-0.14
-0.08
0.07
0.08
0.06
0.18+
-0.03
-0.05
-0.004
0.03
0.01
0.07
-0.01
-0.12
-0.01
-0.02
-0.05
-0.05
4.43**
4.51**
4.30**
4.35**
190
0.04
0.01
0.93
1.39

190
0.04
0.01
1.06
1.28

Note:

190
0.02
-0.01
1.19
0.58

190
0.03
-0.01
1.27
0.79

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

For an audience of superiors, impression motivation significantly predicted situationspecific credit behavior toward the self, as predicted, b = 0.14, p = .05. When reflecting on a
specific past situation, for an audience of superiors, the more motivated an individual was to
manage impressions, the more likely they were to report shifting credit toward themselves.
Impression motivation did not significantly predict situation-specific credit behavior for an
audience of subordinates. Thus, Hypothesis 3b was supported for situation-specific credit in front
of an audience of superiors, but it was not supported for an audience of subordinates or for
general credit in front of both types of audiences. See Table 4.10 for the regression models of
impression motivation predicting credit behavior and Table 4.11 for a summary of findings
related to impression motivation and credit behavior.
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Table 4.10 Impression Motivation Predicting Credit Behaviors: Regression Models

Audience Type:
Impression Motivation
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant

Criterion: Credit Behavior
General Behaviors
Situation-specific Behaviors
Subordinates
Superiors
Subordinates
Superiors
0.02
0.08
0.09
0.14*
-0.05
-0.08
-0.09
-0.16*
-0.07
-0.10
-0.13
-0.06
-0.05
0.02
-0.10
-0.02
0.14+
0.17*
0.21*
0.12
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.04
3.67**
3.80**
3.62**
3.79**

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 183)
F Statistic (df = 6; 183)

190
0.03
0.002
0.89
1.06

190
0.04
0.01
0.85
1.41

Note:

190
0.06
0.03
0.99
2.05+

190
0.06
0.03
0.93
1.85+

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 4.11 Impression Motivation Predicting Blame and Credit Behaviors: Summary of
Findings
Audience Type
Subordinate Superior
Blame Behaviors
General
Shift toward self
Situation-specific
Shift toward self

p = .01

p = .03

n.s.

n.s.

Credit Behaviors
General
Shift toward self
Situation-specific
Shift toward self

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

p = .05

Note: Impression motivation led to blame behaviors that were in the direction
opposite of what was predicted. In other words, for the results reported in this
table, blame was shifted toward the self (taking blame) instead of toward
others (assigning blame).
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Implicit leadership theory. Implicit leadership theory of outstanding leadership was not a
significant predictor of any type of blame or credit behavior for any types of audiences. In this
study, there was no evidence supporting Hypotheses 3a and 3b. See Tables 4.12 and 4.13 for the
regression models of effective leader ILT predicting blame and credit behaviors respectively, and
see Table 4.14 for a summary of findings related to effective leader ILT and blame and credit
behaviors.
Table 4.12 Effective Leader ILT Predicting Blame Behaviors: Regression Models

Audience Type:
Effective Leader ILT
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 183)
F Statistic (df = 6; 183)

Criterion: Blame Behavior
General Behaviors
Situation-specific Behaviors
Subordinates
Superiors
Subordinates
Superiors
0.06
0.11
0.13
0.11
-0.03
-0.07
-0.15
-0.09
0.07
0.07
0.05
0.17
-0.03
-0.04
0.01
0.05
0.0001
0.06
-0.01
-0.12
0.002
-0.002
-0.04
-0.04
4.43**
4.50**
4.30**
4.35**
190
0.01
-0.02
0.95
0.31

190
0.03
-0.01
1.07
0.81

Note:

190
0.02
-0.01
1.19
0.75

190
0.03
-0.003
1.27
0.91

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Table 4.13 Effective Leader ILT Predicting Credit Behaviors: Regression Models

Audience Type:
Effective Leader ILT
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant

Criterion: Credit Behavior
General Behaviors
Situation-specific Behaviors
Subordinates
Superiors
Subordinates
Superiors
-0.03
-0.02
-0.10
-0.06
-0.04
-0.05
-0.05
-0.12+
-0.07
-0.10
-0.12
-0.05
-0.05
0.02
-0.11
-0.03
0.14+
0.16*
0.20*
0.11
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.04
3.67**
3.80**
3.62**
3.79**

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 183)
F Statistic (df = 6; 183)

190
0.03
0.002
0.89
1.08

190
0.04
0.004
0.85
1.13

Note:

190
0.07
0.03
0.99
2.12+

190
0.04
0.01
0.94
1.28

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 4.14 Effective Leader ILT Predicting Blame and Credit Behaviors: Summary of Findings
Audience Type
Subordinate Superior
Blame Behaviors
General
Shift toward self
Situation-specific
Shift toward self

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

Credit Behaviors
General
Shift toward others
Situation-specific
Shift toward others

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.
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LMX motivation. For an audience of subordinates, motivation to build a relationship was
a significant predictor of general blame behavior toward the self, b = 0.14, p = .04. When
reflecting on their behaviors in general, for an audience of subordinates, the more motivated an
individual was to build relationships with their employees, the more likely they were to shift
blame toward themselves. LMX motivation was not a significant predictor of general blame
behavior in front of an audience of superiors. In terms of situation-specific blame behavior, LMX
motivation was not a significant predictor for both types of audiences. See Table 4.15 for the
regression models of LMX motivation predicting blame behavior and Table 4.17 for a summary
of significant and non-significant findings related to LMX motivation and blame behavior. For
all types of credit behaviors for both audiences, coefficients for credit behavior were not
significant.
Table 4.15 LMX Motivation Predicting Blame Behaviors: Regression Models

Audience Type:
LMX Motivation
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 183)
F Statistic (df = 6; 183)

Criterion: Blame Behavior
General Behaviors
Situation-specific Behaviors
Subordinates
Superiors
Subordinates
Superiors
0.14*
0.04
0.03
0.04
-0.03
-0.05
-0.12
-0.07
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.17
-0.03
-0.05
-0.004
0.03
0.01
0.06
-0.02
-0.13
-0.002
-0.01
-0.05
-0.04
4.44**
4.50**
4.30**
4.35**
190
0.03
-0.003
0.94
0.90

190
0.02
-0.02
1.07
0.53

Note:

190
0.01
-0.02
1.20
0.44

190
0.02
-0.01
1.27
0.71

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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See Table 4.16 for the regression models of LMX motivation predicting credit behavior and
Table 4.17 for a summary of findings related to effective leader ILT and credit behaviors.

Table 4.16 LMX Motivation Predicting Credit Behaviors: Regression Models

Audience Type:
LMX Motivation
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant

Criterion: Credit Behavior
General Behaviors
Situation-specific Behaviors
Subordinates
Superiors
Subordinates
Superiors
0.08
0.03
0.12+
0.13+
-0.05
-0.06
-0.08
-0.14*
-0.08
-0.10
-0.14+
-0.07
-0.04
0.02
-0.09
-0.02
0.15*
0.17*
0.21*
0.12
0.06
0.04
0.03
0.04
3.68**
3.80**
3.62**
3.79**

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 183)
F Statistic (df = 6; 183)

190
0.04
0.01
0.89
1.29

190
0.04
0.01
0.85
1.17

Note:

190
0.07
0.04
0.99
2.30*

190
0.06
0.02
0.93
1.78

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 4.17 LMX Motivation Predicting Blame and Credit Behaviors: Summary of Findings
Audience Type
Subordinate Superior
Blame Behaviors
General
Shift toward self
Situation-specific
Shift toward self

p = .04

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

Credit Behaviors
General
Shift toward self
Situation-specific
Shift toward self

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.
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Thus, Hypothesis 4a was supported only for general blame behavior in front of an
audience of subordinates, but neither for an audience of superiors nor for situation-specific
blame. Hypothesis 4b was not supported.
Organizational culture. I conducted a series of regressions to examine whether the
relationships from the four different motives to blame and credit behaviors are moderated by
organizational culture. The individualistic or collectivistic nature of the organizational culture
appeared to shape some of the relationships between narcissism, impression motivation, and
implicit beliefs and blame or credit behaviors, although not always in the predicted direction. For
the regression models of each motive and their interaction with organizational culture predicting
blame and credit behaviors in front of each audience type, see Tables 4.18 – 4.33.
For an audience of subordinates, managers who were more narcissistic tended to take
more general credit in a more collectivistic organizational culture than in an individualistic
culture. The coefficient for the interaction between narcissism and organizational culture was
marginally significant, b = 0.75, p = .05. This marginally significant result ran counter to
Hypothesis 5a. See Figure 4.1 for the interaction plot, and see Table 4.20 for the corresponding
regression model. Other than this significant interaction term, for all other blame and credit
behaviors and audience types, the coefficients for the interaction between narcissism and
organizational culture were not significant. Specifically, the coefficients of the interaction
between narcissism and organizational culture predicting the following behaviors were not
significant at the p < .05 level: general credit behaviors for an audience of superiors, situationspecific credit behaviors for both audiences, and all types of blame behaviors in front of either
audience. Thus, these results do not provide support for Hypothesis 5a. The regression models
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for narcissism and organizational culture predicting all other blame and credit behaviors are
displayed in Tables 4.18, 4.19, and 4.21.

Table 4.18 Narcissism and Organizational Culture Predicting General Blame Behavior:
Regression Models

Narcissism
Organizational Culture
Narcissism × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: General Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
-0.43
-0.43
-0.54
-0.54
0.06
0.07
0.04
0.05
-0.07
-0.22
4.43**
4.43**
4.51**
4.51**
194
0.01
0.001
0.93 (df = 191)
1.11 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.01
-0.004
0.93 (df = 190)
0.75 (df = 3, 190)

Note:

194
0.01
0.0002
1.06 (df = 191)
1.02 (df =2, 191)

194
0.01
-0.004
1.06 (df = 190)
0.75 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 4.19 Narcissism and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific Blame Behavior:
Regression Models

Narcissism
Organizational Culture
Narcissism × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: Situation-specific Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
-1.44**
-1.44**
-1.64**
-1.64**
0.17+
0.16+
0.20+
0.19+
0.26
0.32
4.31**
4.31**
4.35**
4.35**
194
194
194
194
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
1.15 (df = 191)
1.15 (df = 190)
1.22 (df = 191)
1.22 (df = 190)
7.28** (df = 2, 191) 4.92** (df = 3, 190) 8.44** (df = 2, 191) 5.72** (df = 3, 190)

Note:

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Table 4.20 Narcissism and Organizational Culture Predicting General Credit Behavior:
Regression Models

Narcissism
Organizational Culture
Narcissism × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: General Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.48
0.47
0.76*
0.75*
0.14+
0.11
-0.006
-0.02
0.75+
0.38
3.67**
3.67**
3.80**
3.80**
194
0.03
0.02
0.87 (df = 191)
2.66+ (df = 2, 191)

194
0.05
0.03
0.87 (df = 190)
3.05* (df = 3, 190)

Note:

194
0.03
0.02
0.84 (df = 191)
2.82+ (df = 2, 191)

194
0.03
0.02
0.84 (df = 190)
2.22+ (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Figure 4.1. Interaction between Narcissism and Organizational Culture on General Credit
Behavior for an Audience of Subordinates (Note: Lower values on the Credit Behavior scale
indicate credit-giving behavior, and higher values indicate credit-taking behavior.)
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Table 4.21 Narcissism and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific Credit Behavior:
Regression Models
Criterion: Situation-specific Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.94*
0.94*
0.78*
0.78*
0.07
0.07
-0.004
-0.01
0.09
0.11
3.62**
3.62**
3.79**
3.79**

Narcissism
Organizational Culture
Narcissism × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

194
0.03
0.02
0.99 (df = 191)
3.37* (df = 2, 191)

194
0.03
0.02
0.99 ( df= 190)
2.25+ (df = 3, 190)

Note:

194
0.03
0.02
0.93 (df = 191)
2.43+ (df = 2, 191)

194
0.03
0.01
0.93 (df = 190)
1.64 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Similarly, for an audience of subordinates, managers who scored higher on impression
motivation took more situation-specific credit in a more collectivistic organizational culture than
in an individualistic culture. The coefficient for the interaction between impression motivation
and organizational culture was significant, b = 0.30, p = .01. See Figure 4.2 for the interaction
plot, and see Table 4.25 for the corresponding regression model. This result ran counter to the
prediction made in Hypothesis 5a. For all other blame and credit behaviors and audience types,
the coefficients for the interaction between impression motivation and organizational culture
were not significant. Specifically, the coefficients of the interaction between impression
motivation and organizational culture predicting the following behaviors were not significant at
the p < .05 level: situation-specific credit behaviors for an audience of superiors, general credit
behaviors for both audiences, and all blame behaviors in front of all audience types. Thus, these
results do not provide support for Hypothesis 5a. The regression models for impression
motivation and organizational culture predicting all other blame and credit behaviors are
displayed in Tables 4.22 – 4.24.
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Table 4.22 Impression Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting General Blame
Behavior: Regression Models

Impression Motivation
Organizational Culture
Impression Motivation × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: General Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.24*
0.27*
0.22+
0.26*
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.002
0.09
0.15
4.43**
4.42**
4.51**
4.49**
194
0.03
0.02
0.92 (df = 191)
3.30* (df = 2, 191)

194
0.04
0.02
0.92 (df =190)
2.44+ (df = 3, 190)

Note:

194
0.02
0.01
1.05 (df = 191)
1.92 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.03
0.01
1.05 (df =190)
1.75 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 4.23 Impression Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific
Blame Behavior: Regression Models

Impression Motivation
Organizational Culture
Impression Motivation × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: Situation-specific Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.05
0.08
0.06
0.03
0.18+
0.17+
0.21+
0.21+
0.09
-0.09
4.31**
4.30**
4.35**
4.36**
194
0.02
0.01
1.18 (df = 191)
1.81 (df = 2, 191)

Note:

194
0.02
0.005
1.18 (df = 190)
1.33 (df = 3, 190)

194
0.02
0.01
1.26 (df = 191)
2.12 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.02
0.01
1.26 (df = 190)
1.52 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Table 4.24 Impression Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting General Credit
Behavior: Regression Models

Impression Motivation
Organizational Culture
Impression Motivation × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: General Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
-0.03
-0.007
0.09
0.13
0.14+
0.13+
-0.03
-0.03
0.07
0.11
3.67**
3.66**
3.79**
3.78**
194
0.020
0.010
0.88 (df =191)
1.66 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.02
0.004
0.88 (df = 190)
1.26 (df = 3, 190)

Note:

194
0.01
-0.01
0.85 (df =191)
0.50 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.01
-0.004
0.85 (df =190)
0.74 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 4.25 Impression Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific
Credit Behavior: Regression Models

Impression Motivation
Organizational Culture
Impression Motivation × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: Situation-specific Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.07
0.17
0.15
0.21
0.05
0.03
-0.03
-0.05
0.30*
0.18
3.62**
3.59**
3.79**
3.77**
194
0.01
-0.01
1.00 (df = 191)
0.48 (df = 2, 191)

Note:

194
0.04
0.02
0.99 (df = 190)
2.46* (df = 3, 190)

194
0.01
0.001
0.94 (df = 191)
1.09 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.03
0.01
0.93 (df = 190)
1.61 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Figure 4.2. Interaction between Impression Motivation and Organizational Culture on Situationspecific Credit Behavior for an Audience of Subordinates. (Note: Lower values on the Credit
Behavior scale indicate credit-giving behavior, and higher values indicate credit-taking
behavior.)

Furthermore, for an audience of subordinates, managers who scored lower on the implicit
beliefs measure about leadership took more situation-specific blame in a more collectivistic
organizational culture than in an individualistic one. The coefficient for the interaction between
implicit beliefs and organizational culture was significant, b = -0.52, p = .03. The same pattern
was detected for an audience of superiors, and the coefficient for the interaction was significant,
b = -0.53, p = .04. See Figures 4.3 and 4.4 for the interaction plots, and see Table 4.27 for the
corresponding regression models. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 5b with respect
to situation-specific blame behavior.
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Table 4.26 Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture Predicting General Blame
Behavior: Regression Models

Effective Leader ILT
Organizational Culture
Effective Leader ILT × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: General Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.10
0.08
0.22
0.21
0.06
0.07
0.03
0.03
-0.22
-0.04
4.43**
4.44**
4.51**
4.51**
194
0.01
-0.004
0.93 (df =191)
0.58 (df = 2, 191)

Note:

194
0.01
-0.002
0.93 (df = 190)
0.85 (df = 3, 190)

194
0.01
-0.001
1.06 (df = 191)
0.89 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.01
-0.006
1.06 (df = 190)
0.60 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Figure 4.3. Interaction between Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture on Situationspecific Blame Behavior for an Audience of Subordinates. (Note: Lower values on the Blame
Behavior scale indicate blame-giving behavior, and higher values indicate blame-taking
behavior.)
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Table 4.27 Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific Blame
Behavior: Regression Models

Effective Leader ILT
Organizational Culture
Effective Leader ILT × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: Situation-specific Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.19
0.13
0.18
0.12
0.18+
0.20+
0.20+
0.23*
-0.52*
-0.53*
4.31**
4.33**
4.35**
4.37**
194
0.02
0.01
1.18 (df = 191)
2.22 (df = 2, 191)

Note:

194
0.05
0.03
1.17 (df = 190)
3.09* (df = 3, 190)

194
0.03
0.01
1.26 (df = 191)
2.41+ (df = 2, 191)

194
0.05
0.03
1.24 (df = 190)
3.11* (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Figure 4.4. Interaction between Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture on Situationspecific Blame Behavior for an Audience of Superiors. (Note: Lower values on the Blame
Behavior scale indicate blame-giving behavior, and higher values indicate blame-taking
behavior.)
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For an audience of subordinates, however, managers who scored lower on the implicit
beliefs measure took more general credit in a more collectivistic organizational culture than in an
individualistic culture. In this case, the coefficient for the interaction between implicit beliefs and
organizational culture was significant, b = -0.55, p = .002, and this finding runs counter to
Hypothesis 5b with respect to general credit behavior. See Figure 4.5 for the interaction plot, and
see Table 4.28 for the corresponding regression model. For all other blame and credit behaviors
and audience types, the coefficients for the interaction between implicit beliefs and
organizational culture were not significant. Specifically, the coefficients of the interaction
between an effective leader ILT and organizational culture predicting the following behaviors
were not significant at the p < .05 level: general blame behaviors for both audiences, general
credit behaviors for an audience of superiors, and situation-specific credit behaviors for both
audience types. Thus, these results do not provide support for Hypothesis 5b. The regression
models for implicit beliefs and organizational culture predicting the other blame and credit
behaviors are displayed in Tables 4.26 and 4.29.
Table 4.28 Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture Predicting General Credit
Behavior: Regression Models

Effective Leader ILT
Organizational Culture
Effective Leader ILT × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: General Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
-0.13
-0.19
-0.09
-0.12
0.14+
0.16*
-0.01
0.003
-0.55**
-0.26
3.67**
3.69**
3.79**
3.80**
194
0.02
0.01
0.88 (df = 191)
2.00 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.07
0.06
0.86 (df = 190)
4.73** (df = 3, 190)

Note:

194
0.002
-0.01
0.85 (df = 191)
0.22 (df =2, 191)

194
0.01
-0.001
0.85 (df =190)
0.93 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Figure 4.5. Interaction between Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture on General
Credit Behavior for an Audience of Subordinates. (Note: Lower values on the Credit Behavior
scale indicate credit-giving behavior, and higher values indicate credit-taking behavior.)

Table 4.29 Effective Leader ILT and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific Credit
Behavior: Regression Models

Effective Leader ILT
Organizational Culture
Effective Leader ILT × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: Situation-specific Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
-0.27
-0.29+
-0.20
-0.20
0.08
0.08
0.0005
0.001
-0.15
-0.01
3.62**
3.62**
3.79**
3.79**
194
0.02
0.01
1.00 (df = 191)
1.60 (df = 2, 191)

Note:

194
0.02
0.004
1.00 (df =190)
1.24 (df = 3, 190)

194
0.01
-0.002
0.94 (df = 191)
0.83 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.01
-0.01
0.94 (df = 190)
0.55 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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No significant interaction effects of organizational culture on the relationship between
LMX motivation and blame or credit behaviors were found in this data, for either type of
audience, at the p < .05 level. The regression models for LMX motivation and organizational
culture predicting the various blame and credit behaviors are displayed in Tables 4.30 – 4.33.
Thus, there was no evidence to support Hypothesis 5b regarding LMX motivation.

Table 4.30 LMX Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting General Blame Behavior:
Regression Models

LMX Motivation
Organizational Culture
LMX Motivation × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: General Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.24*
0.24*
0.08
0.08
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04
-0.06
0.04
4.43**
4.43**
4.51**
4.51**
194
0.03
0.01
0.92 (df =191)
2.41+ (df = 2, 191)

194
0.03
0.01
0.93 (df = 190)
1.64 (df = 3, 190)

Note:

194
0.003
-0.01
1.06 (df = 191)
0.30 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.003
-0.01
1.06 (df =190)
0.22 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 4.31 LMX Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific Blame
Behavior: Regression Models

LMX Motivation
Organizational Culture
LMX Motivation × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: Situation-specific Blame Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.02
0.03
0.06
0.08
0.18+
0.19+
0.21+
0.22*
-0.03
-0.19
4.31**
4.31**
4.35**
4.36**
194
0.02
0.01
1.18 (df = 191)
1.73 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.02
0.002
1.18 (df = 190)
1.16 (df = 3, 190)

Note:

194
0.02
0.01
1.26 (df = 191)
2.10 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.03
0.01
1.26 (df = 190)
1.70 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Table 4.32 LMX Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting General Credit Behavior:
Regression Models

LMX Motivation
Organizational Culture
LMX Motivation × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: General Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.08
0.09
0.03
0.03
0.13+
0.13+
-0.02
-0.01
-0.13
-0.02
3.67**
3.67**
3.79**
3.80**
194
0.02
0.01
0.88 (df = 191)
1.86 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.02
0.01
0.88 (df = 190)
1.53 (df = 3, 190)

194
0.001
-0.01
0.85 (df = 191)
0.05 (df = 2, 191)

Note:

194
0.001
-0.02
0.86 (df = 190)
0.04 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 4.33 LMX Motivation and Organizational Culture Predicting Situation-specific Credit
Behavior: Regression Models

LMX Motivation
Organizational Culture
LMX Motivation × Organizational Culture
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

Criterion: Situation-specific Credit Behavior
Audience: Subordinates
Audience: Superiors
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.17
0.16
0.20+
0.19
0.05
0.04
-0.03
-0.03
0.08
0.14
3.62**
3.61**
3.79**
3.78**
194
0.01
0.001
1.00 (df = 191)
1.14 (df = 2, 191)

194
0.01
-0.002
1.00 (df = 190)
0.85 (df = 3, 190)

194
0.02
0.004
0.94 (df = 191)
1.43 (df = 2, 191)

Note:

194
0.02
0.004
0.94 (df = 190)
1.23 (df = 3, 190)

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Subordinate organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs). Leaders completed measures
indicating their perceptions of their subordinates’ OCBs. Regression analyses reveal that a
leader’s blame behavior toward the self has a significant relationship with subordinate OCBs
when controlling for gender, age, race, role tenure, and job insecurity. See Table 4.34 for the
regression models of blame behaviors predicting subordinate OCBs.
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Table 4.34 Blame Behavior Predicting Subordinate OCBs: Regression Models

DV: Subordinate OCBs
Model 2
Model 3

Model 1

Model 4

Audience: Subordinates
General Blame
Situation-specific Blame
Audience: Superiors
General Blame
Situation-specific Blame
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant

0.13*
-0.05
-0.06
0.08
-0.26**
4.86**

0.15*
-0.05
-0.06
0.09
-0.25**
4.86**

0.14*
-0.05
-0.05
0.07
-0.26**
4.86**

0.21**
0.14*
-0.07
-0.07
0.10
-0.25**
4.86**

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 183)
F Statistic (df = 6; 183)

190
0.12
0.09
0.91
4.16**

190
0.13
0.11
0.90
4.75**

190
0.13
0.10
0.91
4.47**

190
0.14
0.11
0.90
5.05**

0.15*
0.19**
0.17**

Note:

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Specifically, for an audience of subordinates, general blame behavior toward the self was
a significant predictor of subordinate OCBs, b = 0.15, p = .02. For audience of subordinates,
situation-specific blame-taking behavior was a significant predictor of subordinate OCBs, b =
0.19, p = .004. For audience of superiors, general blame behavior toward the self was a
significant predictor of subordinate OCBs, b = 0.17, p < .009. For audience of superiors,
situation-specific blame behavior toward the self was a significant predictor of subordinate
OCBs, b = 0.21, p = .002.
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In this study, credit behaviors, both general and situation-specific and toward either type
of audience, did not explain subordinate OCBs, regardless of audience type. The coefficients of
credit behaviors predicting subordinate OCBs were all not significant at the p < .05 level. See
Table 4.35 for the regression models of credit behaviors predicting subordinate OCBs. Thus,
there is support for Hypothesis 7a but not for Hypothesis 7b.
Table 4.35 Credit Behavior Predicting Subordinate OCBs: Regression Models

Criterion: Subordinate OCBs
Model 2
Model 3

Model 1

Model 4

Audience: Subordinates
General Credit
Situation-specific Credit
Audience: Superiors
General Credit
Situation-specific Credit
Gender (Female = 1)
Age
Ethnicity (White = 1)
Role Tenure
Job Insecurity
Constant

0.14*
-0.03
-0.06
0.07
-0.26**
4.85**

0.14*
-0.03
-0.05
0.06
-0.26**
4.86**

0.13+
-0.04
-0.06
0.09
-0.26**
4.86**

0.05
0.14*
-0.03
-0.06
0.08
-0.26**
4.86**

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 183)
F Statistic (df = 6; 183)

190
0.10
0.07
0.92
3.39**

190
0.10
0.07
0.92
3.50**

190
0.10
0.07
0.92
3.23**

190
0.10
0.07
0.92
3.28**

0.07
0.09
-0.02

Note:

+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

4.2.3 Discussion. Taken together, these results provide mixed support for the main
effects hypotheses proposed in this chapter. No effect was observed for the relationship between
the implicit beliefs motive and blame or credit behaviors. While the implicit beliefs motive had
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limited effects on blame and credit behaviors, the results demonstrate some evidence for the
other three motives. With respect to the effects of these motives on leader blame or credit
behavior, the effects varied with the type of audience (e.g., subordinate or superior) and the type
of blame or credit behavior (e.g., behavior in general or behavior tied to a specific situation).
The findings regarding narcissism and impression motivation in the regression models
that include all four motives as criterion variables indicate that narcissism (i.e., the ego-defensive
motive) and impression motivation (i.e., the impression management motive) are strong drivers
of blame behaviors in particular. These findings reinforce the link between the ego-defensive
motive and blame-assigning behaviors in the predicted direction. In addition, the findings
reinforce the (unexpected) link between the impression management motive and blame-taking
behaviors, which ran counter to the blame-assigning predictions in the theoretical model.
Specifically, the results illustrate that a leader with an ego-defensive motive may be more
likely to shift blame toward their subordinates in front of various audiences, which provides
evidence for the predicted link between an ego-defensive motive and blame behaviors toward
others. Although no significant effect was detected when examining credit behaviors, this may
indicate that leaders motivated to defend their ego are more likely to shift blame away from
themselves rather than take credit for successes.
The results of the regression analyses for each individual motive also provide evidence
counter to the predictions regarding the impression management motive and blame behaviors.
Namely, the data demonstrate that the more motivated a leader is to manage impressions, the
more likely they may be to take blame instead of blame others after an unsuccessful outcome,
regardless of whether the audience is comprised of subordinates or superiors. This is interesting
given that the proposed theoretical model links the impression management motive to behaviors
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that shift blame away from the self in order to maintain an image of being competent. It is
possible that leaders may view blame-giving behaviors as incompetent leader behaviors, and thus
may view blame-taking behaviors as a way to portray themselves as a “good” leader in the
stereotypical sense, similar to the implicit beliefs motive. However, with respect to credit
behaviors, the data showed that an impression management motive may drive a leader to take
credit after a successful outcome in front of an audience of superiors. This was not the case for
an audience of subordinates. This evidence may indicate that after a successful outcome, leaders
who are motivated to manage impressions may communicate differently to an audience of
superiors than to an audience of subordinates. In front of superiors, taking credit may strengthen
their image as a leader while not appearing as though credit is being taken away from
subordinates. Conversely, in front of subordinates, the leader may refrain from taking credit, as
they might realize that the subordinates have a more accurate understanding with respect to
where credit is due.
Organizational culture. Moreover, in general, the results for organizational culture did
not support Hypotheses 5a and 5b, which predicted that the individualistic or collectivistic nature
of the organization’s culture would influence the relationship between motive and blame or
credit behaviors. In most cases, the findings did not provide support for Hypothesis 5, and in
some cases, the findings ran counter to Hypothesis 5. The main exception was that of a manager
whose implicit beliefs about leadership did not match that of the culturally endorsed implicit
leadership theory of outstanding leadership (Javidan et al., 2006). For these managers, when
recalling a specific past situation and communicating to an audience of subordinates, they
reported taking more blame when recalling on a specific situation in their past in an
organizational culture that was more collectivistic than individualistic. This aligns with
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Hypothesis 5b because managers who did not tend to share the widely endorsed beliefs regarding
effective leadership and perceived their organizational context to be collectivistic took more
blame than those who perceived their organizational context to be more individualistic.
However, with respect to credit, the results showed that these managers, whose implicit
beliefs did not match the widely endorsed beliefs regarding effective leadership and perceived
their organizational culture to be more collectivistic, took more general credit (i.e., not reflecting
on a specific situation) than those who perceived a more individualistic organizational culture.
Additionally, there was a lack of significant findings for the relationship building motive, and the
results for the ego-defensive motive and impression management motive (operationalized by
narcissism and impression motivation, respectively) were contrary to Hypothesis 5 as a whole.
For leaders who were naturally inclined to be more ego-defensive (i.e., narcissistic) or more
motivated to impression manage (i.e., impression motivation), working in a culture that was
more collectivistic and group-focused did not appear to change their tendencies toward certain
blame and credit behaviors. In fact, the findings reveal that being in a more collectivistic rather
than individualistic organizational culture appeared to intensify credit-taking behaviors. The
unusual findings that ran counter to Hypothesis 5 may be related to measurement errors and
should be explored in future studies. A possible source of error may be tied to limitations in how
leader behaviors and organizational culture were measured, because the leaders themselves
completed the scales for leader behavior and organizational culture. Leaders may report enacting
certain behaviors that they believe they enact in general or have enacted in specific situations,
but their subordinates may report that their leader enacted slightly different behaviors. If
measures of leader behavior and organizational culture were collected from multiple other
sources, such as from subordinates, the data might be more accurate and less prone to bias.
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Subordinate OCBs. The findings in Study 2 demonstrate that blame behaviors, and not
credit behaviors, are more strongly linked to subordinate OCBs, as reported by leaders in this
dataset. Thus, the findings provide support for Hypothesis 7a but not 7b. For both audiences of
subordinates and superiors, a leader who shifts blame more toward themselves and less toward
their subordinates may be more likely to observe subordinate OCBs. The results provide
correlational evidence of a relationship between leader blame-taking behaviors and subordinate
OCBs. Conversely, no relationships were observed between credit behaviors and subordinate
OCBs for either type of audience, as reported by the leader participant. Therefore, it is possible
that a leader’s behaviors with respect to blame hold more weight compared to a her behaviors
with respect to credit. For example, a subordinate may be more likely to engage in OCBs when
their leader takes blame rather than when their leader gives them credit.
Limitations. The data in Study 2 are single source and self-reported: the measures of
leader blame and credit behaviors as well as motives were taken from only one source – the
leaders themselves. Because online Prolific Academic participants self-reported their blame and
credit behaviors on the online questionnaire, a discrepancy might exist between their selfperceptions of their own blame and credit behaviors and their subordinates’ perceptions of the
leader’s blame and credit behaviors. Leaders may report enacting certain behaviors that they
believe they in general enact or have enacted in specific past situations, but their subordinates
may report slightly different general and specific behaviors. Because the measures of motives
and behaviors were self-reported, individuals may be biased in reporting their own blame and
credit behaviors, whereas multi-source data may provide a more accurate measure of behaviors
(e.g., subordinates reporting their leader’s blame and credit behaviors). Future research should
collect data from multiple sources, as reports of leader behavior from multiple subordinates
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would provide a more accurate measure of the leader’s behavior, which may not perfectly match
to the leader’s self-reported behavior. In addition, these participants self-reported the OCBs of
their subordinates, which reflects their own perceptions of their subordinates’ behaviors but may
not reflect the actual behaviors or perceptions of the subordinates themselves.
Furthermore, the validity of the organization’s emphasis on individualistic versus
collectivistic values may, at first glance, seem weak because these measures were only taken
from the participants themselves: they reported on their organization’s culture, and the
perceptions of organizational culture across other members in the organization were not
measured. The perception of individualistic versus collectivistic values across the organization as
a whole, however, may not be as important here. How a leader herself perceives the
organization’s cultural emphasis on individualistic or collectivistic values may matter more,
because her perception is what directly influences blame and credit behaviors, not necessarily the
general perception of organization culture across all members in the organization.
Lastly, the data and results collected in this study established certain correlational
patterns but could not test for causal links from motives to blame and credit behaviors.
4.3 Study 3: Examining the Relationship between Motives and Blame Behaviors
The objective of Study 3 was to examine the hypothesized relationships regarding blame
behaviors in a laboratory setting that enables randomization and precision of measurement.
Study 3 tested the causal link from the four motives to blame (Hypotheses 1a – 4a) by
conducting an experiment in which motive is manipulated. This study focused exclusively on
diffuse failure and blame behaviors, and thus, all study participants perceived their performance
on the experimental team task to be well below average (i.e., an unsuccessful outcome).
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Study 3 was a between-subjects experimental design with five treatment conditions that
varied motive (i.e., ego-defensive vs. impression management vs. implicit beliefs vs. relationship
building motives) in addition to a control condition. It addresses the main effects from the four
drivers to blame behaviors.
4.3.1 Methods.
Participants. I recruited 240 undergraduate lab participants through the Olin Research
Subject Pool. The final sample consisted of N = 191 participants. The average age of the
participants was 19.3 years, and the sample was 52% female and 64% white. I dropped 49
participants from the dataset who failed attention checks, failed manipulation checks, or who had
previously done the Moon Survival Task (the first task, as described below). Attention and
manipulation checks included questions that evaluated whether the participant had read and
understood the instructions, including the motive information relayed during the task and the
negative performance feedback on the Moon Survival Task. I removed the data of any
participants who failed to select the correct responses to any of these questions (e.g., if a
participant selected a motive condition that did not correspond to their randomly assigned
motive, or if they reported that they had performed above average on the Moon Survival Task).
In all, 49 participants failed at least one of these checks, and therefore they were excluded from
the final sample.
The participants were told that they were randomly assigned to be the leader of a twoperson team (i.e., dyad), and that their pa"rtner (i.e., subordinate) would interact with them from
another room in the lab via a computer chat interface. This partner was a research assistant
serving as a confederate, posing as a study participant. Each participant was randomly assigned
to a treatment (four motive conditions or control condition). For their participation, students
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received 0.5 course credits for participating in subject pool research, with the opportunity to earn
a cash prize. All participants had an equal chance of winning the cash prize, and those who
performed in the top 10% of all study participants received a prize of $10.00 based on task
performance.
Tasks. Participants were instructed to complete two tasks. The first task was completed
once solo and a second time with their partner. The second task was completed once only and
with their partner. The first task was a survival scenario task adapted for this study: the moon
survival task (Hall & Watson, 1970; e.g., Bottger & Yetton, 1988; Ferrin & Dirks, 2003), in
which participants must work together to prioritize a set of items necessary for survival. The
second task was a brainstorming task, in which participants worked together with their partner to
generate a list of uses for a brick. This brainstorming task is commonly used in creativity
research as a dependent measure of creativity (Frick et al., 1959; Guilford, 1975).
Two tasks were used in this experiment, instead of one, in order to create a more realistic
working environment. Individuals in organizations engage in repeated interactions under the
assumption that their blame behaviors in one situation may influence their relationships and
work dynamics over time. Therefore, informing the participants that they will work with the
same individual on a second task following the first task provides stakes that are more realistic
with respect to maintenance of working relationships and opportunities for repeated interaction
as observed in organizational settings outside of the laboratory. More specifically, the two-task
design increases the likelihood that a participant’s blame behaviors following the first task may
be more realistic in light of the fact that he or she will be interacting with their subordinate
partner again soon.
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In the moon survival task, individuals are presented with a scenario in which they are
stranded on the moon with a set of items (e.g., water, compass, oxygen, rope) that may help them
survive. The objective of the task is to rank order the items based on their importance for
survival; to do so, the participants in each dyad must work together to determine which items are
most important. I adapted the task so that only the leader of each dyad would be able to edit the
list of items and submit the final solution (see Appendix D for details regarding the situation, the
task, and the list of items). This task gave the leader (i.e., the study subject) the opportunity to
problem solve, communicate, and analyze information with their subordinate (i.e., the
confederate partner).
The moon survival task was selected because this type of exercise has been shown to be
an effective method of studying group problem solving in previous research (e.g., Bottger &
Yetton, 1988; Ferrin & Dirks, 2003). Those studies indicated that participants become highly
involved in these types of tasks. To further encourage engagement, an additional monetary
incentive was provided in the study. Because I wanted to manipulate the perception of
performance (i.e., failure of the team’s performance), the survival scenario task is useful because
pre-determined negative feedback can be given to the participants to manipulate their perceptions
of their dyad’s performance on the task. I also wanted to manipulate reward structure in
subsequent Study 4, so these tasks provide an opportunity for the dyad members to perform the
task individually and as a team. In addition, regardless of what performance feedback the
participants receive, the dyad’s actual performance on the task can be measured objectively.
Procedure. All participants performed the same two tasks and underwent the same
procedure, with the exception of the manipulation of the leader motive. Participants were told
that they were the leader of their “team” (i.e., dyad), blind to the fact that the other dyad member
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was actually a trained confederate. They were informed that they would work on two tasks with
the same partner. Each dyad received the same amount of time to rank the items in the first task
(6 minutes) and brainstorm uses for a brick in the second task (3 minutes). They were seated at a
computer workstation, communicating through a custom-built web-based computer program (see
Appendix D, Figure D1 for screenshot of the program) that allowed them to chat with each other
and submit their solution to the tasks. I chose to use virtual communication via computer in order
to reduce possible confounds that might occur, such as judgments of similarity, attractiveness,
liking, and other nonverbal signals about their partner (Byrne, 1971; Frank, 1988). These could
independently induce cooperative (or non-cooperative) behavior.
The participant received information about the potential to earn a cash prize of $10.00,
their role as a leader, the scoring system, and task instructions. They were also informed during
the instructions and on the task page itself that success on the moon survival task was strongly
tied to specific leader ability, which served as the motive manipulation (see Manipulation of
motives section for more details, below). First, the participant was given 6 minutes to submit
their own, individual rankings for the items in the moon survival task. Then, the participant and
confederate had another 6 minutes to work together as a team on the moon survival task and then
submit a shared ranking of the items. At this point, each participant was given feedback
regarding their performance as a team that their performance was well below average (i.e.,
diffuse failure): “Based on your team rankings, you and your partner performed “well below
average”.”
Next, the leader communicated his or her thoughts about their pair’s performance, based
on the feedback received, to the other participant (i.e., the confederate) by selecting from a range
of response options assessing who was to blame for the below average performance (i.e., blame
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behaviors). These response options can be found in the Measures – Leader blame behavior
section, as well as in Appendix D. Then, they answered three questions that they were told would
be seen by the lab administrator (i.e., superior); they measured the extent to which the leader
believed they were to blame for the poor performance. See Measures – Leader blame behavior
for more details.
Next, the participants were told that they would work with the same person to complete
another task – the brick uses brainstorming task. Each dyad was given 3 minutes to brainstorm as
many non-redundant uses of a brick as possible. Finally, the participants completed a post-study
questionnaire including manipulation checks, attention checks, and leader self-assessment. To
complete the session, the lab administrator debriefed all participants regarding the existence of a
confederate and the contrived performance feedback. Participants were then informed that an
average score of their performances on the solo and team Moon Survival Task would be used to
calculate their final score. If they achieved a score that fell within the top 10% of all study
participants, they would receive an email with information about when and where to receive their
$10.00 cash prize (for more details, see Participant compensation section).
Perceived performance. Following the completion of the moon survival task, the
participants were given feedback on their performance as a dyad. All participants were displayed
the same message on the screen: “Based on your team rankings, you and your partner performed
“well below average”.”
Manipulation of motives. The participant (i.e., the leader) was randomly shown one of
four statements in order to activate one specific motive. The leader of the dyad was informed that
success in the moon survival task is strongly tied to the leader’s ability to (1) think highly of
himself or herself (ego-defensive motive); (2) shape the way they are seen by the lab
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administrator (impression management motive); (3) act in ways that fit the stereotype of an ideal
leader (implicit beliefs motive); or (4) develop strong relationships with their partner and earn
their trust (relationship building motive). They were then instructed: “as the leader, you must do
your best to act in a way that is consistent with a leader whose role requires him or her to [motive
condition] as you complete the tasks in this study. In the control condition, no information was
given regarding the successful behaviors of a leader.
Pilot test of the manipulation of motives. The wording of the manipulations was pilot
tested prior to the lab study. The purpose of the pilot test was to test and confirm that the
manipulations in the experimental study induced the desired motive and none of the other
motives being tested. N = 150 subjects were recruited via the online research platform Prolific
participated in an online survey, and three subjects were dropped due to failed attention checks.
The participants were 53% female and 90% white. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
four motive conditions. They first read about a specific type of leader, and then answered
questions about how this particular type of leader might act in the workplace. The wording of
these instructions changed based on the motive condition to which the participant was assigned.
For example, participants in the ego-defensive motive condition saw the following text:
“Leaders often find themselves in situations where it is important that they think highly
of themselves as leaders.
As you answer the questions in this survey, respond in a way that would be consistent
with a leader who thinks highly of himself/herself as a leader. In other words, as you
answer the questions in this survey, take the perspective of a leader whose role requires
that he or she thinks highly of himself/herself.”

Next, the pilot test participants responded to six multiple-choice questions, indicating
which one of four options most closely resembled how they would act or behave when taking the
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perspective of a certain type of leader. Each one of the four options to the survey questions
corresponded directly to each one of the four motives. An example of a question is:
“When a goal is successfully reached by the team, the leader is most likely to:
(a) Express that their leadership led to the successful outcome
(b) Hope that the successful outcome will boost their reputation with their supervisor
(c) Express that they believe the team effectively worked together and can achieve future
successes
(d) Take time to individually let each employee know their contribution is valued”,
where (a) corresponded to the ego-defensive motive, (b) to the impression management motive,
(c) to the implicit beliefs motive, and (d) to the relationship building motive.
I conducted one-way ANOVAs to compare the effect of the motive manipulation on the
survey question responses for each of the four motive conditions. These ANOVA analyses tested
if participants in a specific motive condition most often selected the corresponding behavioral
response in the follow-up survey questions. This was based on a count of the number of
responses that were congruent with motive condition, and counts were averaged across all
participants within that condition. For example, I counted the number of times a participant in
the relationship building condition most often selected the relationship building leader behaviors
in the survey questions over the other three, non-relationship-building behaviors. Then, I found
the average of this count across all participants in the relationship-building condition.
In addition to ANOVA analyses, I conducted a Tukey’s honest significance (HSD)
multiple pairwise comparisons test to examine whether individuals in each condition most often
selected items corresponding to that motive or another one of the four motives. For example, I
conducted Tukey’s HSD test would check whether participants in the relationship building
condition most often selected the relationship building items over the ego-defensive items (in
addition to comparisons with the impression management items and the implicit beliefs items).
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For each motive condition, there was a significant effect of motive condition on the
participants’ responses corresponding to their assigned motive at the p < .01 level. For the egodefensive motive, there was a significant effect of the ego-defensive motive on whether or not
participants selected the ego-defensive leader behavior versus the other three behaviors [F(3,
144) = 20.23, p < .001]. For the impression management motive, there was a significant effect of
the impression management on whether or not participants selected the impression management
behavior versus the other three behaviors [F(3, 152) = 17.63, p < .001]. For the implicit beliefs
motive, there was a significant effect of the implicit beliefs motive on whether or not participants
selected the implicit beliefs leader behavior versus the other three behaviors [F(3, 132) = 56.77,
p < .001]. For the relationship building motive, there was a significant effect of the relationship
building motive on whether or not participants selected the relationship building leader behavior
versus the other three behaviors [F(3, 144) = 69.47, p < .001].
Taken together, the pilot test results indicated that the wording for each motive
manipulation was effective in directing a participant to visualize and think like the type of leader
who would be motivated to act in alignment with each of the four motives.
Scoring of moon survival task. Performance was evaluated based on the accuracy of the
ranking of the twelve items in the moon survival task. For each item ranked, the number of ranks
that each ranking differs from the corresponding correct ranking is calculated as a difference
score. For example, if the participant ranks a map in first place and a first aid kit in second place,
but the expert-assigned rankings are third place and seventh place correspondingly, the
difference score calculated for these two items equals 7. Thus, a lower difference score indicates
greater accuracy, or higher achievement. The achievement score is then assigned based on the
difference score.
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Participant compensation. Participants were told that their final score would be
determined by two different scores: the achievement score and the contribution score. The
achievement score was described above. Participants were also informed that their contribution
score would be based on the lab administrator’s evaluation of the extent to which they, the
leader, contributed to the pair’s success or failure. As the “supervisor” and “superior” figure, the
lab administrator’s evaluation was based on the participant’s blame behavior as the leader (see
“Measures – Leader blame behavior”), which was comprised of three items visible to the lab
administrator regarding their dyad’s (poor) performance on the task.
As a performance incentive, participants were informed that they would win a cash prize
of $10.00 if they achieved a score that fell within the top 10% of study participants, and that they
would be contacted via email within two weeks of study completion if they earned this prize.
Participants were informed that their compensation would be based equivalently on two
scores, the achievement score and the contribution score, in order to create a more realistic
balance of their final score on both dimensions of motive objective: performance and image. The
achievement score captures the performance aspect of completing the task and accounts for half
of their possible high score. On the other hand, the contribution score captured the image aspect
of completing the task as the dyad leader. A score that was based solely on task performance
would not allow for any impression management or self-defense through the blame behavior. By
equally balancing their composite score between achievement and contribution, participants
would also be more balanced between the performance and image dimensions of motive
objective, across all four motives.
During the study debriefing, however, I informed participants that only their achievement
score (i.e., score corresponding to task performance) on the Moon Survival Task would be used
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to calculate their final score, and compensation would be awarded accordingly based on the
average of their solo and team performance on the Moon Survival Task.
Measures.
Manipulation checks. The effectiveness of the manipulations and comprehension of the
study parameters was determined by having the participants complete a set of survey questions at
the end of the lab session. To ensure that the participants understood that their performance was
a failure, I asked each participant to select whether or not their team performed below or above
average. The effectiveness of the motive manipulation was assessed by asking the participants to
indicate which of four statements reflected what type of leader behavior was linked to success on
the moon survival task. Another question determined whether participants understood that their
total score was comprised of two types of scores, the achievement score and contribution score.
Leader blame behavior. Following the completion of the moon survival task, the leader
saw a set of response options and was asked to select one of these messages to send to their
partner in light of their below average performance on the task. The options were: (1) You are to
blame for this outcome, (2) You are somewhat to blame for this outcome, (3) We are equally to
blame for this outcome, (4) I am somewhat to blame for this outcome, and (5) I am to blame for
this outcome (see Appendix D). The leader then selected one of these statements with the
knowledge that their partner (i.e., the confederate) would see the message. The message was
framed as a response or feedback to the other team member. This variable represented the blame
observed by a subordinate audience.
Next, the leader responded to three items assessing their beliefs regarding who was to
blame for the performance on the team task. These measures were framed as the extent to which
the leader contributed to the pair’s relative failure on the task on a 5-point Likert scale, and the
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participant was told that the lab administrator would be able to view their responses to these
items. These items were then viewed as communications to the lab administrator, who
participants believed to be evaluating the them, as the leader participant, and assigning the
contribution score, the level of their contributions to the pair’s overall achievement, or
performance. See Appendix D for full items measuring these blame behaviors. Cronbach’s alpha
for the three items measuring the participant’s beliefs regarding who was to blame was .84. This
measure represented the blame observed by an audience of superiors, as it indicated the leader’s
communication to the supervisor (i.e., superior) regarding their beliefs as to who was the blame
for the team’s unsuccessful performance.
4.3.2 Results. Descriptive statistics and correlations between each of the measures are
displayed in Table 4.36 and Table 4.37. For the blame that the study participants, as the leader,
communicated to their subordinate, on a 5-point Likert scale, the average blame behavior was
3.64 (SD = 0.98). For the blame that the study participants, as the leader, communicated to their
superior, on a 5-point Likert scale, the average blame behavior was 3.84 (SD = 0.66). Histograms
showing the distribution of these two measures are depicted in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7.
Table 4.36 Study 3 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

M
SD
Min
Age
19.27
1.17
18.00
Gender (Female = 1)
0.52
0.50
0
Blame communicated to subordinate
3.64
0.98
1
Blame communicated to superior
3.84
0.66
1
Note: N =191. Blame measures were on a 5-point Likert scale.

Max
23.00
1
5
5
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Age

Gender

Blame
communicated to
subordinate

-0.07
0.13+
0.05

0.01
-0.15*

0.68*

Blame
communicated to
superior

α = .84

Table 4.37 Study 3 – Motive conditions: Means and SDs
N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

37
33
36
44
41

3.51
3.55
3.72
3.70
3.68

1.17
1.09
0.94
0.85
0.88

1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00

5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00

Blame communicated to superior
Ego-defensive motive
37
3.72
0.93
1.00
Impression management motive
33
3.91
0.64
2.67
Implicit beliefs motive
36
3.93
0.56
2.67
Relationship building motive
44
3.78
0.66
2.00
Control group
41
3.89
0.46
2.67
Note: All blame behaviors were measured on a 5-point Likert scale.

5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00

Blame communicated to subordinate
Ego-defensive motive
Impression management motive
Implicit beliefs motive
Relationship building motive
Control group

Figure 4.6. Study 3 – Distribution of Blame Communicated to Subordinate.
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Figure 4.7. Study 3 – Distribution of Blame Communicated to Superior.

A one-way between subjects ANOVA compared the effect of leader motive on blame
behavior in ego-defensive, impression management, implicit beliefs, and relationship building
motive conditions, as well as the control condition. Two ANOVAs were conducted, one where
the dependent variable was the blame observed by subordinate audience and a second where the
dependent variable was the blame observed by an audience of superiors. There was no
significant effect of motive condition on blame behavior, for blame behavior observed by either
an audience of subordinates or an audience of superiors at the p < .05 level. For the blame
observed for a subordinate audience, the effect of motive was not significant when comparing
the blame communication across motive conditions, F(4, 186) = .357, n.s. For the blame
observed for a superior audience, the effect of motive was not significant when comparing the
blame communication across motive conditions, F(4, 186) = .671, n.s. Therefore, the data in this
study do not support Hypotheses 1a – 4a. See Table 4.36 for means.
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Figure 4.8. Study 3 – Average Response to Blame Items Sent to Superior versus Subordinate.
(Note: Lower values on the Blame Behavior scale indicate blame-giving behavior, and higher
values indicate blame-taking behavior.)
A one-way ANOVA examined whether there were any differences in blame behavior as a
message sent to the partner (i.e., blame observed by a subordinate audience) versus the
communication sent to the lab administrator (i.e., blame observed by an audience of superiors) in
each motive condition. Within each of the four motive conditions, as well as in the control
condition, there were no significant differences regarding the audience of the blame behavior,
subordinate or superior at the p < .05 level, F(9, 372) = 1.019, n.s. See Figure 4.8 for a chart
comparing the average blame communicated to a subordinate compared to a superior.
4.3.3 Discussion. Findings from this experiment testing the link from the four motives to
blame behaviors in a laboratory setting did not provide causal evidence for the hypothesized
relationships. Similarly, compelling evidence was not found for differences between
communications of blame with a superior versus a subordinate. The lack of significant findings
in this study could be partially attributed to certain weaknesses in the study design. First, it is
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possible that the effects of the manipulation were not strong enough or were dulled while
participant worked on the moon survival task such that the effects disappeared during the time
the participant progressed through the tasks in the study. By the time the participant was
instructed to respond to the blame measures, they had worked on the moon survival task solo and
then a second time with their partner, and the manipulation may have lost its effect.
Second, the study design may have been weak with respect to the extent to which the
participants perceived their partner (i.e., the confederate posing as the follower) as having
contributed enough to the task to warrant being blamed for an unsuccessful performance. The lab
participants may not have perceived their follower to have much potential for blame because
there was no clear opportunity for their follower to make a substantial contribution to the task
solution. As a result, there may have been neither enough variance in the blame behavior
measure nor a justified reason for some lab participants to feel as though the unsuccessful
outcome was the confederate’s fault.
Lastly, given the compact nature of the student subject pool, it may have been possible
that word of the deception regarding performance on the Moon Survival Task (i.e., that all
participants were told that they performed below average) leaked through the subject population.
If this occurred, it may have comprised the manipulation and data.
4.4 Study 4: Examining the Effects of Motives and Reward Structures on Blame Behaviors
The objective of Study 4 was to examine the hypothesized relationships regarding blame
behaviors in a laboratory setting, in addition to the effects of reward structures, which were not
examined in Study 3. Study 4 focused specifically on the ego-defense motive and the implicit
beliefs motive and their relationships with blame behavior (Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 3a).
These two motives were selected for examination because they reflect opposite ends of the
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motive objective but still have the same inward (instead of outward) direction. The ego-defensive
motive objective is focused on image in an inward direction, while the implicit beliefs motive
objective is focused on performance in an inward direction. These two motives are also of
specific interest because they are linked to opposite predictions regarding blame behavior. Study
4 also tested the moderating effect of reward structure on the relationship from these two motives
to blame (individual vs. shared rewards, Hypothesis 6a(i) and Hypothesis 6b(i)).
Thus, Study 4 was a between-subjects experimental study with a hanging control group
design: a 2 (motive: ego-defensive motive vs. implicit beliefs motive) x 2 (reward structure:
shared rewards vs. individual rewards) + 1 (control group) design. Like Study 3, Study 4 focused
exclusively diffuse failure and blame behaviors, and thus, participants perceived their
performance on the experimental task to be well below average (i.e., a failure).
4.4.1 Methods.
Participants. I recruited 315 undergraduate lab participants through the Olin Research
Subject Pool to participate in the study. Before analysis, 58 participants were dropped due to
failed attention and manipulation checks, resulting in a total of N = 257. The average age of the
participants was 19.26, and the sample was 50% female and 54% white.
A participant’s data was dropped from the sample if the participant failed attention
checks, failed manipulation checks, or had previously completed the Moon Survival Task. As in
Study 3, attention and manipulation checks included questions that evaluated whether the
participant had read and understood the instructions, including both the motive and reward
information relayed during the task and the negative performance feedback on the Moon
Survival Task. I removed the data of any participants who failed to select the correct responses to
any of these questions (e.g., if a participant selected a motive condition that did not correspond to
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their randomly assigned motive, or if they reported that they had performed above average on the
Moon Survival Task). As a new addition in Study 4, participants were asked to reflected on their
experience as a leader and specifically how what it meant to them to act in accordance with the
motive condition to which they had been randomly assigned (see “Additional Instructions”
section, below). Participants who reported that they had not acted or felt in a way consistent with
their randomly assigned motive condition were considered manipulation check failures. Thus, 58
participants were excluded from the final sample (N = 257).
As in Study 3, the participants were told that they had been randomly assigned as the
leader of a two-person team (i.e., dyad). Each participant was randomly assigned to a group –
treatment (with randomly assigned motive condition and reward structure) or control (no motive
condition and no reward structure specified). The students received 0.5 course credits for
participating in subject pool research, with the opportunity to earn a cash prize. All participants
had an equal chance of winning the cash prize, and those who performed in the top 10% of all
study participants received a prize of $10.00 based on task performance.
Procedure, scoring, and compensation. Study 4 was identical to Study 3 except for five
key changes. These changes involved the number of motive manipulations, the inclusion of a
reward structure manipulation, additional instructions for the study participant acting as the
leader, and expanding the blame behavior measure. Each change is described in the following
sections.
Manipulation of motives. In Study 4, there were only two motive manipulations instead
of four, although a control condition was still included. As mentioned above, the two motive
manipulations included the ego-defensive motive and the implicit beliefs motive. The
implementation and wording of these manipulations remained exactly the same as in Study 3.
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Manipulation of reward structure. Before the task begins, the participant read
information about how the moon survival task would be scored. The manipulation of two reward
structures, individual and shared, was derived from definitions accepted in the literature (e.g.,
see Rosenbaum et al., 1980). Participants were given different descriptions of reward structure,
or the basis upon which their scores for the task were assessed, in the different conditions.
Individuals in both conditions were told that their total score would be a composite of two
different scores: an achievement score and a contribution score. The manipulation of reward
structure directly affects only the achievement score.
Prior to starting the moon survival task, participants in the shared reward condition were
told that their achievement score was based upon the team’s performance in the moon survival
task – their score was determined by the ranking of items that they, as the leader, and their
partner determine together. Participants in the individual reward condition were told that their
achievement score was determined by their individual performance on the moon survival task –
their score was determined by the ranking that they determine on their own, and not with their
partner. Of note, in the individual reward condition, participants’ achievement score was not
based on their performance relative to their partner because this would effectively pit the
participant against their partner. If a purely competitive reward system was instituted, then under
this type of reward structure, the participant would have no motivation to collaborate with their
partner to submit a joint ranking of items.
Additional instructions. In Study 4, the study participant received two new instructions
on top of the existing instructions in Study 3. These changes were added to the study design in
order to address two potential weaknesses in the design of Study 3 – the dulling of the motive
manipulation over time and the lack of meaningful contribution on part of the subject’s partner
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(i.e., the confederate). First, when the participant began working on the moon survival task with
their partner, they were given additional instructions to ask their partner (i.e., the confederate
“subordinate” partner) to send them an initial draft of the item rankings. These instructions were
added to Study 4 in order to increase the likelihood and potential for blame to be allocated to the
partner in addition to (or instead of) oneself. This study also included these new instructions in
order to increase the participant’s feeling that they are the leader in the situation, by delegating a
task to their follower. The new wording included in Study 4 was as follows:
“As the leader of the team, please use the chat window to instruct your partner to work on
and send you a draft of the list of items ranked from most important to least important.
If you approve of their work, you can arrange the items in the proposed order and submit
the list. If you believe certain changes need to be made, please make suggestions and chat
with your partner about them until you are satisfied.”

In response to the study participant requesting this initial draft, the research assistant
posing as the participant’s partner then sent a pre-determined ranking of the fifteen items to the
participant. The same ranking of items was sent to every study participant, with the more
obviously important and not important items placed accordingly in the list, as follows: “oxygen,
20 L water, food concentrate, 50 ft of nylon rope, signal flares, dehydrated milk, stellar map,
portable heating unit, parachute silk, first aid kit, the two pistols, FM receiver/transmitter, life
raft, matches, compass.”
With respect to the second addition, for participants in the ego-defensive motive
condition and the implicit beliefs motive condition, a new set of instructions and short reflection
task was added. Immediately after the participant viewed their performance feedback on the
moon survival task completed with their partner (i.e., “Based on your team rankings, you and
your partner performed “well below average”), they were instructed to reflect on their experience
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as a leader. Specifically, they were instructed: “Reflect back on the team task you just completed.
In 3-4 sentences, what did it mean to you to act like a leader who [thinks highly of himself or
herself / acts in ways that fit the stereotype of an ideal leader]?” They were then required to type
a response of a minimum 200 characters into a text box. To detect whether the manipulation was
getting “lost” over time during the study, I asked participants to reflect in this way in order to get
a sense of what they were thinking or feeling based on their experience during the moon survival
task and on the information they had previously read regarding leader behavior linked to success
on the task. Participants who reported that they did not act or did not feel consistently with the
motive condition to which they had been randomly assigned were dropped from the final sample.
Leader blame behavior. As in Study 3, following the completion of the moon survival
task, the leader saw a set of response options and was asked to select one of these messages to
send to their partner in light of their below average performance on the task. However, the
response options were expanded from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale. The revised
options were: (1) You are to blame for this outcome, (2) You are somewhat to blame for this
outcome, (3) You are slightly to blame for this outcome, (4) We are equally to blame for this
outcome, (5) I am slightly to blame for this outcome, (6) I am somewhat to blame for this
outcome, and (5) I am to blame for this outcome (see Appendix D). The leader then selected one
of these statements with the knowledge that their partner (i.e., the confederate) would see the
message. The message was framed as a response or feedback to the other team member. This
variable represented the blame observed by a subordinate audience.
As in Study 3, the leader also responded to three items assessing their beliefs regarding
who was to blame for the performance on the team task. These measures were framed as the
extent to which the leader contributed to the pair’s relative failure on the task, and the participant
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was told that the lab administrator would be able to view their responses to these items. Again,
this measure was expanded from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-point Likert scale. See Appendix D
for full items. Cronbach’s alpha for the three items measuring the participant’s beliefs regarding
who was to blame was .80. This measure represented the blame observed by an audience of
superiors, as it indicated the leader’s communication to the superior regarding their beliefs as to
who was the blame for the team’s unsuccessful performance.
Measures. Regarding the post-lab survey items including manipulation checks, attention
checks, and self-assessment, the exact same measures administered in Study 3 were administered
in Study 4. One additional item was a comprehension (i.e., attention) check regarding reward
structure, in which the participant was instructed to indicate if their moon survival task score was
based on their team’s performance, their individual performance, or an average of both tasks
combined.
Participant compensation. As in Study 3, participants were told that their final score
would be determined by two different scores: the achievement score and the contribution score.
However, in Study 4, participants were told that their achievement score was based on the
reward structure manipulation (shared rewards, individual rewards, or control – average of both
individual and team tasks). A participant assigned to the shared reward structure condition was
told they would be scored on the Moon Survival Task completed with a partner, while a
participant assigned to the individual reward structure condition was told they would be scored
based on their solo performance.
However, during the study debriefing, I informed participants that compensation would
be awarded accordingly based on the average of their solo and team performance on the Moon
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Survival Task. Participants performing in the top 10% of all participants in this study were
rewarded $10.00 in cash for their performance.
4.4.2 Results. Descriptive statistics and correlations between each of the measures are
displayed in Table 4.38 and Table 4.39. For the blame that the study participants, as the leader,
communicated to their subordinate, the average blame behavior was 5.08 (SD = 1.31) (on a 7point Likert scale). For the blame that the study participants, as the leader, communicated to the
superior, the average blame behavior was 5.19 (SD = 0.91). Histograms showing the distribution
of these two measures are depicted in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10.
Table 4.38 Study 4 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

M
SD
Age
19.34
1.05
Gender (Female = 1)
0.50
0.50
Motive (ego-defensive = 0; implicit beliefs = 1) n/a
n/a
Reward structure (individual = 0; shared = 1)
n/a
n/a
Blame communicated to subordinate
5.08
1.31
Blame communicated to superior
5.19
0.91
Note: N =257. Blame measures were on a 7-point Likert scale.

Min
18
0
n/a
n/a
1.00
1.00

Max
22
1
n/a
n/a
7.00
7.00

Age

Gender

Motive

Reward
structure

-0.10
0.12+
0.12+
-0.01
0.1

-0.16*
0.09
-0.13+
-0.15*

0.00
0.24**
0.22**

0.01
0.14+

Blame
communicated to
subordinate

Blame
communicated to
superior

0.73**

α = .80

Table 4.39 Study 4 – Motive and Reward conditions: Means and SDs of Blame Communications

Blame communicated to subordinate
Ego-defensive motive
Implicit beliefs motive
Individual reward structure
Shared reward structure
Control group

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

97
105
98
104
55

4.78
5.45
5.11
5.14
4.89

1.36
1.29
1.32
1.42
1.06

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00

7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00

1.00
3.00
2.33
1.00
3.33

7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
6.67

Blame communicated to superior
Ego-defensive motive
97
5.03
0.98
Implicit beliefs motive
105
5.45
0.88
Individual reward structure
98
5.12
0.90
Shared reward structure
104
5.38
0.98
Control group
55
4.97
0.73
Note: All blame behaviors were measured on a 7-point Likert scale.
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Figure 4.9. Study 4 – Distribution of Blame Communicated to Subordinate.

Figure 4.10. Study 4 – Distribution of Blame Communicated to Superior.
I considered whether participants internalized the motive manipulation or if they were
simply responding in line with how they thought they should respond (i.e., an experimenter
demand effect). If participants completed the measures due to cues about appropriate behavior, a
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demand effect would lead participants in the ego-defensive motive condition to provide very low
blame behavior scores (e.g., the extreme blame-giving end of the scale), but the mean blame
behavior was above 4.5 out of 7.0, instead of closer to 2.0 (see Table 4.39). Additionally,
participants in the implicit beliefs motive condition would provide very high blame behaviors
scores (e.g., the extreme blame-taking end of the scale), but the mean blame behavior was below
5.5 out of 7.0, instead of closer to 6.0 (see Table 4.39). The results, therefore, are not consistent
with an experimenter demand effect.
I computed ANOVAs to determine if there were differences in blame communications to
both the subordinate and the superior across the 5 cells (ego-defensive motive/individual reward,
ego-defensive motive/shared reward, implicit beliefs motive/individual reward, implicit beliefs
motive/shared reward, and control condition), as well as an ANOVA comparing 4 cells (without
the control condition). Both sets of analyses yielded the same results regarding the effects of the
motive and reward manipulations, and therefore I chose to drop the control condition in
subsequent analyses (see Table 4.39 for means of blame communicated to subordinate and
superior in each condition, including the control group).
A two-way ANOVA (leaving out the control group) with an interaction was conducted to
compare the effects of motive and reward structure on blame communicated to the superior in
the ego-defensive motive and implicit beliefs motive conditions, as well as the individual reward
structure and shared reward structure conditions. See Figure 4.11 for boxplot comparisons of
blame communicated to the superior across the four motive-reward conditions. A main effect of
motive was found for blame message sent to the superior, F(1, 198) = 10.779, p = .001.
Participants in the ego-defensive motive condition (M = 5.03, SD = .98) took significantly less
blame for the unsuccessful outcome on the Moon Survival Task than did participants in the
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implicit beliefs motive condition (M = 5.45, SD = .88). Thus, Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 3a
were both supported for blame behaviors communicated to a superior. A main effect of reward
structure was also found for blame communicated to the superior, F(1, 198) = 4.005, p = .047.
Participants in the individual reward condition (M = 5.12, SD = .90) took significantly less blame
for the unsuccessful outcome on the Moon Survival Task than did participants in the shared
reward condition (M = 5.38, SD = .98). See Table 4.39 for means in each motive condition and
reward condition. The interaction effect of motive and reward structure on blame communicated
to the subordinate was not significant at the p < .05 level, F(1, 198) = .372, n.s.

Figure 4.11. Study 4 – Boxplot Comparisons – Blame Communicated to Superior.

Because of the statistically significant results in this ANOVA, I computed a post hoc test.
I selected the Tukey’s honest significance (HSD) multiple pairwise comparisons test, which is
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designed to compare each of the conditions to every other conditions. I conducted a Tukey’s
HSD test to compare the ego-defensive motive and implicit beliefs motive conditions in addition
to the individual reward and shared reward conditions. Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD
test indicated that implicit beliefs participants in the shared reward condition took significantly
more blame (M = 5.54, SD = .96) at the p < .01 level when communicating to the superior
compared to ego-defensive participants in the individual reward condition (M = 4.85, SD = .96).

Figure 4.12. Study 4 – Blame Communicated to Superior – Means and SDs.

The post hoc comparisons test further indicated that implicit beliefs participants in the
individual reward condition took significantly more blame (M = 5.36, SD = .78) at the p < .05
level when communicating to the superior compared to ego-defensive participants in the
individual reward condition (M = 4.85, SD = .96). The ego-defensive participants in the shared
reward condition did not exhibit significantly different blame behaviors compared to all other
participants (i.e., ego-defensive participants in the individual reward condition, implicit beliefs
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participants in either reward condition). In addition, the implicit beliefs participants did not
exhibit significantly different blame behaviors across the two reward conditions. While there was
minimal support for Hypotheses 6a(i) and 6b(i), there was support for some individual
comparisons across cells in line with these predictions. See Figure 4.12 for each cell’s mean and
standard deviation for blame communicated to the superior.
Next, a two-way ANOVA with an interaction was computed to compare the effects of
motive and reward structure on blame communicated to the subordinate in the ego-defensive
motive and implicit beliefs motive conditions, as well as the individual reward and shared reward
structure conditions. See Figure 4.13 for boxplot comparisons of blame communicated to the
subordinate across the four motive-reward conditions. A main effect of motive was found for
blame message sent to the subordinate, F(1, 198) = 12.637, p < .001. Participants in the egodefensive motive condition (M = 4.78, SD = 1.36) took significantly less blame for the
unsuccessful outcome on the Moon Survival Task than did participants in the implicit beliefs
motive condition (M = 5.45, SD = 1.29). Thus, Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 3a were both
supported for blame behaviors communicated to a subordinate. The main effect of reward
structure on blame communicated to the subordinate was not significant at the p < .05 level, F(1,
198) = .031, n.s. Participants in the individual reward structure condition and participants in the
shared reward structure condition did not differ significantly on the blame they communicated to
their subordinate. See Table 4.39 for means in each motive condition and reward condition. The
interaction effect of motive and reward structure on blame communicated to the subordinate was
not significant at the p < .05 level, F(1, 198) = 2.230, n.s.
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Figure 4.13. Study 4 – Boxplot Comparisons – Blame Communicated to Subordinate.
I conducted a Tukey’s HSD test to compare all conditions to every other condition. Post
hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test indicated that implicit beliefs participants in the shared
reward condition took significantly more blame (M = 5.33, SD = 1.45) at the p < .05 level when
communicating to the subordinate compared to ego-defensive participants in the individual
reward condition (M = 4.62, SD = 1.36). The post hoc comparisons test further indicated that
implicit beliefs participants in the individual reward condition took significantly more blame (M
= 5.57, SD = 1.10) at the p < .01 level when communicating to the subordinate compared to egodefensive participants in the individual reward condition (M = 4.62, SD = 1.36). Again, similar to
communication to a superior, for communication to a subordinate, the ego-defensive participants
in the shared reward condition did not exhibit significantly different blame behaviors compared
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to all other participants (i.e., ego-defensive participants in the individual reward condition,
implicit beliefs participants in either reward condition) at the p < .05 level. In addition, the
implicit beliefs participants did not exhibit significantly different blame behaviors across the two
reward conditions at the p < .05 level. Again, while there was minimal support for Hypotheses
6a(i) and 6b(i), there was support for some individual comparisons across cells in line with these
predictions. See Figure 4.14 for each cell’s mean and standard deviation for blame
communicated to the subordinate.

Figure 4.14. Study 4 – Blame Communicated to Subordinate – Means and SDs.
4.4.3 Discussion. The results reveal that motive affects blame communicated to a
subordinate and to a superior. Specifically, the results indicate that participants in the implicit
beliefs motive condition took more blame when communicating to either subordinates or
superiors than participants in the ego-defensive condition. With respect to blame communicated
to either audience type, the results illustrate that both motive and reward structure have an effect
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on the blame communicated. Specifically, ego-defensive participants in the individual reward
condition took significantly less blame than participants in the implicit beliefs motive condition
subject to either individual or shared reward structures. However, ego-defensive participants in
the shared reward condition exhibited no significant differences in blame behavior
communicated to a superior compared to all other participants, and that when examining all
participants within the implicit beliefs motive condition, there was no difference in blame
communicated to a superior when comparing between individual and shared reward structures.
Taken together, these findings show that the two motives examined in this study matter
for blame behaviors in the direction predicted. Namely, people driven by the implicit beliefs
motive tend to take more blame for an unsuccessful outcome than people driven by the egodefensive motive. This pattern appeared for blame communicated to both a subordinate and a
superior. Reward structure did not have a main effect on blame communicated to a subordinate,
but there was a main effect of reward structure on blame communicated to a superior. When
communicating blame to a superior, individuals in the shared reward condition took significantly
more blame for the unsuccessful outcome than individuals in the individual reward condition. It
is possible that individuals who were informed that their score on the task would be computed
based on their team performance believed that as the leader of a team, they were accountable and
thus shifted more blame toward themselves when their team fell short in the lab exercise.
Conversely, perhaps participants who were informed that their score on the task would be
dependent on their solo performance on the task were not as invested in the task because their
partner’s score would rest on their performance as a leader, and thus they refrained from taking
as much blame for their performance in the lab exercise.

154

Envisioning the motive condition and reward structure conditions in a 2 x 2 design, the
effect of the two conditions together was most powerful on the diagonal, where the motive is
“congruent” with the reward structure. An individual with an ego-defensive motive in a context
with an individual reward structure tends to shift blame away (i.e., assign more blame) compared
to individuals with an implicit beliefs motive in a context with a shared reward structure. When
looking at the opposite diagonal, in which the motive is incongruent with the reward structure
(i.e., ego-defensive motive with a shared reward structure, and implicit beliefs motive with an
individual reward structure), the differences seem to wash out and counteract each other.
However, the ego-defensive motive appears to be particularly powerful, in that the effect lasts
beyond reward condition. Individuals driven by an ego-defensive motive in an individual reward
structure still assign more blame compared to individuals with an implicit beliefs motive in an
individual reward structure. The differences observed in this study appear to be driven by the
combination of an ego-defensive motive in a context with individual rewards.
As with any study, the findings are limited by the design of the experiment. One
limitation with respect to the theoretical model is that this study examines two of the four
motives proposed – the ego-defensive and implicit beliefs motive. While blame behaviors linked
to these two motives appear to be significantly different in this sample, conclusions cannot be
drawn regarding the other two motives in the model – the impression management motive and
the relationship building motive – because they were not examined here. In addition, the study
was conducted in a sample of undergraduates in a laboratory setting. As with any study of this
kind, the sterility of a laboratory environment and the nature of a student subject pool sample
must be noted as limitations of the study’s overall ecological validity. This limitation itself may
have contributed to the lack of a strong effect observed for reward structure. As participants,
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students may not have been motivated enough by the $10.00 cash prize, either due to $10.00 as
an insufficiently large prize or by the low probability of earning. All participants were informed
that 320 students would be participating in the study (although only 315 were ultimately
recruited), and that participants who performed in the top 10% of all participants would receive a
$10.00 cash prize, while the other 90% would receive no prize.
4.5 Key Takeaways
Taken together, results from the studies in this chapter indicate that the ego-defensive
motive and the implicit beliefs motive have very different effects on leader blame behavior in
particular. The ego-defensive motive is linked to behaviors that shift blame away from the
leader, while the implicit beliefs motive is linked to behaviors that shift blame toward the leader.
4.5.1 Ego-defensive motive and blame-assignment. Together, the findings from a study
of an online sample of managers and an experimental study demonstrate that an ego-defensive
motive is strongly related to blame assignment. Leaders driven by the ego-defensive motive tend
to assign more blame than take blame. Based on the data collected, I argue that this behavioral
tendency persists in front of an audience of subordinates and an audience of superiors. This falls
in line with the predictions and the literature indicating that individuals who are inclined to
defend a positive self-image will shift blame away from rather than towards themselves (e.g.,
Ross, 1977). Although the laboratory study examined only blame behaviors and not credit
behaviors, findings from the online sample of managers indicate that ego-preserving tendencies
may be more apparent when it comes to blame than when it comes to credit, as no effect was
observed for self-reported credit behaviors.
Perhaps it is the case that individuals are more likely to shift blame away for unsuccessful
outcomes than shift credit towards themselves for successful outcomes, such that people perceive
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blame, which typically has a negative connotation, as being more negative than they see credit as
being positive. This is related to the notion in prospect theory that, with respect to a leader’s
reference point, the effect of a loss is much larger than that of a gain (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). Loss aversion may partly explain the strong relationship between the ego-defensive
motive and blame behaviors. That the link between the ego-defensive motive and blame
behaviors towards others was observed across two studies (Study 2 and Study 4) demonstrates
that the ego-defensive motive has a particularly powerful effect on blame behaviors. While no
interaction between ego-defensive motive, operationalized by narcissism, and organizational
culture was observed in Study 2, the contextual factor of individual reward structure in the lab
study seemed to emphasize the difference in blame behaviors between ego-defensive individuals
and individuals who are driven by implicit beliefs of an ideal leader. This shows that contextual
factors do matter, as they may augment the link between motive and blame behavior, but that the
strength of the motive may at times outweigh the influence of one’s context.
4.5.2 Implicit beliefs and blame-taking. Furthermore, findings from Study 4 reveal that
the implicit beliefs motive has a main effect on blame-taking behaviors, regardless of reward
structure. There were negligible differences in blame behavior between the implicit beliefs
motive participants in the individual versus shared reward conditions. However, in the online
sample of managers, main effects were not observed between the implicit beliefs motive and
blame behaviors. Yet, within this sample, individuals who scored low on the implicit beliefs
measure of an ideal leader took more blame in the context of a collectivistic culture than in an
individualistic culture, which may indicate that organizational culture is a strong contextual
factor, perhaps stronger than reward structure, in shaping the link from the implicit beliefs
motive to blame behaviors. Reward structure can be viewed as a signal of organizational culture;
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for example, the existence of an individual reward structure in an organization is an aspect of the
organization that signals a more individualistic culture. Organizational culture as a whole, with
reward structure as one component, may have a deeper influence on the link between the implicit
beliefs motive and blame behavior, and perhaps the other motives and blame behavior.
4.5.3 Impression management and blame-taking. The findings from Study 2 reveal
that the impression management motive may be linked to blame behaviors opposite that
predicted by the theoretical model proposed in Chapter 3. The findings reveal that a leader who
is highly motivated to manage impressions is more likely to report taking blame instead of
blaming others after an unsuccessful outcome, regardless of whether they are communicating
this blame to a group of subordinates or superiors. As discussed previously, leaders who take
blame may perceive these types of behaviors as a way to manage others’ impressions of them as
a “good” leader, which ties into the implicit beliefs motive. However, the implicit beliefs
motives is directed inward, in that leaders who are driven by the implicit beliefs motive behave
congruently with their personal beliefs regarding good leadership in an attempt to behave
consistently with their own self-concept (e.g., Lord & Brown, 2001) and their implicit theories
regarding ideal leadership. On the other hand, the impression management motive is directed
outward, in that individuals driven by the impression management motive are driven to shape
their image in the eyes of others, and they may view blame-taking behaviors as a way of shaping
how others perceive them as a leader. With respect to credit behaviors, leaders may take credit in
front of a group of superiors in order to strengthen their image as a leader. But in front of
subordinates, a leader driven by the impression management motive may not take the credit for a
successful outcome, as their subordinates are closer to the circumstances surrounding the
outcome and have an accurate evaluation of to whom credit is due.
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4.5.4 Link between blame-taking and subordinate OCBs. While subordinate OCBs
were not included in the experimental studies, from the online sample of managers, it appears
that leaders who shift blame more toward themselves and less toward their subordinates may be
more likely to observe subordinate OCBs. This paper provides correlational evidence of a
relationship between leader blame-taking behavior and subordinate OCBs. No relationships were
observed between credit behaviors and subordinate OCBs. Therefore, it is possible that a leader’s
blame behaviors hold more weight compared to a leader’s credit behaviors. For example, a
subordinate may be more likely to engage in OCBs when their leader takes blame rather than
when their leader gives them credit. Perhaps subordinates perceive their leader’s blame-taking
actions as protecting the subordinate from harm whereas credit-giving behaviors are perceived as
giving them the credit they are due. Social exchange theory argues that reciprocity norms
between two parties signify that if one party supplies a benefit (e.g., a leader takes the blame for
an unsuccessful outcome), the receiving party should respond correspondingly in the future
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). As a result, based on reciprocity norms, subordinates may
indeed repay a supportive, blame-taking leader who has protected them from potential harm by
engaging in organizational citizenship behaviors.
In Chapter 4, three studies were conducted to empirically examine selected elements in
the theoretical model. Field data was collected from an online sample of managers, followed by
two experimental studies in a population of undergraduates that focused specifically on blame
behaviors. The studies in this chapter provide evidence for some of the hypotheses and key
propositions in the theoretical model posed in Chapter 3, with more support for the connections
between a leader’s motive and their blame behaviors than for their credit behaviors.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
In this dissertation, I examine how and why leaders communicate accountability by
addressing blame and credit, thus generating and establishing the conversation about blame and
credit behaviors in the workplace in three distinct ways. First, this dissertation evolves the
current state of thought regarding blame and credit by acknowledging the existence and
importance of unexplored blame and credit behaviors. Second, it introduces a theoretical
framework of the motives driving the blame and credit behaviors of leaders, including the effects
of two contextual factors on such behaviors. Third, the empirical work conducted provides some
evidence for the validity of the theoretical model. As a whole, this dissertation brings to the
forefront the importance of various blame and credit behaviors in organizations and explains
why leaders enact these behaviors following diffuse positive or negative outcomes.
5.1 Contributions
The existing literature has operated on the assumption that individuals want to reduce the
blame assigned to them and increase the credit they receive – they more often take credit for
successful outcomes than take blame for unsuccessful ones because of a desire to avoid threats to
self-esteem (Shaver 1985; Gioia & Sims, 1985; Greenwald, 1980). Only a few researchers have
provided scientific analysis, including Crant and Bateman (1983), who found that individuals
strategically use self-handicapping tactics and casual accounts in order to shift blame away and
shift credit towards themselves in order protect or enhance the self. Gunia (2011) was the first
the introduce the notion of blame-taking, by studying the incidence and effectiveness of blametaking, as compared to remorse and evasion. Beyond this, the conversation regarding blame and
credit behaviors involves primarily anecdotal evidence, such as in the popular news media or in
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accounts of U.S. Navy SEAL training (e.g., Bregman, 2013; Cannon & Cannon, 2003; Sharer,
2014; Suddath, 2012).
Therefore, the first main contribution of this dissertation is that it identifies a new area of
research and generates new conversation regarding the existence and importance of various
blame and credit behaviors. It acknowledges, explains, and examines other types of blame and
credit behaviors beyond blame assignment and credit-taking, such as blame-taking and creditgiving. Other researchers in the blame and credit literature, such as Crant and Bateman (1983)
and Gunia (2011), have yet to acknowledge and examine the comprehensive map of blame and
credit behaviors. Thus, the theoretical framework developed in this paper serves as an initiating
and propelling force to strengthen and compound our current understanding of a wide variety of
blame and credit behaviors, their antecedents, and subsequent outcomes. Furthermore,
practitioners, such as Bregman (2013), Sharer (2014), and Suddath (2012), have provided
anecdotal evidence illustrating instances of blame-taking and the benefits of blame-taking in the
workplace, but a major shortcoming of this conversation stems from its reliance on unscientific
speculation. Therefore, the empirical work presented in this dissertation comprises the scientific,
empirical evidence to date regarding a more comprehensive range of leader blame and credit
behaviors. As a result, this dissertation is the first paper of its kind to provide both theory on and
empirical evidence for various blame and credit behaviors, their drivers, and a potential
downstream outcome. In effect, this dissertation pushes the boundaries of the current knowledge
space that comprises the blame and credit literature.
This dissertation discerns blame and credit behaviors as two separate spectrums of
behavior. Blame or credit is shifted toward others on one end and toward the self on the opposite
end, while the middle of the spectrum denotes the sharing of either blame or credit (see Figure
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3.1). In the first two chapters, I highlight the importance of blame and credit behaviors and the
salience of such behaviors in leaders’ thoughts and statements. I conducted two studies to map
out leader blame and credit behaviors beyond blame-assignment and credit-taking, creating a
more comprehensive view of the various types of blame and credit behaviors and what they look
like. In the Pilot Study interviews, coaches conveyed that, as leaders of sports teams, they
attempt to think carefully about their communications regarding blame or credit toward the
athletes on the team because they believe that these behaviors can have positive or negative
consequences on their relationships with the athletes and on the athletes’ performance. Study 1,
which involved canvassing and analyzing statements in NFL coaches’ press conferences,
illustrated that expressions of blame and credit occur asymmetrically in a public context. In this
study, I examined blame and credit behaviors directly, without the measurement error that
sometimes occurs when assessing memories, perceptions, or hypothetical scenarios.
The second main contribution of this dissertation is that it integrates four unique
perspectives in the literature to create a theoretical framework of the motives driving blame and
credit behaviors. The framework also includes a classification scheme that categorizes each
motive by its objective and direction. Drawing from the psychology literature on self-image and
ego-defensiveness bias (e.g., Greenwald, 1980; Ross, 1977) and the impression management
literature (e.g., Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Staw, McKechnie, and
Puffer, 1983; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971), the theoretical model links the egodefensive and impression management motives to blame behaviors toward others and credit
behaviors toward the self. Stemming from the literature on implicit leadership theory (e.g., Eden
& Leviatan, 1975; House et al., 1999; Nye & Forsyth, 1991) and theories in LMX and social
exchange (e.g., Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Cropanzano &
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Mitchell, 2005), the model links the implicit beliefs and relationship building motives to blame
behaviors toward the self and credit behaviors toward others. By tying together these four unique
perspectives, this dissertation contributes a theoretical model of four motives that drive blame
and credit behaviors.
In addition to these four motives, the theoretical model also integrates the role of
contextual factors. Previous literature has considered organizational cultures that emphasize
individualistic or collectivistic values (Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Chatman and Jehn, 1994). The
model in this dissertation argues that when a leader’s motive is incongruent with the
organization’s culture, the emphasis on individualistic or collectivistic values may attenuate the
behavioral tendencies associated with this motive. As a result, the leader’s blame or credit
behaviors become more compatible (or less incongruent) with the organizational culture.
Drawing from the literature on reward structures (e.g., Johnson and Johnson, 1989; Tjosvold,
1982; Triandis, 1989), individual and shared reward structures will have a similar influence on
the relationship between motive and blame or credit behavior. By introducing these two
contextual factors, the theoretical model proposes that leader blame and credit behaviors are
shaped not only by a leader’s motives but also by the environment in which they lead.
Lastly, the empirical work in this dissertation contributes by providing partial evidence
for the theoretical model. The evidence presented in this dissertation reveals that the egodefensive motive is particularly powerful in driving leader blame behaviors. In line with the
theoretical model, the ego-defensive motive was linked to behaviors that shifted blame away
from the leader, while the implicit beliefs motive was linked to behaviors that shifted blame
toward the leader (i.e., toward the self). There was evidence of a strong relationship between the
ego-defensive motive and blame assignment; leaders driven by the ego-defensive motive tended
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to assign more blame than take blame. This behavioral tendency was observed regardless of
whether the audience was comprised of subordinates or superiors, which parallels the predictions
in the model drawn from literature arguing that individuals who are inclined to defend a positive
self-image will shift blame away from rather than towards themselves (e.g., Ross, 1977).
The empirical work in this dissertation reinforces the difference in blame behaviors
between ego-defensive leaders and leaders who are driven by implicit beliefs of an ideal leader
with respect to the contextual factor of reward structure. The relationship between the egodefensive motive and blame behaviors was stronger under an individual reward structure but was
also observed under a shared reward structure. The implicit beliefs motive was related to blametaking behaviors, regardless of reward structure. Together, these results comprise the current
evidence of the validity of the model.
The evidence in Study 2 illustrates, however, that the impression management motive
may be more complex than currently proposed. The empirical evidence links the impression
management motive to blame behaviors toward the self, opposite to the prediction in the
theoretical model. Instead, leaders highly motivated to manage impressions were more likely to
report taking blame instead of assigning blame after an unsuccessful outcome. One explanation
is that blame-taking may be perceived as a way to manage others’ impressions of them as a
“good” leader. For a leader who is highly motivated to manage impressions, this motivation may
translate into a desire to be viewed as an “ideal” leader or as a leader who builds relationships.
The unexpected pattern regarding the impression management motive observed in the online
sample of managers should be explored in future research, as it seems that taking blame may be a
way to manage a specific type of impression.
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While the theoretical model focuses on the motives of blame and credit behaviors, the
empirical work in this dissertation speaks to one consequence of blame-taking behaviors:
subordinate OCBs. This dissertation provides evidence for a correlational link between leader
blame-taking behaviors and subordinate OCBs, but not credit-giving behaviors and subordinate
OCBs. Subordinates may perceive their leader’s blame-taking actions as protecting them from
harm. According to reciprocity norms (e.g., Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), subordinates may be
spurred to repay a supportive, blame-taking leader who has protected them from potential harm
by engaging in organizational citizenship behaviors. In addition, subordinates may view an act of
blame-taking as part of a favorable social exchange, which is related to trust and organizational
commitment (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Supervisory support, in the form of blame-taking, may lead
to subordinates to engage in OCBs because they feel more supported by both their supervisor
and the organization.
5.2 Practical Implications
This dissertation argues that leaders will engage in blame and credit behaviors not yet
examined by the literature. Their behaviors are partly explained by their motives and by the
environment in which they operate. The theoretical model in Chapter 3 proposes that there are
four motives that drive leaders’ behaviors in shifting blame and credit towards or away from
themselves. Moreover, there are certain contextual factors that may work to shape these
behaviors. The empirical work in Chapter 4 provides mixed support for the predictions derived
from the model. Based on this evidence, I offer three key practical implications.
First, the theory and evidence in this dissertation demonstrate that managers have
tendencies that stem from their motives, manifesting as blame and credit behaviors. Therefore, it
is important for managers to understand that they may possess individual characteristics that
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push them to enact certain types of behaviors. Having an awareness of one’s behavioral
tendencies stemming from one’s natural motivations might help an individual, in a managerial
role, think more deliberately regarding their actions and reactions following a successful or an
unsuccessful diffuse outcome. Being particularly mindful of the context (for instance, whether
individualistic or collectivistic values and reward structures are a part of the environment) may
help managers better understand their own behaviors and tendencies. Given the correlational
evidence linking blame-taking behaviors to increased reports of subordinate OCBs, managers
may be motivated to build strong relationships with their subordinates by taking blame in order
to establish organizational and supervisory support. This may be especially helpful for managers
working in individualistic contexts or who are aware that they are driven by the ego-defensive
motive, for example.
Second, from an employee or subordinate perspective, it may be helpful and important to
recognize that a manager’s behaviors may be a result of long-lasting motives and their link to
blame and credit behaviors, and that these links may be difficult to weaken or eliminate.
Furthermore, a manager’s behaviors could be driven not only by individual characteristics but
also by the situation and context in which she works. For example, from a subordinate’s
perspective, they may observe a manager shifting blame toward their subordinates, which they
may in turn interpret as the manager lashing out against subordinates following an unsuccessful
outcome. Then, the subordinate may take a moment to consider that perhaps their manager may
be driven by the ego-defensive motive, a long-lasting state, as well as being in an organization
that values individual performance or has implemented an individual (or even a competitive)
reward structure. In this type of situation, it could be helpful to take an alternate perspective by
considering their manager’s internal motives and the external context. Perspective-taking can be
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productive, not necessarily as a means of absolving the manager of any unproductive behaviors
or actions, but as an employee’s strategy of mitigating her own unproductive reactions or
behaviors to a manager’s blaming behaviors (or other potentially damaging behaviors). Then, the
employee might be able to effectively engage in a more productive sequence of events following
the unsuccessful outcome and the manager’s undesirable response.
Lastly, there may be practical implications from this line of research at the organizational
design level. Organizations themselves can be mindful about creating and fostering an
organizational culture, or reward structure, to counteract leaders’ motives and tendencies. For
example, if decision-makers of an organization wish to establish an organization that values
leaders who take blame, or a leader who shares and disperses credit, they can refer to the
theoretical model in this paper or some of the findings from the empirical studies regarding
individual- and group-focused contextual factors. Developing and fostering an organizational
culture that values collectivism and implements a shared reward structure may lead managers to
shift blame towards themselves and credit towards others, whereas developing an individualistic
organizational culture with an individual reward structure may lead to the opposite behaviors.
Organizations that are interested in promoting particular blame and credit behaviors might
benefit from being mindful about the values, norms, and beliefs espoused in the workplace.
5.3 Future Research
The development of a theoretical framework explaining the motives driving blame and
credit behaviors was a necessary first step to understand blame and credit behaviors and their
consequences. There is more work to be done. To begin, from a theoretical standpoint, the
current model can be extended by considering other factors, such as the magnitude of the
outcome and the hierarchical position of the audience.
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With respect to magnitude, positive or negative outcomes can have varying effects on an
organization. The ramifications of certain outcomes may be contained within a particular team or
department, whereas other outcomes may threaten the viability of an organization. The degree to
which an outcome impacts an organization may change the magnitude of blame or credit that is
allocated, as well as the way in which blame or credit is communicated (e.g., Cornelissen, 2008).
For example, the effects of a negative outcome of a small magnitude may be confined within a
team, and the blame communicated may be toward an internal, intra-team audience and the
effects temporary. However, if the negative outcome is of a large magnitude, the leader may
want or need to communicate blame to an external audience as well as an internal audience, and
the effects may be more permanent and severe (e.g., an individual(s) may lose their job). The
relationships theorized by the model proposed in this dissertation may be more fitting for
outcomes that are smaller in magnitude, and the model may evolve when the assumption of the
homogeneity of outcome magnitude is relaxed. A larger, more threatening failure, because of its
extreme nature compared to a more trivial failure, could warrant and trigger a more extreme
response from a leader. For example, if the company faces a multibillion-dollar lawsuit because
of a large diffuse failure, the magnitude of this failure may impact the relationship between a
leader’s motives and subsequent behavior, and perhaps directly impact the behaviors themselves.
For example, the relationship between the motives and behaviors could be washed out if a leader
responding to and managing a legal crisis must act in accordance with the law or may enact
behaviors under the advisement of their general counsel.
With respect to hierarchical positioning of an audience, future research should continue
to tease apart the upward and downward (and lateral) communication of blame and credit. Given
that leaders may communicate blame and credit to different audiences, it would be interesting to
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explore the discrepancies (or similarities) between communications to superiors versus
subordinates. Individuals may differ in their communications to separate audiences (e.g., Celsi &
Gilly, 2010; Cornelissen, 2008), and research in this area should continue to parse the reasons
behind differences in blame and credit communications as well as the impact of these
discrepancies on organizational outcomes. While this paper included audiences comprised of
subordinates and superiors, it is important to consider audiences of a laterally equivalent
hierarchical position. Furthermore, individuals may not only communicate blame and credit
differently to unique audiences, but the relationships they seek to establish may be different
across their subordinates, their peers, and their own superiors. The relationship building motive
in the current theoretical model focuses only on relationships in a hierarchically downward
direction, from a leader to a subordinate. Future research should examine the relationship
building motive by incorporating relationships in multiple directions – not only downward to a
subordinate, but also upward to a supervisor, across to a peer, or outward to the public. In
practice, managers simultaneously juggle multiple relationships, and how this juggling factors
into the relationship building motive and the resulting blame or credit behaviors is important to
understand.
Based on the findings in this dissertation, the theoretical model can be further refined in
future research. The empirical evidence illustrates a discrepancy between the impression
management motive and its proposed blame behaviors. Individuals who were highly motivated
to manage impressions reported taking blame following a diffuse failure. Researchers should
investigate what image an impression-managing leader wishes and attempts to convey by blametaking, and why. Future research should also explore the impression management motive with
respect to perceptions of a leader’s competence, benevolence, and/or integrity. Because
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individuals “have an ongoing interest in how others perceive and evaluate them” (Leary &
Kowalski, 1990: 34), they may want to control how they are perceived in terms of their
competence, benevolence, and integrity, specifically. If a leader is driven by the impression
management motive, she may enact credit behaviors in line with her desire to be perceived as
being competent – for example, by taking credit for a successful outcome. If she wants to be
perceived as being benevolent, she may take blame for an unsuccessful outcome, as blametaking might be perceived as protecting subordinates from blame or as a generous act of taking
the fall for the team. A leader who wishes to manage an impression of integrity may enact
behaviors that uphold her moral principles or that are in line with what she believes is the truth,
which lends additional complexity to the already complex link between the impression
management motive and blame and credit behaviors. Future research should study the effects of
the impression management on perceptions of competence, benevolence, and integrity, as well as
examine whether the desire to be seen as a leader of competence, benevolence, or integrity is an
accurate reflection of a genuine desire to be competent, benevolent, or a leader of integrity,
rather than merely seeming like one.
Furthermore, the scope of the current theoretical model excludes deflecting behaviors
(i.e., deflecting blame, deflecting credit). While deflection does not exist on the spectrum of
blame or credit behaviors established in this dissertation (see Figure 3.1) because it is not
directed toward others, toward the self, or to anyone in between, deflection of blame or credit
does indeed occur in the workplace. While observations of deflection were noted in Study 1,
future research should explore deflection by expanding the theoretical model to include
deflecting behaviors and the motives that potentially drive these behaviors.
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Furthermore, the empirical work completed in this dissertation involved an online field
sample of managers and two experimental lab studies. Future research should turn to a field
context to examine the connection between the four motives proposed in this dissertation. A field
study with multi-source data, rather than only single-source, self-reported data, that explores the
drivers of blame and credit behaviors, as well as the potential individual and team outcomes of
these behaviors, would extend the credibility of the theoretical framework proposed. Linking a
leader’s motives (which are self-reported) to blame and credit behaviors as reported by her own
subordinate(s) would not only provide more conclusive and compelling evidence for the model,
but would also provide more insight into the potential practical implications of this area of
research. In addition, a field study of working managers would strengthen the ecological validity
of the findings in this paper.
Additionally, further research should be conducted regarding credit behaviors. The
experimental studies in this paper focus on blame rather than credit behaviors, and while there is
undoubtedly room to continue exploring the drivers and consequences of blame behaviors, by
comparison, our current understanding of credit behaviors is limited. Future research can
determine whether there are benefits to blame-taking that outweigh credit-giving, or compare the
effects of blame-assignment to those of credit-taking. By probing into the drivers and
consequences of blame and credit behaviors, research may uncover unique patterns in blame
behaviors that are different than those in credit behaviors. Future work should also delve into the
consequences of blame and credit behaviors beyond subordinate OCBs. Examining the effects of
leader behaviors on their employees, as well as on the teams they lead, could have substantial
practical implications. Such research could reveal that certain types of behaviors are conducive
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to positive individual and team outcomes, whereas others may be counterproductive and provoke
dysfunctional team outcomes.
Lastly, future research should commit to examining differences in gender and in national
culture. Researchers should explore gender differences with respect to how and why leaders
enact blame and credit behaviors and whether contextual factors shape the leadership behaviors
of men and women differently. While significant gender differences were not detected in the
studies conducted for this dissertation, it is possible that being driven by a particular motive(s)
has divergent effects in different contexts or industries for female leaders compared to male
leaders. Researchers should also consider not only the gender of the leader enacting the blame or
credit behavior, but also the gender of the subordinates who are the receiving end of those
behaviors. The leadership literature has explored differences in gender and perceptions of
leadership effectiveness (e.g., Eagly et al., 1992; Paustian-Underdahl et al., 2014). Future work
should delve deeper into whether men and women, as employees, react or perceive a manager’s
blame and credit behaviors differently and evaluate their managers differently as a result,
whether these differences in perception have varying effects on performance, attitudes toward
work, or other outcomes. Research should also investigate whether there is an interaction
between the gender of the employee and that of the manager.
The theoretical model in this dissertation acknowledges differences in organizational
culture (e.g., individualism versus collectivism), but it does not speak to national cultural
differences. When considering the cultural dimension of power distance, the propositions, as
well as the empirical results, may not hold for countries that have higher power distance as
compared to the United States. Power distance refers to the distribution of power and strength of
social hierarchy (Hofstede, 1984). In societies of low power distance, individuals attempt to
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distribute power more equally to minimize inequality, whereas in high power distance societies,
this is not the case, and individuals are more inclined to adapt to a hierarchy. Countries that have
low power distance include the United States and Australia, whereas countries with high power
distance include India and China. In high power distance cultures where leaders are expected to
be more autocratic and opposition to authority is less accepted, there may be different norms
with respect to leader blame and credit behaviors. It may be more appropriate (or less
inappropriate) for leaders to blame subordinates for failures and to take credit for successes
compared to leaders in low power distance cultures. Subordinates may not question such
behaviors or feel mistrust towards leaders who blame them because hierarchy generally goes
unquestioned.
In addition to the individualistic or collectivistic nature of an organization’s culture,
national cultural differences with respect to individualism and collectivism must also be
examined. In collectivistic national cultures, people are interdependent within their groups and
tend to be more concerned with relationships (e.g., Mills & Clark, 1982; Triandis, 1996). In
individualistic national cultures, however, people are more independent from their group and
prioritize their personal goals, and their social behaviors and interactions can be predicted by
social exchange (Triandis, 2001). Therefore, the degree to which a leader operates in a society
that is more individualistic or collectivistic may shape how a leader’s motives translate into
blame and credit behaviors, as well as which motives are more likely to drive their behavior. In a
more collectivistic nation, perhaps relationship building is a higher priority than in an
individualistic nation.
There is an interesting dynamic to explore with respect to the individualism or
collectivism of society and the high or low power distance of a nation’s culture. Researchers
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should study these differences in national culture, taking into account that there could be
different values associated with leader-follower relationships in different countries. These
societal elements may influence blame and credit dynamics with respect to the implicit beliefs
held about leaders, as well as attitudes towards relationship building between leaders and
followers. Leaders may hold vastly different implicit beliefs regarding ideal leadership in
countries that have collectivistic values and high power distance, as these societies operate
differently than in the United States, which has low power distance and more individualistic
norms (Hofstede, 1984). The relationships built between leaders and followers in countries
dissimilar from the United States on these dimensions may look different as well. For example, a
strong relationship between a leader and follower in China might be established not only through
social exchanges as a relationship might be in the United States, but also by other factors such as
kinship relations, shared birthplace, shared acquaintances, and even the exchange of gifts or
banquets (Nie & Lämsä, 2015). These factors are not as relevant in building Western
relationships. Different ILTs may also inform the ways in which leaders are trained to act, for
example, in press conferences. Leaders may receive training according to their society’s implicit
beliefs about ideal leaders, which are shaped by their national culture, to communicate blame and
credit in a normatively appropriate way, although they might occasionally be prone to deviate
from these normative behaviors when under stress (e.g., Coach Mark Rivera taking credit in
Study 1). Future research should examine national culture and ILTs alongside the media training
of leaders in response to crises.
The international growth of many companies may serve as an interesting backdrop to
further our understanding of leader blame and credit behaviors with respect to national cultural
differences. Leaders of globalized organizations will need (and likely already need) to navigate
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relationships and communicate with individuals who do not share their national culture.
Exploring the impact of power distance and individualism versus collectivism on motives and
their relationship with blame and credit behaviors will be important with the continued
globalization of the economy.
5.4 Final Note
The key contributions of this dissertation include (1) evolving our understanding of the
communication and variety of blame and credit in organizations, (2) establishing a theoretical
model delineating the motives driving leader blame and credit behaviors, and (3) providing
empirical evidence that speaks to the validity of the theoretical model. This is the first paper of
its kind to theorize, categorize, and empirically examine the motives behind blame and credit
behaviors of leaders. While Crant and Bateman (1993) and Gunia (2011) have provided
scientific analysis, the conversation regarding the possible spectrum of leader blame and credit
behaviors has rested primarily on unscientific explanation and anecdote, predominantly in the
popular business news media. Therefore, this dissertation breaks new ground for the blame and
credit literature by delivering both theory and empirical evidence.
Through the integration of four separate literatures, I establish a categorization of those
motives and present evidence that illustrates that leaders with disparate motives may act
differently in light of unsuccessful outcomes in particular. Specifically, the ego-defensive motive
appears to be a strong driver of blame behaviors toward others (i.e., blame-assignment), which
lay in contrast to the blame-taking behaviors linked to the implicit beliefs motive. The findings
from this dissertation also support the notion that a leader’s motive is more important than the
context they operate in, but that contextual factors still remain a possible means of shaping or
even reversing the links from the proposed motives to blame and credit behaviors. Contextual
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factors that are congruent with the nature of the leader’s motive may heighten the tendency for a
leader to enact certain types of behaviors. It will be important to continue developing research
and extending the theoretical model of motives driving blame and credit behaviors, their
connection to contextual factors, and key downstream consequences, in order to tease apart the
link between motives and behaviors and to uncover potential interventions that discourage or
reduce behaviors that are harmful to individuals and teams.
The findings in this dissertation reveal that there are unique, underexplored blame and
credit behaviors, that there are key theoretical drivers of blame and credit behaviors, and that
there are contextual factors that shape leader behaviors. While this paper looks primarily at
subordinate OCBs, blame and credit behaviors may be linked to other individual- and team-level
outcomes. By initiating a dialogue of the drivers of leader blame and credit behaviors, this paper
serves to stimulate future research on the consequences of blame and credit behaviors. In
examining these motives of leader behaviors, as well as the individual- and group-focused
contextual factors, we can better understand why there is variation across leader behaviors.
Investigating the drivers of these behaviors matters as we seek to discern their consequences as
well as how to improve managerial behaviors and team dynamics. In order to move towards a
more comprehensive understanding, future research must be conducted regarding leader blame
and credit behaviors given the salience, relevance, and importance of blame and credit in the
workplace. Through this dissertation work, I aim to inspire other researchers to explore this area
of research, so that we can work together to improve the ways leaders manage their subordinates
and the way teams operate.
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Appendix A
Boxplot Comparisons of Various Acknowledgments of Blame and Credit

Figure A1. Blame-assignment vs. Credit-assignment, Across All Coaches for 2015 Season.
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Figure A2. Blame-taking vs. Credit-taking, Across All Coaches for 2015 Season.
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Figure A3. Blame-sharing vs. Credit-sharing, Across All Coaches for 2015 Season.
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Figure A4. Blame-deflection vs. Credit-deflection, Across All Coaches for 2015 Season.
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Appendix B
Measures Used in Study 2
Items Adapted from Impression Motivation Scale (Jansen et al., 2012) and Additional
Items
In the following set of questions, please think about the extent to which each statement is true for
you, as a leader. Then select your response from the 7-point scale below, ranging from “strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree.” Additional items are designated with *.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

It is important to me to present myself positively in my job.
I am very motivated to present myself as optimally as possible in my job.
My ambition to present myself at my best is very high.
I want people at work to see me in a positive light.*
I want people at work to think that I am very good at my job.*
It is very important to me to be seen as a high performer.*

Items Adapted from Culturally Endorsed Implicit Leadership Theory of Outstanding
Leadership (Javidan et al., 2006)
For each word below, please rate how characteristic you believe this trait is of an effective
leader, from “not at all characteristic” to “extremely characteristic.” Reverse coded items are
designated with (R).
1. Charismatic
2. Team-oriented
3. Involves others in making decisions
4. Involves others in implementing decisions
5. Humane
6. Autonomous
7. Self-protective (R)
8. Inspirational
9. Motivational
10. Emphasizes team building
11. Emphasizes team purpose or goals
12. Allows others to offer opinions
13. Supportive
14. Considerate
15. Independent (R)
16. Individualistic (R)
17. Self-centered (R)
18. Face-saving (R)
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Items Adapted from LMX-MDM Scale (Liden & Maslyn, 1998) and Additional Items
Please think about the extent to which each statement is true for you. Then select your response
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Additional items are designated with *.
1. I would like my subordinates to respect my knowledge of and competence on the job.
2. I would like to defend my subordinates to others in the organization if they made an
honest mistake.
3. I would like to be the kind of person my subordinates would like to have as a friend.
4. I would like my subordinates to not mind working their hardest for me.
5. I would like to come to a subordinate’s defense if they were “attacked” by others.
6. I would like my subordinates to like me very much as a person.
7. I would like my subordinates to do work for me that goes beyond what is specified in
their job descriptions.
8. I would like my subordinates to admire my professional skills.
9. I would like to defend my subordinates’ work actions to a superior, even without
complete knowledge of the issue in question.
10. I would like to be a lot of fun for my subordinates to work with.
11. I would like my subordinates to be willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally
required, to meet my work goals.
12. I would like my subordinates to be impressed with my knowledge of my job.
13. I would like to strengthen my working relationship with subordinates.*
14. I would like to build positive working relationships with my subordinates.*
Items Measuring Leader’s Blame and Credit Behaviors
Instructions for leader participants: Please carefully read the following statements. Then, indicate
which one of the three statements most closely reflects your actual response in the situation you
were asked to imagine. (When asked about communication to a superior audience (i.e., the
leader’s own superiors), all instances of “you” or “yours” were replaced with “they” or “theirs.”)
Blame Items: (communicating to subordinate audience)
1. “You made a mistake.” // “We made a mistake.” // “I made a mistake.”
2. “The fault is yours.” // “The fault is ours.” // “The fault is mine.”
3. “You are responsible for this outcome.” // “We are responsible for this outcome.” // “I am
responsible for this outcome.”
Credit Items: (communicating to subordinate audience)
1. “You made this a success.” // “We made this a success.” // “I made this a success.”
2. “The win is yours.” // “The win is ours.” // “The win is mine.”
3. “You are responsible for this outcome.” // “We are responsible for this outcome.” // “I am
responsible for this outcome.”
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Appendix C
Distributions of Measures in Study 2

Figure C1. Distribution of Narcissism Measure.
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Figure C2. Distribution of Impression Motivation Measure.

Figure C3. Distribution of Effective Leader ILT Measure.
198

Figure C4. Distribution of LMX Motivation Measure.

Figure C5. Distribution of Organizational Culture Measure.
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Figure C6. Distribution of Subordinate OCBs Measure.
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Figure C7. Distribution of General Blame Behavior (Audience: Subordinates).

Figure C8. Distribution of General Blame Behavior (Audience: Superiors).
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Figure C9. Distribution of Situation-specific Blame Behavior (Audience: Subordinates).

Figure C10. Distribution of Situation-specific Blame Behavior (Audience: Superiors).
202

Figure C11. Distribution of General Credit Behavior (Audience: Subordinates).

Figure C12. Distribution of General Credit Behavior (Audience: Superiors).
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Figure C13. Distribution of Situation-specific Credit Behavior (Audience: Subordinates).

Figure C14. Distribution of Situation-specific Credit Behavior (Audience: Superiors).
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Appendix D
Tasks and Blame or Credit Responses Used in Studies 3 and 4
Moon Survival Task
In the following situation, your “life” and “death” depends upon how well you can prioritize
items for survival in a relatively unfamiliar environment. This problem is fictional, although the
ranking to which you will compare your results was done by a number of space experts.
The Situation
You are a member of a lunar exploration crew originally scheduled to rendezvous with a mother
ship on the lighted surface of the moon. Due to mechanical difficulties however, your ship was
forced to land at a spot some 320 kilometers (200 miles) from the rendezvous point. During the
re-entry and landing, much of the equipment aboard was damaged, and, since survival depends
on reaching the mother ship, the most critical items available must be chosen for the 320 km trip.
The Task
Below are listed the 15 items left intact and undamaged after landing. Your task is to rank these
items according to their importance in aiding you to reach the mother ship, starting with “1” the
more important, to “15” the least important. You should assume that you and your team
members are the only survivors, you have agreed to stick together, and all 15 items are in good
condition.
Items
-

Box of matches
Food concentrate
50 feet of nylon rope
Parachute silk
Portable heating unit
Two .45 caliber pistols
One case of dehydrated milk
Two 100 lb. tanks of oxygen
Stellar map
Self-inflating life raft
Magnetic compass
20 liters of water
Signal flares
First aid kit, including injection needle
Solar-powered FM receiver-transmitter
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Screenshot of Computer Program – Moon Survival Task (with partner)

Figure D1. Studies 3 and 4 – Interface of computer program (Moon Survival Task).
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Leaders’ Options in Communicating Blame
To Partner (Subordinate)
Your team performed “well below average”.
As team leader, you must communicate with your partner about the outcome achieved.
Choose one of the below messages to send to your partner.
Study 3:
You are to blame for this outcome
You are somewhat to blame for this outcome
We are equally to blame for this outcome
I am somewhat to blame for this outcome
I am to blame for this outcome
Study 4:
You are to blame for this outcome
You are somewhat to blame for this outcome
You are slightly to blame for this outcome
We are equally to blame for this outcome
I am slightly to blame for this outcome
I am somewhat to blame for this outcome
I am to blame for this outcome

To Lab Administrator (Superior)
Your answers to the below three questions will impact your Contribution Score.
As a reminder, your Contribution Score is based the lab administrator’s evaluation of the leader’s
contribution (your contribution) to your team’s performance on the Moon Survival Task.
The administrator of the lab study will see your responses to these questions.
1. To what extent are you, as the leader, or your partner to blame for your team’s
performance?
a) My partner is entirely to blame
b) My partner is somewhat to blame
c) My partner is slightly to blame*
d) My partner and I are both to blame
e) I am slightly to blame*
f) I am somewhat to blame
g) I am entirely to blame
2. To what extent do you, as the leader, take responsibility for your team’s performance?
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Study 3:
a) I take none of the responsibility
b) I take very little of the responsibility
c) I take some of the responsibility
d) I take a considerable amount of the responsibility
e) I take all of the responsibility
Study 4:
a) I take none of the responsibility
b) I take a very small amount of the responsibility
c) I take a small amount of the responsibility
d) I take a moderate amount of the responsibility
e) I take a large amount of the responsibility
f) I take a very large amount of the responsibility
g) I take all of the responsibility
3. As the leader, to what extent do you agree that your team’s performance was your fault?
a) Strongly disagree
b) Disagree*
c) Somewhat disagree
d) Neither agree nor disagree
e) Somewhat agree
f) Agree*
g) Strongly agree
Note: Items labeled with * or “Study 4” were included in Study 4 but not included in Study 3.
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